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1 “The Origin of Two Maritime City-States”
The world is an ever changing place that has witnessed the rise and fall of a multitude of
vast empires, the formation and break-up of alliances, and the invention of institutions and
specializations that people have endeavored to create. Most of history focuses on the bigger
picture, the so called “Big Players” or superpowers that are thought to control and be the main
avenue for change. Past historians have concentrated on national histories, which in turn have
dominated the narrative. However, this will never add up to be a complete history as small
nations or cities have proven to play pivotal roles in historical events. These important moments
in history are where the City-State, or ancient Polis, come into play as serious political, military,
and commercial actors. The question is, not that of national histories, but instead a manner of
scale and understanding the fact that national boundaries were not distinct and were fairly
permeable which helps explain the massive cultural contacts that occur within this region of the
world. This thesis will examine medieval and early modern city-states in the Mediterranean as
illustrative of political, commercial and military responses to threats and opportunities in the premodern period instead of focusing on larger states and empires that seemingly dominate the
Mediterranean world. When discussing state powers such as Venice, it is not enough to simply
enough to acknowledge how they conduct wars, but the manner in which city-states are able to
successfully negotiate with larger states and its ability to establish multi-layered relationships.
This relationship creates an air of complexity that could see a city like Venice, go to war with the
Ottoman Empire for example, and yet still conduct regular trade and commercial expeditions
with them in Istanbul, so as not to allow political disturbances to ruin the overall trade economy.
In order for a city-state to survive, that city must have shrew negotiation skills, skills that can
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create creative outcomes such as this, when the alternative, all-out war, is extremely risky and
could end in the military domination of the capital city.
In order to accomplish this goal, this thesis will attempt to identify and understand the
institutions in which city-states, such as Venice and Genoa-- seemingly fragile and weak-employ to counter significant internal and external threats in the form of rivalries with other citystates, the environment in relation to disease and commercial risk within the Mediterranean Sea,
and finally, larger states or empires whose presence simply and utterly dwarf that of the
respective city-state, both politically and militarily. The dynamics and institutions that comprise
states are imperative in understanding how a specific state will act in a situation that they deem
to be threatening. According to Hui, who wrote War and State Formation in Ancient China and
Early Modern Europe, states whose rulers “wish to maintain survival, recover losses, or establish
hegemony would have to strive to increase their military and economic capabilities” by not only
creating “larger armies, but also [establishing] a range of administrative, fiscal, and policing
organizations.”1 In order to view this process and understand the mechanisms used and employed
by city-states, this thesis will focus mainly on Venice as our chief example and will, on occasion,
branch out to other city-states in the region for comparative purposes. The time period that this
paper will deal with will roughly cover between 1100 AD and 1600 AD. In addition to this, it is
important also to take into consideration the mechanisms that enabled city-states to survive,
which this paper will accomplish by examining not only the city-states that endured and
prospered, but also those that failed establish themselves and which were ultimately conquered
by a neighboring forces or states.
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This thesis will also stand as a comparative study of two main city-states, Venice and
Genoa. In addition to this, other city-states will be discussed in varying lengths in order to
achieve a broader and more accurate understanding of their responses and reactions to threats.
This will in part occur naturally with the application of the “survivor bias theory,” which takes
into account (for the purposes of this thesis) those city-states that survived in addition to those
that failed to establish themselves and lost power. Most historians, according to John Gaddis,
“trace process from a knowledge of outcomes” whereas political scientists use “process tracking”
“which suggests a rediscovery of narrative, and the technique does employ narratives in
constructing comparative case studies.”2 One primary goal of this thesis is to accomplish both
tasks that historians and political scientists employ in an attempt to discover other key significant
players within the Mediterranean region while at the same time analyzing their institutions which
have allowed these states to react and respond to events. One of the goals of this examination is
to identify those traits which help city-states and potentially more importantly, those
characteristics that caused it fail. This comparative study will help determine the nature of citystates in the terms of what sorts of areas these entities tend to form in and the conditions that
contextualize their rise to power. In addition, this will help identify each city-states distinct
culture as well as how their foundings have influenced the institutions and mechanisms that their
citizenry create.
One might ask: Why is it important to study city-states? Or perhaps what possible benefit
can one receive from studying a city-state that they can’t receive from studying a larger country
in the same context? In short, it’s important to study city-states as they have either been key
players or influential partners in many historical events that allowed for larger countries or
2
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alliances to be able to accomplish their feats in addition to that of carrying out the interests of
the city-state itself. Part of a city-states power comes from its geographical location and their
ability to assist themselves as well as other states. According to Giovanni Botero, a
contemporary historian who has done considerable research on cities regarding their institutions
and functionality, considers “a site convenient if it is so situated that many peoples need it for
trade, either exporting the goods of which they have a surplus, or importing those that they
lack.”3 This is the case because most contemporary historians of the time focused on the
significance of cities, despite the ever growing power of the nation-state monarchies. Both
Genoa and Venice are great cities “because they both mediate between extremes; they are not
just transit-points, but warehouses and stores…it is not enough; therefore, for the site to be
necessary, in order to render a city great; besides that, it must be useful to the neighboring
peoples as well.”4 Furthermore, and additional example of this can be seen during the crusades
where Europe sent vast armies to conquer land in Palestine. City-states in Italy became key to
this operation as a means for troops to travel across the Mediterranean as city-states such as
Venice, which had vast fleets, was able to allocate the city’s resources in order for them to be
able to pump out ships at a rate no country in Europe had the ability to even come close to. Due
to this, one could argue that Italian city-states dominated the Mediterranean during this time. The
crusades were an essential component to the rise of Italian city-states and will be discussed in
depth later on in this paper.
An ancient example could be viewed when ancient Greek Polis united under the Delian
League and the leadership of Athens in order to combat the Persian Empire that was attempting
3
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to invade and conquer Greece. These accomplishments would be impressive for that of a country
to manage, and seems nearly impossible for a single city to accomplish. This is discussed heavily
in Faruk Tabak’s Waning of the Mediterranean, in which he describes “a pulsating unit that,
despite some regional variation caused by the arrival of new crops or proximity/distance to other
markets (such as the Atlantic), responded with great uniformity to the dominant rhythms of
‘temporalities’ and socioeconomic process” along with incorporating “a half centur[ies]” worth
in “research on agriculture, manufacturing, money, and land use, especially from Turkishlanguage sources.”5 This brings us to Tabak’s larger concept of a Geohistorical approach that
rejects the classic “Clash of Civilizations” theory which splits the Mediterranean into the East
and West, Christians and Muslims. One possible explanation for these instances of immense
achievement within city-states could be that they have an innate ability to concentrate their
power on a single goal or task that larger countries lack the efficiency and capacity to
accomplish. To reiterate a previous example, many coastal Italian city-states focused mostly on
navies and building large fleets chiefly for commercial gains and power. During the times of the
crusades, Genoa has able to refocus all of her efforts into making ships in order to carry troops
and supplies over to the Levant, which it did so by allowing its government to temporarily
assume control in order to organize the building project. It was said that “the citizens of Genoa
decided that the time had come to bury their differences and to unite in a compagna under the
direction of six consuls; the aim of the compagna was primarily to build and arm ships for the
crusade” between the years 1083 through 1096.6 This shows the ability of a city-state to fully
take control of their economy in order to accomplish a single great task that other larger
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countries would have difficulty organizing. Another side effect of this specific example is that
citizens of city-states like Genoa or Venice would become expert sailors that states and other
cities would seek out in order to conduct business.

i.
City-State as Polity
Before going into the immediate historical context that will surround this thesis, it
is important to actually understand what a city-state is in comparison to that of a nation or
empire. Mogens Herman Hansen has done a tremendous amount of research on identifying what
a city-state’s (Polis) characteristics are that distinctly separate them from actual states. In A
Comparative Study of Thirty City-State Cultures, The shotgun method: the demography of the
ancient Greek city-state culture, and An Inventory of Archaic and Classical Poleis, Mogens
explores the wide depth and breadth of characteristics and traits that most city-states tend to
possess.7
To begin with let’s start out my explaining the differences between states and city-states
according to Hansen. He acknowledges that a city state must not only have a “nucleated centre”
but must also have these five characteristics that he refers to as stadtgemeinde.8 Stadtgemeinde is
the German word for borough, township or urban center which Hansen likes to use in his
research. These five characteristics that city-states must possess to be classified as a city-state are
(1) a defense circuit, (2) a market, (3) laws and law courts, (4) political decision-making body,
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and (5) at least partial autonomy.”9 These characteristics are very broad and one might find it
more helpful to determine those characteristics of a state which Hansen seems to have a more
specialized criteria for. A “territorial state,” as Hansen refers to these entities, although dislikes
the term, is:
“Is characterized by specialized and hierarchically organized decision-making institutions and
administrative organs which have monopolized the legitimate use of physical force. Thus a state
is a centralized legitimate government in procession of the sole right to enforce a given legal
order within a territory over a population.”10

Some historians feel as if this definition is insufficient and lacking a criteria that establishes a
public power over both ruler and ruled.11 However, this may not be appropriate to apply during
this time as public powers over both ruler and ruled appear to have a more modern day
distinction over the responsibilities of the state over the individual or general public where
people have some power to elect officials and check the government’s role. Although some citystates and states may have had institutions such as this, it might be unfair and counter-productive
to require the application of this criteria over a territorial state.
Many historians refer to states as “territorial states;” however, this causes a significant
problem as far as classifications go. Hansen would argue that a city-state is a “territorial state just
as much as any macro-state with multiple urban centers” and that “It has a small territory (mostly
the immediate hinterland) but nevertheless a territory with, usually, well-defined borders.”12
Focusing on definitions and characteristics such as size and territory are unhelpful. It is better to
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acknowledge and identify the concentration of political organization “surrounded by either a city
or many urban centers.”13 City-states vary in size and territory over the course of their history. A
city-state can even aspire to and become an “empire” but is still considered a city-state, not
because of its territory, but due to the inability of the political institutions to fully assimilate the
cultural and social aspects of a neighboring territory and incorporate it into its own. When citystates do expand and increase in size and territory, the usual result is that of a capital region that
has few or many “dependent” regions, which is why some city-states are awarded the name of
empire.
This next section will examine the regions and dynamics that tend to allow city-states to
take root. This will tie into how city-states tend to form, the culture they develop, and the
relations these geo-political entities have with their neighbors. A city-state usually forms within a
region where the people that inhabit it all share a common language and cultural history.
However, if one were to look at this region in a broader context, Hansen notes that for centuries,
this area will deal with long periods of political divides which dissolve into smaller communities
that share a common idea.14 These smaller communities are what create city-states. These
communities tend to form out of a need for protection, but can occur for a variety of different
reasons. Hansen explains a few of these occurrences and acknowledges that city-states most
commonly form from a period of decline where a larger macro-state that disintegrate into a
number of independent cities.15 However, city-states can also form from colonization, a period of
demographic and economic upsurge that takes place at the same time as this city’s state
13
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formation and urbanization occur.16 In addition, this period of colonization can either occur in a
location where no state has existed prior, or where a state once existed but has lost significant
political and military sway over the region, thus allowing smaller groups within a macro-state to
break away and form small independent, or semi-autonomous states.
Although the formation of city-states can vary, one aspect, however, tends to be a
constant throughout history and geographical region. Most areas that have one city-state tend to
have many more either already in the region, or will see many additional ones founded.17 This is
the case for two reasons. First being that once a city-state has been formed, this area is then
established as a decent location for smaller independent or semi-autonomous states to form.
Again, this can either be from a break-up of an empire or macro-state, or could occur from
colonization of a newly discovered region. The second reason for multiple city-states to form is
that this occurrence will dictate how long these cities will survive. This is the case because citystates are dependent on one another for protection, finances, and quite often food from trade,
whether or not these city-states understand this fact or not. One might grow confused and ask,
“Why did city-states fight amongst themselves if they are dependent on one another for
survival?” An easy answer to this question could be that the leaders of city-states were short
sighted in their mindset when thinking about how to deal with major threats such as empires.
However this is not to say that city-states are incapable of working together; in fact, this is
essential to their survival within their geopolitical regions.

16
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Most alliances made between city-states were temporary at best. Within clusters of citystates, these cities communicate over land, sea, or a mixture of the two.18 If a region is not
efficient or convenient for city-states to communicate within a larger cluster, then these citystates will become isolated and extremely vulnerable to foreign influences or invasions as a lack
of efficient relations between these political entities means that these states will most likely be
weak economically and militarily due to being forced to rely on themselves entirely or close to it.
However, some regions that have split into clusters of city-states have done so on multiple
occasions.19 This means that just because a region has now become occupied by a macro-state,
does not mean that this area cannot disintegrate into city-state clusters again. Later on in this
chapter, there will be an example of a city-state that suffered from a poor geopolitical region and
were then conquered due to lack of efficient resistance to foreign influence.
Despite certain common characteristics between city-states, most vary considerably in
relation to size, both geographically and demographically. This is partly the case, as Hansen
points out, because no city-state is powerful enough to permanently conquer a region and
transform it into a cohesive political unit in line with the “capital” city.20 This is an additional
characteristic that city-states tend to share and can therefore be helpful in identifying the
difference between a city-state and a macro-state. An attempt to create a larger political unit that
encompasses multiple major cities tend to fail when dealing with these. City-states, in this case,
tend to get “swallowed up” by larger neighboring states or end up in a breakdown of the alliance
as these agreements favor the stronger city-states, leaving the weaker ones to contend with more
18
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problems.21 This becomes apparent during the 16th century in Europe as city-states in Italy face
grave threats from Empires and larger states as more and more cities in the North and South of
Italy become subservient to these greater authorities.
Depending on the manner in which a city-state was founded, will have significant bearing
on the institutions and culture the political entity adopts. Hansen has divided this into three
separate political cultures: hegemonic, independent, and dependent.22 Depending on which
political culture each city-state has will determine how much political freedom that city will
bestow upon its citizenry. That being said, city-states all vary according to how strict their laws
are and their distinctions between what they consider to be a citizen and an “outsider.”23
Now that some time has been spent on discussing how city-states are formed and varying
characteristics that some might employ, this next section will cover some common
characteristics that Hansen has acknowledged most if not all obtain. City-states have been in
existence since about 5000 B.C. and were first found in Mesopotamia, and then began to spread
throughout India, China, Egypt, and the Americas.24 With each passing military conquest, these
cities tend to fluctuate, either increasing or decreasing in size and population. As far as size and
territory are concerned, this will vary from region to region, and city to city. Typically, however,
most city states start quite small in regards to population and land are concerned and then begin
to grow as they survive through history. Hansen has struggled with setting exact parameters for a
city-state in comparison to a macro-state as they can be considered both large and small.
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However, the typical city-state will have a main city, with a developed political urban center
which is surrounded by territory in the immediate vicinity that the city can control.25 Many citystates do expand territorially and can encompass additional regions with small towns that can be
assimilated into the capital region; however, this can be quite limited as city-states tend to
borders of other city-states and thus create conflicts over control of the land. As far as population
is concerned, as previously stated city-states tend to be smaller usually in the 4 to 5 digit range,
although some do grow and incorporate over 100,000 residents within a single city, even though
not all of these people will be considered citizens.26 A city-state has a distinctive political and
ethnic identity that can be shared across a region with other city-states as well as tend to refer to
their respective ethnicity according to the name of their city.27 However, this does not serve as a
unifying force for these city-states as most tend to be centered on an idea that puts their city-state
first and foremost ahead of other cultures, which includes other city-states. A city-state’s
political identity can differ from this ethnic identity as it is formed and based off the
urban/political center decided upon by the city’s citizens. A city-states urban center will reveal
much about the identity and values of the citizens which live within the city and can help explain
their decisions when dealing threats or other governing duties. Just because city-states are in the
same region, does not necessarily mean they share a similar ethnic or political identity. Citizens
within a city-state tend to change their form of government as the times and situation of their city
demands. However, a city-states ethnic identity is not something that can so easily be changed, if
at all. People can migrate from place to place; however, the ethnic identity of a city-state is
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difficult to drastically change due to very stringent citizenship laws that many Italian
Renaissance city-states obtained at the time. This is not by any means a new or relatively new
phenomenon of dealing with citizenship and ethnic identity.
A city-state differs greatly from a macro-state in respect to the size and location of the
majority of the population. In a city state, the population of urban centers tend to be far higher in
number than that of populations existing in macro-state city-centers.28 The sheer size of
population could be an explanation as to how an individual city can be so efficient and capable
of preforming difficult tasks. Most people in city-states tend to live either in the urban center, or
along the countryside in small villages. Hansen remarks that all city-states have a single urban
center which serves as a central place for the community’s economic, religious, military, and
political power or authority.29 A city-states government is centered and run from the urban center
and tend to remain within that city, even if they conquer other territories or cities. Hansen
stressed that multi-centered governmental city-states are extremely rare.30 This urban center will
serve as the sole place of political authority, even if a city-state manages to conquer additional
regions or cities. In order to be considered a city-state by any standard, there must be at least “a
self-governing polity” within the urban center, although this system does not have to be fully
independent.31 These polities usually have some form of a legislature, administration, and
judicial unit. These institutions will possess the legal authority over internal matters of the
“state,” or at least a government with the ability to enforce laws. In order to be thought of as a
28
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city-state, the urban center must have some form of defensive capability. This can be
demonstrated by possessing an army and having a fortified location.32 Each city-state also must
have an efficient and subsistence economy.33 What this means is that each city must have some
form of farming in which to feed its citizens, along with specialization of functions within
society, such as merchants, along with division of labor, thus ensuring a cites capability to
function. The last main characteristic of city-states is that they are not self-sufficient.34 Citystates usually are characterized by its lack of economic self-sufficiency usually due to the small
area in which the urban center is located. This will also lead a city-state to interact with its
neighbors and will enter into large amounts of trade and commerce in order to make up for this
self-sufficiency problem.
Relations between city-states vary but it is important for these cities to establish and
maintain diplomatic relations as discussed earlier. However, city-states will inevitably go to war
with each other. Hansen describes this phenomenon as “endemic,” but acknowledges that despite
ongoing military conflicts, city-states will still attempt to continue and maintain economic,
religious, and cultural interactions as this is vital to their overall survival.35 Although wars may
occur quite frequently, city-states do tend to seek peaceful relations with city-state neighbors, or
least those neighbors who are not direct rivals. During times of peace, city-states will establish
diplomatic relations with one-another by entering into an alliance, formation of a league (often
hegemonic with one dominant city-state leading the league), trade agreement, or just maintaining
32
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standard diplomatic relations in order to attempt some moments of peace.36 After establishing
diplomatic relations, city-states can begin to expand, not necessarily territorially, but culturally
and economically through commerce. This expansion, either through commerce or military is the
ultimate goal of the city-state as they are attempting to increase the reach and power of not only
the city-state, but the notable families that run them. This is especially prevalent within the
Mediterranean context. A city-state will cease to exist if their urban/political center is destroyed
or by conquest of a stronger state.37
Cities were initially created in order to maintain security during invasion.38 People feared
attack and dangers in countryside from nomadic raiders so this was an understandable alternative
as city walls provide protection from invaders and raiders. Once security was under control,
these cities began to expand their power and influence. In the end, “the development of imperial
cities with control over large areas allowed for rapid growth of trade in all areas of early urban
growth, from China to Egypt, Mesopotamia, and eventually the Americas.39 This development
will later provide the vary foundation in which Italian city-states follow in order to survive in the
Mediterranean Sea. With this, came population increase, commercial advancement as trade
continued to expand throughout Italy, and transformed what is today modern Italy into a vibrant
region teeming with life and potential.40 This is the location that strong city-states will form as
the region had a significant economic and political recovery period despite the collapse of the
Roman Empire and waning of the Byzantine Empire.
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ii.
City-States in the Mediterranean Sea
This in the end provides a broad, but basic description of what we can refer to as a citystate throughout the rest of this thesis, which is how this paper will create a broader connection
to city-states in general, even though this thesis will focus only on a handful of city-states in the
Mediterranean. However, before examining these specific city-states, one must first establish an
historical context in order to explain and critique a city-state’s development. David Abulafia’s
The Great Sea and Faruk Tabak’s The Waning of the Mediterranean both offer deeper insight
and context into the events that transpired within the Mediterranean for a vast majority of its
contact with people starting from as early as 22000 B.C. leading up to modern day times. David
Abulafia offer his own history separating his timeline into several sections in which to analyze
and contextualize events. Faruk Tabak presents a history of the Mediterranean, but one that is
propelled through finance, and economic prosperity. In other words, his books focuses on how
economic practices shaped both political and military ventures along with their outcomes.
Another aspect of importance that Tabak offers is some insight on how the plague decimated
certain areas and the effects that had on society. At an economical level, Tabak argues that due to
the Black Death, there was less need for food due to fewer people being left alive at that time.41
This could provide both positive benefits in form of other crops for trade, but could also prove
negative as a cut in food production could negatively affect ones trade output if that city or state
is trading in food stuffs.
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By 600 AD, the Mediterranean had become a fractured region with little to no unity
remaining. Before the collapse of the Roman Empire, Rome had divided herself into two
Empires, a West and an East. The Eastern Empire “far surpassed the second, both in superiority
of civilization and in much higher level of economic development.”42 This in part is due to the
lack of significant and major cities left within the Western Roman Empire before its collapse.
Therefore, once Rome fell, the region will undoubtedly be in an economic state of desolation.
However, the Mediterranean still maintained an internal trade network. One could see this from
the Byzantine Empire as they still had a thriving economy at this time that spanned, arguably, the
length of the Mediterranean at some points. The Byzantine Empire at this time still had
considerable power and reach, but was significantly diminished from its former glory.43 In the
early 600’s, a new threat began to rise in the east, which threatened Byzantine holdings in North
Africa, Egypt in particular. This came to be due to the unification of Muslim tribes under the
banner of Islam, which saw many caliphs unite.44 This unification gave some tribes power
enough to seize control of Jerusalem, parts of Syria, and Egypt, which caused the Byzantines a
chief grain supplier. However this strong resistance to Byzantine authority quickly began to
deteriorate. These tribes were mostly united under Islam but quickly reverted back to their
original tribes who began squabbling amongst themselves.45 This further provided chaos in the
Mediterranean and officially marked the beginning of Arab and Muslim navies in the sea.46
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Piracy had been mostly controlled in the Mediterranean until the introduction of these navies
which further weakened the strained trade networks of a weakened Byzantine Empire who no
longer could protect its neighbors from this threat.
The Mediterranean Sea turned into a battleground between Christian fleets under
Frankish and Byzantine banners against Muslim fleets. However, Frankish and Byzantine
interests quickly came to a head over land possessions in Europe.47 Charlemagne, the leader of
the Franks, had gained a considerable amount of power which threatened Byzantine interests
ensuring that the Muslims fleets saw no strong resistance. However, Charlemagne did make
some effort and sought to establish or improve settlements along the coast of his empire or near
his empire that could build ships. One of these settlements included Genoa. The site where
Genoa is located had been in use since the 5th or 6th century B.C. but saw varied amounts of
prosperity. However, Genoa became an important location again as the want for more ships
became a need for many states and empires in the Mediterranean. In 827, the Franks responded
to Muslim pirates with very ambitious naval assaults all along the North Coast of Africa.48
Although the Franks won almost every battle during this campaign, Charlemagne’s successor,
Louis the Pious knew it would be impossible to keep any of the newly acquired cities and had to
abandon them. In addition, due to internal rivalries and border disputes with the Byzantines,
Louis’s attention had been taken away from pirates altogether after these events. These border
disputes were due to conflicts in the Adriatic, which held many important trade routes along the
sea. Cassiodorus wrote that “the early inhabitants of these marshlands lived ‘like water birds,
now on sea, now on land’ and their wealth consisted only of fish and salt, though he had to admit
47
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that salt was in no sense more precious than gold: everyone needs salt but there must be people
who feel no need for gold.’”49 When war breaks out in this area between these two powers, the
cities that inhabit the region are forced to pick sides. Some end up swallowed by these Empires
but some, like the people in the lagoon, were able to survive, gaining wealth from this conflict
but remaining somewhat independent. One city-state had its roots established within this conflict
as the neighboring villages sought collective defense within the Lagoons.50 This land was
formally controlled by the Byzantines but left them mostly independent in return for a tribute and
collective defense against Slav barbarian invasions and pirates. Once these villages and towns
gathered, they established a settlement on the water, and named it Venice around the year 812.
These people were expert watermen with ties to significant land holdings in which to grow
food.51 The lagoon also provided protection for its inhabitants. This concept of the benefits
provided by the lagoon is further supported by Denis Crouze-Pavan, writer of Venice
Triumphant, who states that “the lagoons were already more than a mere shelter” and became
“dotted with edifices and crosses” of a thickly populated city showing an area that has become
heavily populated due to its variety of benefits.52 Many merchant families found significant trade
in this location and accumulated wealth from salt, fish, and timber in addition to luxury items
from East to West trade like silks, jewels, gold artifacts, saints, and relics.53 Abulafia asserted
that “Now that Marseilles was in decline, Venice had become the main port through which
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contact with the Eastern Mediterranean was maintained—commercial, diplomatic,
ecclesiastical.”54 In other words, within a relatively short period of time, Venice became a very
important location within the Mediterranean. This turned into a center for pilgrim traffic and
became a patriarchal seat of Christianity due to that traffic. The prominent families of Venice,
with their new found power and wealth established the Doge, part of the government that has the
most power within the Venetian government, and kept a tight hold on it.55
Despite the Mediterranean suffering from both Muslim and Christen fleets battling it out,
a third religious group found opportunity. The Genizah Jewish traders flourished during this time
monopolizing trade wherever they could locate it.56 They were especially well known for trade in
silks, and traders like them became known for their ships as one of the only means of crossing
the Mediterranean at the time. This helped to change the face of the Mediterranean Sea thereby
once again establishing Alexandria as a powerhouse within the Fatimid Empire and helping
Southern Italian city-states prosper. Some city-states like Amalfi were located here and thrived
from this new trade. At the same time, German influence under Otto I began to fade which saw
the rise of Pisa and Genoa as independent authorities.57 This marked the time where city-states,
in the words of Faruk Tabak, “had dominion over the inner sea.”58
This thesis will primarily cover the institutions and events that transpired for Genoa and
Venice; however, it is important first to look at a variety of different cultures, states, and
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civilizations that also occupy the same space as these two city-states. In the next chapter, the
institutions of Venice and Genoa will be discussed in great detail, although again, it is vital to
have a basic understanding of many of the events that caused cities like Venice to choose to
create and establish a particular institution.
Genoa is located in the Ligurian Alps, which provides protection for Genoa from land
based attacks. However, these mountains also cut Genoa off from any decent land with which to
grow food. However, despite lacking a plethora of land, Genoa still managed to export wine,
chestnuts, olive oil, and herbs which connected Genoa to a rather ambitious trade network.59
Genoa was not a center for industry, except for the fact that ship-building was very active here,
especially during the time of the crusades.
Pisa, in comparison, is located aside the river Arno, many miles from the sea due to the
fact that the land around where the river connected to the sea was very marshy and prevented
Pisans from establishing a sufficient port. Pisa’s assets including excellent land, which allowed
them to trade in grains, livestock, leather, wool, meat, and dairy products.60 These trade networks
allowed these city-states to improve their financial institutions which saw the rise of significant
merchant and banking class. In addition, Tabak notes that fanning the flames of rivalry between
city-states and notable families allowed merchants to capitalize on the financial and commercial
opportunities which eventually, a few hundred years later, will result in fierce fighting
cumulating in the Italian hundred years war which ended with the Peace of Lodi in 1454.61

59

Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA,
2011 pg. 271
60
Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA,
2011 pg. 271-272.
61
Tabak, Faruk. The waning of the Mediterranean, 1550-1870: A Geohistorical Approach. Baltimore,
Md. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2008 pg. 41
21

In 1060, Genoese and Pisan fleets began concentrating on eliminating Muslim pirate
raiders by attacking Sardinia and Sicily.62 This resulted in both city-states earning the title as
defenders of Christianity along with providing a substantial increase in security for this part of
the Mediterranean. At this same time, these city-states began establishing the first communes
seen in Italy along with creating a trade network focused around Genoa, Pisa, and Venice. These
were established and able to be created due to the fact that impressive developments in business
and record-keeping had been achieved along with their ideal position for trade exponentially
increased the power of these city-states wealth, which allowed them to expand their traditional
trade territory.63 A few decades earlier in 992, Venice saw a considerable gain in power thanks to
their actions in the aid and service of the Byzantine Empire where Venice received a grant of
trading rights for which to boost its economy.64 The Byzantine Empire acts as a sort of Patron
State that helps and nurtures Venice during its beginnings. Pisa and Genoa both had to rely on
themselves when dealing with threats at this time but Venice had the Byzantine Empire which
was sort of allied with Venice. Normally this could be extremely dangerous for a city-state;
however, the Byzantines chose to allow Venice to remain as it was as this provided the
Byzantine Empire with more substantial benefits.
In the later 1060’s, Robert Guiscard and Roger de Hauteville, both Norman knights,
attacked and conquered much of Southern Italy, which at that time had a substantial cluster of
city-states that had appeared to be flourishing economically from trade. 65 This occurred in this
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region because the city-states that inhabited the lands in Southern Italy suffered from
geographical bad luck. The terrain was very mountainous and made traveling from city to city
difficult which hampered any diplomatic progress of unity amongst these city-states. Therefore
when the Normans arrived to invade Southern Italy, instead of seeing a united South, they
witnessed multiple individual city-states who would not lift a finger to help one another.
The Normans conquered land at the expense of the Byzantine Empire who was also, at
this time, facing a breakdown in cooperation between the Pope and the Greek Orthodox Church
thus weakening the Byzantine position within the Mediterranean Sea. The Byzantines, who were
currently busy with factional fighting and attacks by the Slavs to the north, turned to Venice to
solve this Norman problem in the form of ships and fleets to help stop the Norman advance.
Venice provided naval assistance in 1082 against Guiscard’s fleet off the coast of Dyrrhacion
which allowed the Byzantines to retake the city.66 The Byzantine Empire was very happy and
grateful for the assistance and showered Venice in gifts. Emperor Alexis sent a golden bull to
Venice while emphasizing that they were his “duli” or subjects(even though they were
independent), which the Venetians took pride in their status as imperial subjects as they saw
themselves as the inheritors of the Roman Empire who were helping the sister empire to Rome.67
These girts sent with the Golden Bull included a right to trade anywhere in the Byzantine Empire
except the Black sea and Cyprus without any taxation and granted to Venice bits and pieces of
land along the Golden Horn.68 The consequences of this was that Venice was now able to
establish a trade network throughout the Byzantine Empire, which would still exist after that
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Empire is gone. In addition, this golden bull helped establish a gold standard which city-states
looked to when establishing treaties for the future.
In 1095, Pope Urban II “set in motion a movement that would transform the political,
religious, and economic map of the Mediterranean and Europe.”69 This movement is referred to
as the Crusades, and ensued due to Byzantine appeals oppression of Christians in the East, the
defeat of Christian armies by Turks, and that fact that Jerusalem had been lost to “infidel” hands.
The crusades saw the movement of massive armies traveling across Europe in an effort to
reclaim the “holy land.” City-states monopolized on this as they provided the ships that many an
army will utilize in order to reach this distant lands. The Genoese elite believed that their city
was destined to play a dominant role in the crusades and therefore did everything they could to
help these initial crusades.70 In return, they were rewarded with a Church in Antioch, along 30
houses, a warehouse, and a well which created the nucleolus for a merchant colony in the Middle
East.71 Genoa became the first of many as Italian city-states to begin setting up colonies such as
this. They then began to appear all over the Levant in such cities as Jerusalem, Acre, Tyre and
Jaffa. Acre eventually served as the main port for which Italian merchants did business within
the Mediterranean.72 Pisa, after helping seize Jaffa in 1099, was allowed to set up a trading base
there.73 Venice was perhaps the slowest city-state to voluntarily participate in the crusades.
Historians disagree, but many attribute Venice’s slow advance into the crusades as due to
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construction projects within the city-state. At this time, Venice was building and expanding the
city rapidly. This is also the time when Venice begins and finishes construction of the Church of
San Niccolo which sits on the Venetian Lido.74 Once Venice began to participate in the crusades,
their main role was to help via sea, in the form of transporting troops and supplies along with
establishing and maintaining naval blockades. Italian sailors from city-states were some of the
best watermen around at this time, which is why it is no surprise that many countries will rely on
any number of city-states to accomplish naval feats on behalf of their states or empires. Usually,
city-states preferred times of peace with which they can establish trade; however, Abulafia points
out that “trade obviously flourished in times of peace, but in war too there were excellent
business opportunities: the seizure of booty and of slaves, the provision of armaments, and pirate
raids against enemy shipping” to name a few.75
Venice’s participation in the crusades yielded some negative effects. This soured
relations with the Byzantine Empire who were angry with the crusaders over not relinquishing
land back to the Byzantine Empire. Venice’s participation frustrated them as well as their
growing economic position within the Mediterranean. In response, John II, son of Alexios
Komnenos, refused to renew the Golden Bull (1082, trade rights) bestowed upon the Venetians
for service to the Empire.76 With this, the Venetians turned elsewhere. Within a few years, a
burst of crusader energy came from within Venice allowing the city to accomplish more feats in
the Levant. Abulafia asserted that this rise in popular sentiment “enabled the Venetians to
blockade Tyre, which was still in Muslim hands but fell the next year. Here the Venetians
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established themselves in a highly privileged position, acquiring not merely one-third of the
town, but estates outside it, and the right to a church, a square, an oven, and a street in every
town they helped capture in the future.”77 Two facts were evident at this point, the first being that
Muslim navies could no longer combat Italian shipping supremacy, and the second was that the
Byzantines needed the Venetians and could not afford to lose yet another ally. Therefore in 1126,
the Byzantines reconfirmed the Venetians Golden Bull. In addition, with the hopes of containing
the Venetians, Emperor Manuel I Komnenos established “an enclosed area next to the Golden
Horn, taking away land from Germans and French merchants, so as to create a Venetian quarter
and control the Venetian traders more easily.”78
Amalfi, a city-state in Southern Italy, is at this time beginning to fail. As of 1130, Amalfi
had stopped the Norman Invasion, unlike many other city-states within the southern cluster.
Amalfi had been close with the Byzantines; however, they were replaced by the Venetians who
were able to provide far more for the Byzantines. In 1127 while looking for new allies, Amalfi
and Pisa entered into a treaty of friendship.79 Pisa at this time had just joined the war with the
Germans against the Norman invaders from the south. The Normans, who had been blockading
the Amalfians allowed there ships to leave port if they attacked Pisan vessels. Amalfi agreed, but
while away, a fleet of Pisan ships attacked and sacked the city in 1135, losing a substantial
amount of their wealth.80 Amalfi had been known for basic goods such as wine and oil but now
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could no longer support itself due to a lack of resources. They could no longer resist foreign
influence and passed between Pisan and Norman control.
Needing new sources of wealth, Pisan and Venetian merchants begin to turn their
attention to Northern Africa, specifically Egypt, with the hopes of finding new trade. The
Genizah Jewish merchants who had dominated this area had recently lost influence under the
Fatimads which the Italians hoped to secure. Genoa soon followed suite and acquired “a
fonduk—a warehouse and headquarters—in Tunis, Bougie, Mahdia, and other cities along the
coast of Africa.”81 Italian merchants traveled to cities all along North Africa and “visited the
ports of Maghrib to acquire leather, wool, fine ceramics, and from Morocco, increasing
quantities of grain. Particularly important was the supply of gold, in the form of gold dust that
reached the towns of the Maghrib along the caravan routes that stretched across the Sahara.”82
During the second crusade, the Byzantines saw renewed attacks by the Normans. This
time, the Emperor again sought the aid of the Venetians when Corfu was attacked, but Norman
navies remained a continual presence in and around Italy.83 The Venetians were successful in
repelling the Norman navies; however, both the Byzantines and Venetians were slowly realizing
they did not like each other as much. They begrudgingly continued to help each other but
relations had significantly soured. This is the point in which we will begin to fully examine
Genoa and Venice as their communes or system of government have begun to better develop a
more comprehensive system of institutions along with their vast fleets which can now operate
throughout the Mediterranean Sea.
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2 “Venice and Genoa, a Struggle for Foundation: Their Routes to Empire”
In the last chapter, this thesis discussed some of the primary and essential characteristics
that all city-states must possess, as well as offered a glimpse into a very volatile world in which
these Italian cities existed. At the conclusion, I discussed one city-state, Amalfi that was unable
to cope with this radically changing world and analyzed some of the reasons as to why that
happened. This chapter will build off of those ideas and will analyze specifically how Genoa and
Venice rose to power. Venice and Genoa both embarked on a journey of great risk around the
beginning of the 10th and 11th centuries in an attempt to assure their continual existence and
security within the Mediterranean; in fact, they sought to accomplish by creating institutions that
28

not only helped the day to day processes of their respective cities, but they also acquired the
ability and nature of their city’s responses to commercial and military threats and opportunities.
This chapter will begin to explore these two city’s histories and institutions starting
around 900 AD, however, it will quickly move to the 12th century, as that will be the start of the
main focus of this piece. Whilst beginning to analyze these institutions, it is ever so important to
have a good contextual understanding, which will explain the volatility and luck of the
Mediterranean region in which Venice and Genoa find themselves situated.
Towards the end of the 12th century, Middle Eastern industries were in decline, with their
economies contracting and their politics fragmenting, albeit temporarily.84 This most likely
resulted from the recent crusades that saw the formation of the Latin Kingdoms along the Levant,
thus allowing European powers to enter into the region. Italian city-states jumped at the
opportunity to expand their trade and thus started moving toward this location. City-states at this
time were mainly competing with each other for profits and monopolies within certain regions of
trade. This competition saw the decline and thinning out of some weaker city-states as some
were eventually unable to fend off foreign influence. Mogens likens the rise of Italian city-state
power with that off the creation and adequate formation of the Commune, which allowed citystates to better handle the “growing volume and complexity of trade,” which many acknowledge
to be the lifeblood of these city-states.85 In addition, Mogens suggest that this institution is a
political response to “either to the void left by the collapse of the central government or to the
opportunities for political autonomy opened up by the struggle after 1076 between the German
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Emperor and the papacy.”86 This argument is convincing due to the fact that most Italian
communes began to form after this date such as Pisa in 1081, Cremona in 1078, Genoa in 1098,
Verona in 1107, and Venice in 1143. It should be noted, however, that these communes had
slightly different names for their governmental systems and assemblies. For many European
powers, city-states became a necessary solution to the question of attempting to establish
sustained trade within different regions of the Mediterranean as they were known as some of the
most skilled merchants in Europe. The Commune, is defined as “a sworn association of likeminded men who promised to abide by their own rules and to be sanctioned to be sanctioned for
any infringement… whose purpose is to establish and uphold the reciprocal rules of engagement
and to protect merchants against reprisals and the confiscation of goods.”87 Two main benefits
immediately arose from this institution, which saw the lowering of costs for trading over long
distance and the multiplication of trading centers across the Mediterranean world, which also
saw the increased division of labor as well as the collection and diffusion of information.88 In
short, trade became cheaper and less risky for those funding the expeditions. This immediate
reaction makes sense because first and foremost, trade, was the most important part of the
economic system in which city-states find themselves built upon, as they do not have the large
swaths of land in which to cultivate numerous agricultural and industrial projects of their own.
Both Genoa and Venice faced similar struggles at home which would suggest multiple
reasons as to how improbable it is for these two entities to not only survive but flourish under
these circumstances. Nonetheless, both cities managed to endure and build upon their success.
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Both cities saw poor conditions at home, which will be discussed later in the chapter, that forced
them into the sea as further land expeditions would bring them into conflict with multiple
different states or cities that could overwhelm the lone city. Yet both capitalized on this inherent
“bad luck” and sought to exploit the sea as a means for mobilization of their respective
militaries, resources, and as a means to obtain their “birth rights” as they both saw themselves as
decedents of the great Roman Empire. However, none of this would have been possible without
the foundational institutions that these two cities both created in order to simply function as an
entity in the Mediterranean.
The next section will be divided into two main portions: Legacies, institutions, and
systems created prior to 1200 AD, followed by those created after 1200 AD through about 1300
AD.

i.
Geography and Myth:
As previously stated, both Genoa and Venice suffered from a lack of usable land which
forced them to turn to the sea. This was not without considerable risk. Many like to think about
how accessing the seas allows for opportunities to explore new lands and establish commerce
with new states. In actually, these ventures comes with considerable risk. For example, both
Venetian and Genoese citizens felt a considerable amount of anxiety during the month of June,
which was when their fleets and trade expeditions were set to return from their long distance
journeys. A Genoese historian remarks that “in 1207, seven galleys and other ships, containing at
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least 1000 Genoese, were close to safety in nearby Nervi when a great storm sank a navis and
two barks, and one galley was beached at Sturla.”89
For Venice, land was scarce, due to the fact that those people who settled Venice, settled
the city in a lagoon due to the need for protection against competing barbarian and European
forces. As a result, Venice was able to produce little food except for the fishing that was
attainable within this location.90 Due to a lack of land, status and wealth was based not on landed
aristocracy but instead on entrepreneurial skill.91 Besides food shortages, ironically, fresh water
was a constant problem which Venice struggled to correct. In addition, the constant changing of
tides within the lagoon altered the shape and accessibility of the area, which the Venetians had to
adjust for by creating safeguards in barriers in order to effectively live in this location.92 Aside
from that, Venice did prosper from the fishing and salt collecting that occurred within the
Lagoon. In addition, it did not take long for others to acknowledge the relative safety that the
lagoon afforded to its inhabitants and were thus sought after as a safe haven to conduct trade.93
Upon this realization, the Venetians are thought to have begun charging for this protection,
which began the onslaught of trade goods flooding into this region. This prime location, at the
mouth of the Adriatic, soon saw a flourishing trade community born. So although Venice herself
could not produce a wide multitude of products, a large variety of goods still flowed through
Venice, allowing her to reap the benefits of becoming a trade center. In addition, this trade also
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greatly benefited from the good relationship the Venetians kept with the Byzantines up until the
end of the 12th century.
Genoa, on the other hand, did not possess as good landed area, however, it also was
located “at the mouth of nothing on a sea where some of the great ports sat” which meant trade
competition was a considerable obstacle that the inhabitants would have to face.94 Genoa was
situated in an area with rocky beaches, rugged cliffs, and had access to little flat ground or fresh
water. Genoa had a number of other disadvantages to go with this. Liguria, the region in which
Genoa is situated, suffered from a lack of plentiful resources and had little to no mineral wealth
worth taping, except for some marble deposits. In addition, Genoa also had a lack of rivers near
the city, which forced them to build ships along coves across the coast.95 The lack of rivers and
fresh water also meant that the soil Genoa had, was less fertile and more shallow, which meant
agriculture would never be as profitable as it could have been otherwise. Cereal farming was
impossible due to the lack of land and freshwater and it also suffered from a lack of sufficient
fishing because the waters near Genoa were too deep.96 Lastly, the environment around the city
was quite fragile, taking considerable time to recover from either natural or man-made disasters
that occurred in the area.
However, Genoa did possess a good harbor, and despite being mostly mountainous,
Genoa did have some fertile ground which was accompanied by “dramatic changes in altitude
[within] this small region [, which] produced five zones of vegetation and climate within a small
ecosystem” thus allowing for a wide variety of different agricultural products, although,
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truthfully, limited in scale.97 This area hosted small forests, chestnut trees, land for vineyards,
and olive groves which all helped to boost Genoese trade. Another environmental benefit of
these mountains was that the mountains negated any chance of the formation of lakes near
Genoa.98 This might initially sound like a disadvantage as Genoa was suffering from a water
shortage, however, with lakes, this brought more mosquitos which carries the increased chance
of disease. Genoa also produced fruit trees, made bread from chestnut flower, and produced
cheese, wool, and leather from their livestock.99
As previously stated, both Genoa and Venice saw themselves as heirs of the Roman
Empire. This was displayed time and again through the Venetians willingness to assist the
Byzantine Empire during times of need as the Byzantines were all that was left of the once great
Roman Empire. Several myths have arisen from the Venetians early years, which they thought
justified their place amongst the great Mediterranean powers. One day, it is said, the Pope,
disguised as a poor beggar, entered Venice as a test to see how their citizenry and leaders would
react. It is said that the Venetians treated him with such care and kindness that the Pope, ever so
grateful and happy to see this reaction, named them protectors of the faith, and allowed them to
walk in procession with a white candle during the feast-day procession to symbolize their honor
and purity of the faith.100
Later on, the Pope also gave the Doge permission to seal his letters with lead instead of
the traditional wax, which signified the Doge was on level with the rank of emperor. The story
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goes that when the Holy Roman Emperor found out about this, Frederick wanted the Pope locked
away in chains and sent a massive fleet against the Genoese. The Venetians, in defense of the
Pope and their city, launched a spirited defense, despite being so badly outnumbered at the time.
The Doge’s forces managed to defeat the Imperial fleet and was rewarded with a sword that
“represented justice of the war” and a golden ring, which now serves a pivotal role in the Festa
Della Sensa(Ascension) ceremony where Venetians sail out to where the lagoon meets the
Adriatic and toss the golden ring into the waters, symbolizing their union with the sea.101
Whether or not this is true, these stories serve the purpose of instilling pride within the mention
of Venice as they are not only skilled warriors and watermen in these stories, but also offer great
kindness and protection toward Christianity, a potentially unifying force in the region.
Genoa was an old Roman city, with Roman roads that lead to the heart of the city.102
Despite this however, Genoa was not a center for trade, and the roads most likely were in place
for military purposes although the ruins of the old city still remain the nucleus of Genoa,
showing visual proof of their inherited right. Up until after the sacks by Muslim raiders in 93435, Genoa did not possess imposing magnificent buildings like some great cities, although, it was
still seen as critical, due to their port which, many landlocked city states sought to use or covet.
These sacks, could help explain the religious Christian fervor that the people within this city felt,
along with their belief that they are destined to partake in the crusades, a premise which we will
explore later on in the chapter.103
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Genoa’s early history differed from that of Venice’s in the sense that the Genoese
commune was less stable, but is comparable due to the fact that both polities found and acquired
nationalistic tendencies through the use of their early founding myths. Genoa dealt with constant
internal civil strife, which continued well into the 13th century, as well as constant threats of
domination and invasion from the Germans to the North and had to be granted much of their
rights by higher authorities.104 Genoa began, however, to develop significant strength at the start
of the 11th century as they concentrated on building up their naval power in response to Muslim
raiders. Through their wars with them, Genoa was seen by the Pope as a defender of Christianity.
After 1156, Genoa had many rights bestowed upon them by the Lombard Marchese Alberto, who
“confirmed the customs of the city.”105 This granted Genoa all the rights their fathers had under
their previous host and also allowed them to exercise justices over themselves, thus, making
them immune from any nobility. This is important because with this charter, Genoa was
effectively (or not so effectively) governing themselves without the aid or creation of a
commune. One additional fact that was seen under this charter, was that Genoa granted rights to
farmers allowing them to hold land without public service.106 This is noted to be a relic from the
Roman Empire, and is yet another example of how they descended from them.
ii.
Creating a Government
Venice and Genoa both took some considerable time to fully establish their official
government structure, most likely due to the erratic nature of events that occurred within this
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region, which forced these city-states to adapt to these ever-changing conditions. Both Genoa
and Venice had to achieve some level of autonomy from other states and empires in the area.
Although not officially owned by any one nation, both these two cities had strong connections to
the Byzantine Empire and the German Holy Roman Empire respectively, both of which felt
some privilege or entitlement to these cities. Nevertheless, both Venice and Genoa enjoyed
considerable autonomy from the beginning, as these empires were now allowing these cities to
operate on their own was more profitable for them at the time. These relationships between cities
and empires will be discussed later in this chapter.
Venice’s political structure saw significant divisions among factions either loyal to the
Byzantine cause, or the Holy Roman Empire.107 Officially speaking, legally, “the ruler of the
Lagoon was the emperor of Constantinople” and the Doge, who ran the city, was “at best, a
governor” as Medieval kings and Emperor’s received their power through God, whereas, the
Doge’s power “flowed directly from the people they governed.”108 The Doge was specifically
beholden to the tribunes and the people, the latter of which could assume the form of the Arengo
which would be formed in moments of crisis. Thomas Madden, a historian reexamining Venice’s
history, argues that the Arengo was so powerful that no authority could “trump” this assembly,
“save for the emperor.”109 The Doge is elected by the people and can also be deposed by the
people through the formation of an Arengo. This is significant because it highlights the
Venetians distrust in concentrated power, and that they prized freedom over all else.
For much of the 9th and 10th centuries, Venice prospered from a series of stable
Dogeships, which tended to switch between ruling families, which at this time consisted of the
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Badeor, Candiano, and Partecipaze families.110 This was a crucial time for the Venetians as the
Mediterranean Sea was now being invaded by Muslim pirates along with Europe facing constant
attacks by Vikings and Slavic raiders. Many Doges during this time, personally led war
expeditions in order to eliminate pirate activity within their waters and throughout the Adriatic.
This had the potential to curry favor with other cities and states also effected by the pirates and
this, no doubt, greatly affected their relationship with the Byzantines who were also reeling in a
vain attempt to protect their processions from these pirates.
During the 950’s, Venice saw herself caught between a political event which forced the
city to choose between their allegiance to the Byzantine Empire and that of the Holy Roman
Empire. This occurred due to a coup led by Pietro IV who supported the Holy Roman Emperor,
against his father Pietro III, who held allegiance to the Byzantines.111 This coup ultimately failed
and saw Petro IV fleeing to the German Emperor. Upon his arrival, Pietro IV began to launch
naval assaults against Venetian shipping. Shortly after this began, Pietro III died and the Arengo
surprisingly elected Pietro IV to the Dogeship, as they saw this as a means to end the assaults.112
Upon attaining the Dogeship, Pietro IV married Waldrada, the sister of the Marquis of Tuscany,
who was the kinswomen to Emperor Otto II, Ruler of the Holy Roman Empire.113 Waldrada had
German soldiers accompany her to the Ducal Palace (the residence of the Doge) for her
protection. This had the unfortunate effect of creating resentment among the Venetian people,
who now felt as if their palace was occupied by the HRE. Not surprisingly, in 976, civil strife
erupted split between the Morosini family who opposed the Germans and favored the Byzantine
Emperor, and the Coloprinis family who supported the doge and sought to strengthen relations
110
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with the Germans.114 The Morosini family won the day and assaulted the Ducal palace, killing
Pietro and his son, though they had the wisdom to spare Waldrada out of fear of reprisal from the
German Emperor.
Upon this very violent uprising, the Arengo, in 976, elected Pietro Orseolo to the
dogeship. This series of events points to a larger possibility that the very foundation of the
commune in both Venice and Genoa were unstable and that additional political, and commercial
institutions need to be put in place in order to create a significant period of stability. Venice, far
more so than Genoa, is adept at understanding the civil uprisings and worked to avoid them from
the beginning. What is important to note about this individual is that he was not aligned to any
leading noble family, but was instead, well known for his wisdom and piety, as well as being a
well-respected individual in Venetian society.115 Pietro Orseolo personally financed the
reconstruction of the Ducal Palace as well as levied new taxes in order to pay reparations to the
German Emperor who was furious over the incident. However, this tax levied proved enough to
avert war and also enough to fix much of the damaged cities caused by the civil strife in the
previous year. Later in 991, Pietro II Orseolo was elected Doge and managed to quell the
remaining factional strife by simultaneously improving relations with both the Byzantine and
Holy Roman Empires.116 This was accomplished because, due to the actions previously
discussed by Venetian fleets, the Byzantine enacted a Golden Bull, bestowing immense
privileges on the city of Venice, which had the added benefit of making Venice more
independent from their rule. In addition, it also helped that the new German Emperor Otto III
was a personal friend of this Doge. This is important to show because it demonstrates Venice’s
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ability to not only politically navigate potentially divesting incidents, but also their ability to
recover from such events and still end up on the beneficial side, be it luck or skilled diplomacy.
From this point in the late 10th century, until about, the early 12th century, Venice
prospered from improved relations with the Byzantine Empire in addition to relative peace
amongst leading Venetian families. It is apparent from their actions during this time, that the
Venetians realized early on that peace and quiet amongst their city and neighbors was good for
business, which remained their guiding principle for dealing with notable families and
international relations. During the Dogeship of Pietro Polani rom 1129-1148, Venice began to
found their very own commune by raising additional families to become “notable”, which he did,
by awarding them positions as Judges and advisors in his court.117 Some of these families include
the Dandolos, Ziani and Mastroperos families. In addition, under Polani’s leadership, Venice saw
the creation of the Consilium Sapientium, which was a council of wise men that represented the
Venetian people and dealt with general day-to-day activities.118
On July 24th, 1177, a historic event occurred in Venice, and involved both Pope
Alexander III and Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa of the Holy Roman Empire. The Pope and
Holy Roman Emperor had been at war for some time, creating much instability within the region
and distracting Europe from affairs occurring in the Levant. This conflict arose from territorial
claims made by both the Emperor and Pope concerning northern and central Italy.119 To
counteract German influence, the Pope initiated the creation of the Lombard league (an invention
that will be discussed later in order to explain one method of how city-states can defend
themselves) which sought to oppose German influence in the region. Venice, which had been
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“officially” neutral during this struggle, was asked and then selected to be the meeting point for
which to discuss terms and bring peace between these two Christian nations. Doge Sebastiano
Ziani greeted both leaders and after much ceremony, began to conduct the last necessary acts to
ensure peace.120 Much of the negotiations had been completed far before the Pope or Emperor
arrived. The city of Venice also underwent massive preparations, including the completion of the
Piazza San Marco, which was the largest open air gathering in Venice at the time and hosted a
plethora of different buildings, immense columns, and magnificent statutes all which were to fit
the nature of the grandiose event.121 In addition, this event further demonstrated Venice’s ever
increasing economic might, as well as their furthered independence from the Byzantine Empire,
as relations with them have begun to sour by the end of the 12th century. This event is also
politically and internationally significant, not only because a very advantageous peace treaty was
being negotiated, but also because of the fact that Venice, a lone city-state, now had the stature
and importance to be able to hold such a significant event, which brings us to a conclusion for
this section concerning the Venetians as their next great governmental, political, and military feat
will entirely revolve around the expedition known as the forth Crusade.
Where Venice prospered from a mostly stable urban and civil populace, Genoa faced an
ever-increasing dilemma of how to manage their leading rival families, as on more than one
occasion, these different groups attempted to pursue war against one another. This was a
significant and persisting problem because the “great Genoese families were grouped together in
tight clans, and the common interest of the clan overrode the immediate concern of the
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individual. The price that Genoa paid was acute factional strife, as rival clans tried to gain
mastery of the consulate and other offices.”122
Between the years 1087 and 1099, Genoa established a commune which, described by
Vito Vitale, one of Italy’s leading historians of Genoa in the twentieth century, as a “voluntary
association of neighborhoods, with the bishop and nobility joining the oath” under the leadership
of 6 consuls.123 Genoa herself was separated into 7 neighborhoods, each with their own
economic and political power, in addition to each having an obligation to provide crews for
merchant or military ships depending on the city’s need at the time.124 This took the form of a
city that could self-govern, but suffered from an overly federated layout with not enough unity
between the districts. Initially, Consuls served anywhere from 4 to 12 years depending on the
laws that existed during that particular decade, as these laws tended to change rapidly in order to
attempt to prevent families from consolidating too much power. This was the case until the year
1122, when consuls were allowed 1 year in office.125 The responsibilities of the office of the
consul is outlined as follows: Consuls were to administer equal justice among citizens, serve as
judges, and not diminish the honor/income of the city or churches.126 The Compagna was an
assembly that dealt with the day to day activities of the city and advised Consuls on their
recommendations. This body had a large set of rules governing who could be in it and what they
could do once entered into the body. If an individual was called to enter the Compagna, meaning
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the individual was male, a citizen, and of a certain age, he would have 40 days to comply, or be
barred from entering this body for 3 entire years.127 This was a severe penalty for those seeking
political life, as only members of the Campania could enter into the offices of consulship,
treasurer, legate, or advocate. Only members of this body had the right to vote for the Consul and
carry out merchant ventures, and worked on the basis of the majority. This body also had
jurisdiction over trade in addition to the responsibility of outlining laws pertaining to homicide,
assault, and developing an overall legal code.128 In short, if one wanted political power in the city
of Genoa, one would want to work to achieve office within this assembly.
The Genoese Commune was quite efficient at levying taxes as well as raising money.
Since defense was a primary concern for this city, Genoa needed to ensure enough fiscal revenue
to fund defensive projects. One such method they employed in achieving this goal, was the tax
on foreign merchants and their income made along not only the port but also the coastal territory
that Genoa controlled.129 In addition, Genoa taxed land and goods sold into Genoa; however, this
did not always fulfill Genoa’s monetary needs and often resulted in Consuls needing to borrow
money in order to pay the bills.130
The Commune not only benefited Genoa by levying taxes, but also allowed them to
accomplish a great many other feats. For example, as the power of the Commune grew, so too
did Genoa’s international prowess and ability to conduct affairs with other nations. The
commune accomplished this by spending money in order to bribe other cities or states in order to
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achieve their goals, and more importantly, the Genoese people trusted Consuls specifically to
make these fiscal decisions.131 To add to this, the centralized government also allowed Genoa to
concentrate on dominating the surrounding area, which also in turn, grew and expanded the
city’s reach at home and abroad. For example, Ventimiglia, a small town near Genoa, saw its
population come under Genoese control after the Commune humiliated their Count through
economic dealings.132 In short, this Commune was able to not only develop and maintain an
economic and legal system, but also sought to deal with political squabbles, although the latter,
saw Genoa facing considerably more difficult squabbles, as individuals began using their offices
to their own ends. This can be seen in a law change where Consuls now had to swear that they
would fight wars till the end instead of leaving their compatriots to deal with the conflict on their
own.133
Throughout this decade, Genoa faced considerable internal and political strife that the
Compagna could rarely correct on its own. Even the Consulship found it difficult at times to
preserve the peace within the city and constantly had to make reparations and promises to
unhappy families. These periods of unrest would generally follow times of war, due to the fact
that as soon as the unifying enemy is dealt with, families once again fall into their standard
squabbles and rivalries that tend to keep them separated and weak for some time. At the
beginning of 1179, external wars raged and internal strife seemed to escalate, creating a
considerable crisis for the commune to contend with. The Consuls at this time began separating
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markets and allowing families to build walls in order for them to feel secure within their areas.134
However, this did not work, and in 1193-4 the situation worsened with the sight of families
creating siege weapons behind their walls as they hurled rocks and weapons at one another
within the city.135 A few years prior to this, Ottobono Scriba described a significant shift in the
power of the commune as they slowly began to realize their current structure of government was
no longer effective in quelling the social unrest. In response to this, the city created the position
of the Podesta who was not only the new city manager, but also the military commander and
chief judge.136 In addition, an 8-member body called reactors, was created to help serve this
individual in order to face the difficult task at hand. In 1194, Oberto de Olevano became both the
Consul and Podesta and managed to restore order and calm within the city. Following him, was
Drudo Marcellino, who not only managed to continue the peace, but also determined a way and
followed through with paying off Genoa’s considerable debts brought about by the civil strife
and military conflicts.137
iii.
Economy of a City-State
For a city-state, their main goal was to obtain and secure safety and privileges for their
merchants both at home and abroad. This is the case because a vast majority of income and
wealth of a city-state depends upon how skilled and crafty they are at conducting trade. These
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economic practices bred a very individualistic and capitalistic environment, where all merchants
were vying with each other for profitable goods and exchange rates.
Venice is situated in an excellent location for prosperous trade at the top of the Adriatic.
The city was positioned in a location that conveniently provided a “place from which to move
goods to and from other European markets while also providing plenty of commercial docks and
local markets for overseas shipping.”138 During the 900s, Venice focused most of their time on
building, whether it be actual structures or large fleets. Within this time Venice also began
reaching out and establishing trade agreements with far away locations. It is important to bear in
mind, that all of this supplemented their already valuable relationship with the Byzantine
Empire. Venice’s fleet became masters of the Adriatic, after clearing out the pirates, thereby
freeing Venetian ships to offer patrol missions for valuable cargo. Around 900 to 950, Venice
had a population that number around 50,000. This increased over the next few centuries and by
1200 AD, the population living in Venice had hit 100,000 people, making it a very large and
crowded city.139
Like other city-states, Venice too, developed a system in which their people could enter
into both sea voyages and landed trade routes with hard labor or by financial means in order to
take part in commercial expeditions. Within Venice specifically, “lending, both simple and ad
negotiandum, appeared early, and in the 12th century it became an indispensable tool even
though borrowing money was expensive. Commercial companies existed in Venice, for the most
part they were used for acquiring shares in boat leases, where risk was reduced by dividing the
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global investment into 24 shares, or carati.”140 This system is similar to that of other city-state
economic practices but was referred to as colleganza instead of the more traditional name,
commenda. This allowed for a system with “limited liability contract that might be unilateral, or,
more often, bilateral and ended at the completion of the voyage.”141
Genoa as well had developed an economic system in which their citizens could
participate in trade. There system took the form of many classic Italian city-state trading systems
and employed the use of commendas, or commercial contracts, where an investor puts money
into a venture, and the traveling partner puts this money to use in return for a fixed part, which
would usually be around a quarter of the profits.142 For example, in October 1st, 1158, a Genoese
citizen named Bongiovanni “‘accepted in a commenda’ L69 and agreed to take the investment to
Sicily. Malfigliastro bore the risk of the venture, and Bongiovanni, by custom, received onequarter of the profit for his labor.” Societas are like commendas except the key distinction is that
societas have both individuals contributing money with the individual assuming who goes on the
expedition receiving a slightly higher share.143 In addition to these two, Genoa also employed a
Sea Loan. This form of transition involves one citizen borrowing money from another and
agreeing to pay it back within a certain amount of time or upon the conclusion of the
expedition.144One important note is that this agreement requires the safe return of the expedition,
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thereby leaving some room for insurance in case the merchant and sailors encounter pirates,
storms, or any number of tragedy while out on the Mediterranean Sea.
As time went on, these legal practices became more defined and evolved to face the ever
changing events that face the city. In the Cartulary of Giovanni Scribba, who was a notary for
Genoa between 1154 and 1164, one can note that these practices and institutions demonstrate an
advanced stage of society that had clearly been evolving for some time.145 Many of these
documents show and depict legal contracts, commodity sales, wills, dowries, estate inventories
and more, which show a very complex society that had achieved a very robust system of record
keeping. Many contracts were included in this describing Sea Loans and Commenda
transactions, as well as articulated much of the cargo being pepper, Brazilwood, cotton, gold,
silk, alum, cloth, and exports of woolen cloth and silver. The jobs of these merchants were to go
to a location such as Syria, Alexandria, Constantinople, Acre, Tyre, etc.,, and after selling or
buying merchandise, they were to return to Genoa. This principle kept in touch with their
mandate of moving commodities of places with abundance, to locations with scarcity, thereby
allowing for maximum profits.146 This not only helped with profits, but also greatly increased the
diversity of products coming in and out of Genoa.
Epstein further remarks that Genoa can contribute most of its economic success to four
basic reasons. These include “A rapidly growing domestic market, emphasis on capital-intensive
trading, a legal environment relying on trust and not force to create functioning markets, and the
abilities of families to devise organizations capable of sustaining knowledge and techniques of
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trading over time.”147 The capital based trading augmented the productivity of a region obtaining
scarce resources. The Commune, well trusted by the citizenry, did not try to overstep its bounds,
and most trade partnerships were created from kinship and family relations, thereby allowing
little room for misunderstandings and vendettas.
IV
Military Institutions and Responses
City-states can be relatively small entities that obtain an immense amount of suspicion
due to necessity and force of ideology, although justly deserved at times, due to their fear of a
large state or empire potentially attempting to take them over. Therefore, in order to deal with
this problem, city-states have developed a number of responses both for large and small state and
city threats. Before entering into the specific institutions that Genoa and Venice possess, wherein
this thesis will discuss methods employed in dealing with both large and small states, it is
important to understand the grand scheme of things being that not all is as it seems. In other
words, just because a city-state as entered into a war with another city-state, does not mean they
are arch-nemesis or have cut off all relations/trade entirely. In most cases, city-state relations
with other cities and country are quite complicated and exist on a level of potential perpetual
peace and war simultaneously. This will become clearer as the thesis moves forward and is vital
in eventually understanding Venice’s role with the Ottoman Empire.
A very common response when an Empire or large kingdom threatens a city-state is the
formation of a league. For example, in 1156 the Lombard league was formed between:
“Several shifting constellations of cities had emerged. Some were merely bilateral (the
alliance between Milan and Piacenza in 1156 against Pavia and Cremona), others
embraced several cities (Milan, Brescia, and Piacentza in 1159), buut the so called
147
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“Veronese League” of 1164 was a genuine regional power bloc linking Venice with
Vicenza and Padua as cities of the March of Treviso, and Verona, whose own Marca
Veronese had by then been elided into it.”148
But even when cities like these form alliance, it is equally not uncommon for them to break those
alliance and go to war with one another. In truth, city-states tend to spend so much time at war
fighting one another that even during times of peace, it is not uncommon for ships from
competing states to attack one another. But even in the case of Venice and Genoa, Madden
reports that:
“On occasion Venetians and Genoese would swallow their dislike and band together
against a common enemy, as they did with Emperor Frederick II, who waged war across
Italy against the Popes and the Lombard’s. But usually the two powers entertained some
level of aggression. It was not always easy to gauge their relations. Although Venice had
an increasingly complex government to oversee their expanding empire, the Genoese did
business in a much more casual manner, as families struggled against one another for
dominance. Against their enemies, Venetians sent war fleets; Genoese sent Pirates.”149
Even though they are major rivals, they still are able to find enough common ground, which is
something Northern Italian city-states have prospered from.
Venice handles most of these threats by attempting to avoid them in the first place, and
then learning from each subsequent attack. For example, the Magyar invasion in 899 was
stopped by Venetian fortifications in Malamocco, which is the same way in which they held back
the Franks in the 700s.150 After 1000 AD, Venice had additional walls constructed around the
lagoon and placed them in a large sea chain that spanned across the entrance of the Grand Canal.
During this time period, between 1000AD to 1200 AD, the Byzantine Empire had grown
considerably weaker due to relentless attacks in the Middle East and the Normans in the
Mediterranean. This forced Venice to keep bigger fleets around, not only for protection of their
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city, but greater protection for their merchants across the Mediterranean Sea. But in order to
build ships, a city needs wood, something Venice did not have easy access to. This is why the
Venetian assaults off the coast of Dalmatia in 1071 are explainable, because Dalmatia was
reasonably close to Venice, in the Adriatic, and it had lots of forests.151
By the 14th century, Venice had a famous squadron known as the Gulf Squadron which
was charged with protecting the waters in the Adriatic.152 However prior to this, Venice first had
to create a location in which to better construct ships. In the past, Venice relied on private
shipyards and business for the construction of Venetian commercial and military vessels. In 1100
AD, Venice founded the first Arsenale, “it was up until 1300 relatively small, and indeed may
not have consisted of more than a storehouse for supplies. By 1300, however, with the
construction of the ‘New Arsenal’, shipbuilding had begun on site (as opposed to being
undertaken exclusively in private yards), with a mix of private merchant vessels and ships for the
state. From 1302, the provision of a monopoly was established, forbidding the building of ships
for the state elsewhere.”153 This is the process of how Venice created their large industrial shipbuilding yard that had its roots in economic practices hundreds of years before it was actually
significant.
The Venetian fleet consisted of two main types of ships. The first being the Round Ship,
which was a ship equipped with lateen sails and generally used for trade and heavy cargo and
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could transport up to 500 tons of weight, depending on how many decks the ship possessed.154
These ships were called Tarette for ships with one deck and Navi, for ships with multiple. The
second ship is the Long-ship, or biremes. These were military vessels propelled forward by oars
and were faster and lower in the water, thereby allowing much more maneuverability. These
ships usually possessed two decks and mainly protected cargo vessels (Round ships).155 The
bireme was later replaced by the trireme which could hold more cargo and had an additional
deck.
By 1171 AD, relations with the Byzantine Empire had greatly declined. Sometime during
that year, a group of Venetian merchants attacked the Genoese quarter in Constantinople.
Emperor Manuel, furious over this attack, decided he no longer wanted, or needed, the Venetians
and ordered his soldiers to capture the Venetians and seize all their goods and possessions.156
Nearly 20,000 Venetians were captured within the Byzantine Empire, thereby, forcing Doge
Michiel I to respond. The Doge wanted a diplomatic resolution; however, an Arengo formed and
order the Doge to respond to this grievous act of war. The Doge led a fleet of 100 galleys and 20
transports, and sailed them to Chalkas, which was the capital in Greece at the time.157 The
Governor came out to speak with the Doge in order for a peaceful resolution. The Governor
agreed to help him send an envoy to the Emperor, which the Emperor refused to see. During this
time, plague set into the military camp outside Chalkas and greatly weakened the military
force.158 The Doge, having no other choice at this point, returned to a very dissatisfied people
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who then assassinated him, after accusing him of not carrying out the “people’s” will. This is one
of the last instances an Arengo will be formed, as this body’s rashness hurt Venice gravely
during this hostage crisis and failed war.
In 1180, Emperor Manuel I died, thereby allowing his son Alexius II to rule at the age of
12.159 Andronicus Comnenus became regent for the young ruler and encouraged and sanctioned
anti-Latin fervor. Thus, it should be no surprise that later that year, mobs and riots formed and
attacked Latin individuals in and across the Byzantine Empire. Thousands of women, children,
and clergy-men were massacred, along with their processions seized.160 In response to this, Pisa
and Genoa immediately declared war in the Byzantine Empire, which left the Byzantines with no
choice but to turn to Venice for naval assistance.161 This was manageable because despite having
20,000 Venetians in custody, all 20,000 were safe and soundly locked away from the mobs along
with all their processions. The Regent immediately released all Venetian prisoners, restored their
quarter, and made payments for reparations.162 This demonstrates both luck and good timing as
Constantinople, with the rest of the Byzantine Empire, was no longer a place for competition and
were only occupied by the Venetian merchants. However, relations never achieve the height that
they once saw prior to the hostage crisis, which will help explain Venice’s actions (or inaction)
during the 4th crusade.
Unlike Venice who began ship-building as a means for protection and increased
economic activity, Genoa began as a means for aiding and potentially leading one of the crusades
in an effort to reclaim the Holy Land. As far as their ships were concerned, they were relatively
the same as Venice with both transports and galleys. By 1098, the first Genoese ships helped
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participate in the first crusade, providing the wood needed to build the siege weapons in order to
take Jerusalem.163 In Caffaro’s, Annals of Genoa, this historian recounts that:
“The Genoese went to the River Jordan during Holy Week, then returned to Jaffa with the
king, and held a council meeting there. From there they reached Arsuf, and captured it
after three days fighting. Then in the month of May they reached Caesarea, and
immediately beached their galleys. They ravaged all the cultivated land right up to the
city walls and began to build siege-towers and siege engines.”164
After aiding in the capture of several Middle Eastern cities they then:
“Came with the galleys and the whole army to the beach of San Parlerio near St Symeon,
and pitched camp. They first set aside one-fifteenth of the booty in the camp for the
galley crews. The remainder they divided among 8,000 men, and gave to each as his
share 48 solidi in the coin of Poitou, and two pounds of peppercorns, except for the
rewards due to the consuls, the seacaptains, and men of quality, which were substantial.
They started their journey back to Genoa on the Eve of St James the Apostle [24 July];
and they arrived back in the month of October, 1101 in triumph and covered in glory.
[As] with the first Frankish army against Antioch in 1097, in the African expedition in
1088 [correctly 1087], in the first expedition to Tortosa in 1093, and when Jerusalem was
taken in 1099.”165
The Genoese grew quite wealthy from the initial crusades. They were rewarded by Baldwin I in
1104 with the bones of Saint John the Baptist, a relic for the city, along with a number of
buildings in Antioch and Jerusalem, and small colonies across the Levant in Acre, Arsuf, and
Caesarea from which they could conduct business and trade enterprises.166
In 1155, Frederick I of the HRE was marching to be crowned Emperor by Pope Adrian
IV. Most cities in response sent money as gifts to the Emperor, however, Genoa did not and
instead fortified their city, launching a massive wall project to protect its people.167 Frederick
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surprisingly was not angry with this action and instead, impressed by their engineering feat over
a very short time, rewarded them by leaving them alone, at least for the time being. Later that
same year, Genoa received a promise of security throughout the Byzantine Empire, as well as
receiving monetary gifts and tax incentives along with an embolum, or leased merchant quarter,
inside Constantinople.168 This helps explain why the Venetians and Genoese were present inside
Constantinople, setting off the Venetian hostage crisis. In return for these gifts, Genoa promised
to not make war with the Byzantines, protect them from Norman fleets, and allowed their own
citizens to serve as sailors in the Imperial fleet for a wage, but Genoa would not automatically be
entered into war with the Byzantine enemies.169 These negotiations with the Byzantines were
logical because relations closer to home were developing fast and Genoa needed more allies not
so close to home, in order to continue conducting business.
The problems at home surrounded the HRE and the Normans in Sicily, who both wanted
Genoese support against the other. In return, both leaders were promising the city much and even
began bestowing Genoa with some of these gifts prior to Genoa siding with anyone. In 1162,
Frederick sacked the city of Milan and summoned Genoa for another round of negotiations.
Frederick promised the Genoese greater independence, along with a hint at virtually no taxes in
return for Genoese assistance in helping fight the Normans. To add to this, Genoa would receive
one quarter of any city that it helped capture, the city of Syracuse (once captured), and one
quarter of the emperor’s treasury at the time for their service.170 This was accepted by Genoa but
did not go accordingly to plan, due to newfound conflicts erupting between Pisa and Genoa over
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the island of Sardinia. This conflict which lasted from 1162 to 1175 was fought over Sardinia
because of potential resources the island held along with commercial benefits.171 In truth,
Sardinia was not that beneficial for either side but still a war they felt they had to fight in order to
prove their superiority. At the same time as this war, civil strife erupted in Genoa and lasted for
close to a decade due to military folly’s and squabbling among the families. The Consuls did
manage to bring about peace eventually but further highlighted the volatility and sensitivity that
their current political/social structure held. In 1175, Genoa makes peace with Florence and Pisa
which agreed to provide each their own sphere of influence in Sardinia along with trading rights
in their respective cities.
V
Changes in Military Institutions and Responses (After 1200 A.D.)
The 13th century saw a time of constant fighting between city-states and nations, in the
backdrop of an overarching battle between the Christian and Muslim faiths known as the
crusades. This should be no surprise to anyone, as the crusades had been occurring for more than
200 years prior to this point. What is worth exploring is the constant squabbling between
Christian nations that result in an ultimately weak effort to claim any land for Christianity. In
1280, after the fall of the Latin kingdoms within the Levant and the Latin Empire that had
assumed the role of the Byzantines, these city-states still enter into conflict over commercial
gains instead of focusing on larger threats to the East. Again in 1280, Caffaro reported on an
incident where he witnessed a skirmish between Venetian and Genoese Galleys:
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“The Venetians were at the time at war with the Anconitans, and therefore…they were
patrolling in that area just as many [Venetian] armed galleys [sailed] in different regions
for protection as well as to attack their enemies, the Anconitans. The said galleys of the
Venetians unjustly set upon our [(Genoese)] galleys attacking them even though they
recognized the flags of the Genoese. The Genoese recognizing and seeing the Venetian
arrogance, vigorously drove their galleys forward, entering into battle…The Genoese
came out with the victory, so that they captured two of the Venetian Galleys, while the
third rode swiftly away.”172
What is interesting to note about this particular incident is that it shows how even during times of
peace, these rival city-states will still set out and attack one-another for simply entering into
territory they respectively regard as their own. Before diving into the aggression displayed
between rival city-states, it is important to take into consideration the events and military
responses to these incidents that occurred leading up to the end of the 13th century.
A good place to begin is with Venice and to have a better understanding of how Doge
Enrico Dandolo turned this city from a Republic, into a Maritime Empire. Venice has had a
history of helping to support crusades in the past. In 1099, the Venetians supposedly set sail with
some 200 ships, although they never saw any fighting due to delays on the part of the Byzantine
Empire.173 But then again in 1122, the Venetians were instrumental in capturing the city of Tyre
and demonstrating a more robust response to the Byzantine antagonism toward Venetian
involvement in the crusades. With these two crusades, Venice reaped many commercial gains as
the fragile Latin Kingdoms greatly appreciated the added support by capturing this extremely
important trade port.
With this, we arrive back to the 13th century, on the eve of the 4th crusade led by the
French, Count Thibaut of Champagne, Count Baldwin of Flanders, and Count Louis of Blois, all
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of whom were attempting to create a logistical solution to how they were going to get an army
around the size of 20,000 men over to the Holly Land.174 There end result was that they wanted
to sail to the Middle East, and approached Venice asking them if they could do it. Innocent III
had already called for this crusade a few years earlier, and had approached Venice with the idea
of raising a fleet to sail to the Holy Land, so this appeal came as no surprise to them.175 What did
however shock them, was the sheer size of the proposed army. The projected size of the crusade
was 20,000 foot soldiers, 9,000 squires, 4,500 knights and resources to sustain them.176 This
would require an incredible number of ships and manpower that any nation would balk at, let
alone the lone city of Venice with a mere population of at best, 100,000 people. Another problem
was finances. Venice did not necessarily have the required funding to start building immediately
and would already require the vast majority of the merchant fleet, the entity that sustains the
city’s treasury. However, the Doge with his council devised a plan that would help solve this
problem. His proposal consisted of payments of 4 silver marks per knight, 2 silver marks for
each horse, and 2 silver marks for each person who was not a knight, which totaled to around
85,000 silver marks. In addition, Venice would supply a year of travel, along with 50 war galleys
of their own to fight in the crusade on condition that all spoils would be split between the two.177
However, since this was Venice, the Doge required the approval of the Great Council and the
Arengo in order to carry out his plan. Luckily for the Doge, both bodies agreed, along with the
French Counts, clearing the path for Venice to begin preparations for the crusade. In 1202, Doge
Dandolo order all Venetian merchant vessels back to Venice and suspended all overseas trade in
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order to acquire the vessels needed for transport.178 This was an enormous undertaking, the likes
of which no state, or city-state for that matter had ever accomplished in the past. Venice had not
only promised 50 war galleys, but also 450 transport ships for which to carry troops and supplies.
This venture had the potential to economically cripple the Venetians, as they had to commit the
entirety of their naval military might and merchant fleet in order to complete the task. Most ships
had to be built at the state’s expense and Venice, who only had about 30,000 able-bodied men to
send, decided to commit half that force to the crusade and come up with another 15,000 men
from its dependencies as they did not want to leave the city completely unprotected.179 Despite
this planning and successful completion of Venice’s promises, less than half of the assumed
number of crusaders actually arrived on time, leaving Venice with a problem of collecting the
fees for transport as each individual was supposed to pay independently; in fact this setback
greatly angered the Venetian populace.180 In the end, the crusaders only came up with 51,000
silver marks out of the promised 85,000, leaving Venice and the entire crusade with a potentially
crippling dilemma of what to do next. In order to save the crusade, the Doge managed a
compromise that saw Venice loaning the 34,000 silver marks to the crusaders in return for the
army assisting them in attacking the Christian nation of Zara, which posed a threat to Venetian
dominance in the Adriatic.181 This was agreed to and in October of 1202, the crusade set sail.
Despite various setbacks and attempts by some individuals to not have a crusader army sack a
Catholic settlement, the attack carried on as planned, and the city was destroyed, as the crusaders
did not want to abandon the entire campaign due to this.182
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After the assault on Zara, the crusaders were left with the problem of choosing where to
direct this army. Some wanted to invade Egypt and plunder the riches that lay within, whereas
others wanted to go to Jerusalem. However, due to manpower problems, neither option seemed
adept enough as the crusader’s numbers were to few. This problem, however, was eventually
resolved as the crusader camp received an “unexpected” visitor. His name was Alexius IV, son
of Emperor Isaac who had been murdered by his brother in a coup to take control of the
Byzantine Empire. Antonio Morosini, who wrote the Morosini code reports that:
This lad (Alexius IV), was the [son] of the emperor…emperor Isaac, who was chased
from his empire by the Grifoni (Greeks), was carried safely by a tutor of his to Germany
and grew up in the court of the Emperor. So the young man made a request of the Doge
or his barons saying that on the recommendation of the monarch he wished to travel with
the fleet and return to his empire, which was his by right. The words were very pleasing
to misier the Doge, and they were accepted, with an agreement on the following terms,
that when he regained his empire he would give misier the doge 200 thousand silver
marks, and in addition to this repay every expenditure that the fleet made in this service
and trouble.”183
This agreement, which promised 200,000 silver marks, supplies, and a Byzantine army, was
overwhelmingly accepted as the crusaders saw this as a mission to reclaim the throne for the
rightful ruler of the Byzantine Empire. Alexius even promised to have the Greek Orthodox
Church become subservient to Rome, giving the Pope some benefit from this crusade. This
agreement came just in time as the Pope had just recently excommunicated the Venetians due to
their destruction of Zara.184 The Doge, who felt almost trapped by this agreement, reluctantly
concurred with the decision as he hoped to keep the excommunication secret, even though he
knew that assaulting Constantinople was a significant political, economic, and military gamble
for Venice.
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By 1203, the crusade reached Constantinople. During the initial assault, headed by the
Doge, the crusader army appeared to be doomed to defeat. In the face of retreat, the blind Doge,
standing at the bow of his ship, ordered it to be beached under a hail of stones and arrows.185
Venetian troops, witnessing this successful act of bravery, rallied to the Doge as the Byzantine
troops fled in fear. In the end, the Venetians won the day and oversaw the crowning of Alexius
IV, who immediately gave Venice 100,000 silver marks with the promise of more to come.186
However, more did not come and the leaders of the crusade were now faced with immense
discontent from their army. Alexius eventually refused to pay any more money after many riots
and fires that were started by disgruntled Venetians and Pisans, who managed to destroy nearly
100,000 people’s homes.187 With this announcement, the crusaders took matters into their own
hands and began raiding outside the walls of Constantinople. During this chaos, Emperor
Alexius was murdered and replaced by Alexius V, which caused the crusading army to
immediately declare war on the new Byzantine Emperor. The battle for Constantinople that
occurred in 1204 between the Crusaders and the Byzantine Empire was mostly a naval affair,
where “outnumbered but determined Venetian [and crusader forces] attacked and took the most
well-fortified and powerful city in the Mediterranean.”188 The crusaders sacked the city for 3
entire days.189 During the sack, Venice attempted to “save” some valuable pieces of art and
history as the crusader forces were destroying a variety of objects in order to acquire the precious
gems that lay inside. For example, during this sack, the Venetians “acquired” the Bronze horses
of San Marco.190 The fall of Constantinople poised a significant danger to Venice. Therefore, the
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Doge took steps to ensure stability in the region. The first of these moves consisted of a
committee that would decide who the next Emperor of Constantinople would be. An account of
the event states that:
“When Misier the Doge was preparing to return to Venice after winning such a great
victory and allegiance, he held a council to choose an emperor, since at the time no one
of imperial blood could be found, and Count Baldwin of Flanders was worthily elevated
by Misier the Doge and the barons, and one of the relatives of Misier the Doge.”191
Thanks to Venetian support, Baldwin of Flanders won the election, signifying the beginning of
the Latin Empire in Constantinople. As far as the spoils are concerned and in addition to
Venice’s purchase of Crete from Boniface, Madden reports that:
“The Partition committee awarded Venice a large section of Constantinople near the
harbor, the Sea of Marmara shoreline from Heraclea to the end of Gallipoli, and the city
of Adrianople. Venice was also given rights to the islands of Salamis, Aegina, Andros,
and both ends of Negroponte as well as the gulf of Corinth and the Morea (Peloponnese).
Finally, [the] Venetians received all the lands of Western Greece along the Adriatic Sea.
Like the purchase of Crete, these awards consisted only the right to conquer the region.
Nevertheless, Dandolo immediately assumed a new title, which Venetians doges would
proudly don for decades: “Lord of three-eighths of the Roman Empire.”192
Venice also attempts to justify their actions and role in the crusade by affirming that
Constantinople was in the hands of heretics, and that the events that transpired could only have
been the work of a prophecy.193 This is a common theme of how the Venetian tend to respond to
the threat of international scrutiny. Though Venice never tried to fully claim all the land they
were given they did benefit from several strategic ports that greatly aided Venice’s economy,
which was in need of activity due to the hiatus caused by the Forth crusade. 194
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For the Genoese, they saw dire consequences as the new Latin Empire in Constantinople
was under heavy Venetian sway, thus allowing them to exclude all their rivals from these
prosperous and tactical ports. This caused a serious blow to the Genoese commercial economy.
This in part can explain Genoa’s financial problems during this century, which lead to constant
warfare to find needed money and civil uprisings as these expeditions failed to produce adequate
results.
During this century, Genoa was in constant warfare with mainly Pisa, Venice, and
Florence. Due to this, Genoa attempted to secure alliances in order to strengthen their position.
Genoa sent peace treaty offerings to the Greek Emperor of Nicaea, the despot in Epirus, and the
sultan of Egypt, as well as strengthening existing relations with the Holy Roman Empire.195 The
latter was in need, due to existing contentions between the two state leaders. The Emperor had
decreed in 1232 that rulers in North Italy, including Genoa, should not have a Lombard as a
leader or ruler, which was a problem because the Genoese had just elected a Podesta who was a
Lombard from Milan, and due to pride, Genoa refused to change officials.196 In response to this,
the Emperor had Genoese traders and goods seized throughout the empire, thus virtually
stopping trade with many colonies including the ever important Sicilian ports.197 Genoese
politics became split once again between Pro-Lombard and Pro-Emperor forces. However,
despite these new groups forming, Genoa still managed to operate and reinforce Middle Eastern
colonies in the 1230s and negotiate the release of Genoese merchants in Sicily thus avoiding
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war.198 Also, during the 1230s, the King of Morocco wanted and planned an attack on Ceuta, a
site with a large Genoese merchant colony. In order to protect their interests, Genoa sent 18
galleys and 4 large ships to aid the Sultan of Ceuta, however, the King of Morocco was still able
to take the city despite Genoese intervention.199 In 1235, Genoa launched a major naval
operation as a show of force against the newly taken city, sending 70 large vessels, 30 smaller
ones and 20 war Galleys under Ugone Lercario, which was the largest fleet Genoa had ever
assembled.200 This affair was ended with diplomacy as the King of Morocco ceded a portion of
the custom duties of the city to Genoa along with payment and reparations for the Genoese
merchant belonging in the city.201 This is an example of city-state diplomacy as these cities
possessed the dominant naval force within the Mediterranean, thus allowing them to press other
nations even via their naval capacity, despite that nation potentially dwarfing them in size.
The 1230s and 1240s saw continuous peasant revolts and rebellions within the city of
Genoa and throughout the countryside across Liguria. Many believed that Emperor Frederick of
the HRE was responsible for inciting these upheavals in response to Genoa’s refusal to change
their Podesta.202 Genoa however was saved by Pope Gregory IX, in return for Genoa’s
acknowledgement of their supremacy in a religious sense.203 Genoa received 50 war galleys, as
well as, a promise of aiding the city in recapturing the city of Syracuse. To add to this, Pope
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Gregory IX excommunicated Emperor Frederick.204 The civil uprising had almost broken the
city of Genoa during these decades; however, this was ultimately quelled with the help of Rome
and the Podesta. To help the healing process, the leading Genoese families and Podesta chose not
to punish any family siding with the Holy Roman Emperor, so as to have the city heal faster.205
This is an excellent example of city-state families choosing to not punish the losers in order to
better establish lasting peace.
Major wars broke out with Pisa in the years 1282 and 1283. These wars were caused by
Genoese suspicion that Pisan’s were inciting further unrest along the Genoese countryside.206
Pisa launched a naval assault on Genoa; however, they failed, therefore, Genoa returned the
favor sending 93 Galleys and 8 Panfili under the command of Doria and Zaccaria who caught the
main Pisan fleet in the harbor. This battle is known as the Battle of Meloria207 Most of these
ships were boarded with several others being sunk. This stood as a crippling naval blow for Pisa
who would require considerable time to recover. This also allowed Genoa to dictate the terms in
1288, which they received from Pisa, the regions of Cagliari and Sassari, along with being able
to keep their possessions in Corsica. To add to this, Genoa got to keep the important site of
Elba’s Castle until the Pisan’s fulfilled their monetary and land obligations to the Genoese.
Lastly, the Pisans had to destroy their fortifications in Acre and in return, Genoa would return the
considerable number of prisoners that they captured during the battle of Meloria.208 As a result of
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this war, Pisa was never again able to challenge the might of the Genoese navy and subsequently,
Genoa was able to get rid of one of their staunchest trading rivals in the Mediterranean Sea.
Genoa’s main rivals now consisted of Venice, and a few other major trading ports along the
south of France. For the last few years of the 13th century, Genoa and Venice were entered into a
bloody conflict due to increasing animosity that had been building up over the last century. In
1298, this conflict came to a head when the Genoese sent a fleet of 87 galleys up the Adriatic and
right into Venice led by Lamba Doria.209 Venice responded by launching 90 of their own galleys.
Among those present were Marco Polo, who had just recently returned from his adventures in the
East.210 This battle swayed heavily in the Genoese favor although they were unable to attack the
city. Most of the Venetian fleet was destroyed along with the capture of Marco Polo by the
Genoese. The next year, in 1299, Pisa, Venice, and Genoa made peace each swapping prisoners
and agreeing to stop fighting for some years.211
VI
Changes In Government (After 1200 A.D.)
Many significant events occurred in the years leading up to and during the 13th century
which effected the Venetian government and changed it into what will eventually manage and
maintain their empire. In 1192, Enrico Dandolo was elected Doge and is considered by many
historians to be responsible for the creation of Venice’s maritime empire.212 By this point in
time, Doges, upon their election, had to swear an additional oath stating that they will not act
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without the approval of the “Doge’s Council,” which is a “growing body of important Venetians
who represented various portions of the city.”213 This is significant, because this shows an oath
enumerating and limiting the powers of the Doge, which creates a nice system of checks, which
further highlights the Venetians’ distaste and distrust of concentrated power. During his time in
office, Dandolo created the first ever codification of civil and criminal laws in Venice, and made
it publicly accessible for the people to acknowledge.214 This will later be improved upon by
Doge Giacomo Tiepolo who created the Statuto, which is an “extensive codification of Venetian
civil law.”215 This served as the basis of Venetian civil law for centuries. In addition to this,
Dandolo also reformed the Venetian coinage system initiating the first token, quartarolo, and the
first silver coin, grosso, the last of which became an international coin of exchange bearing the
image of the Venetian Doge receiving a banner from the winged lion.216 This stands as a symbol
of the economic and political might Venice possessed at the time.
Later on, under the Dogeship of Vitale II Michiel, Venice saw a new transformation in
their system of organization. This Doge separated Venice into six sestieri, or districts, which
included San Marco, Cannaregio, Santa Croce, San Polo, and Dorsoduro.217 This is significant
because it greatly improved the local administration for each area of Venice, and also will in
later days serve as the system for distributing the mail.
Throughout all these ideas and institutions, the Venetians were careful as their feared the
formation of factional groups that would place the interests of the group ahead of the city, which
could prove detrimental for everyone. Therefore, in order to avoid this, the Venetians created a
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rigorous system of checks and balances to avoid partisan politics. This election process was
designed “to filter out partisanship while enlisting the wisdom of men and the will of God to
make the best choice for the people of Venice.”218 Without going over the entire process to elect
the Doge, a long arduous process is set in motion that begins with plucking a random boy from
the streets in order to select and read wax balls with paper slips inside, that will eventually select
the 41 individual council members who then selected the Doge. The election process was
designed “to be so cumbersome that only God could influence” the outcome.219 This created a
new, stable, and most importantly, peaceful method of electing the most powerful individual in
Venice.
Also, during the 13th century, Venice’s population, as previously stated, nearly doubled
over the course of a few hundred years. A consequence of this was that the number of wealthy
individuals increased, and they all wanted to serve in political office with the goal of attempting
to achieve more power for their families and themselves. This saw increased numbers of
members in the Doge council, which eventually began meeting on their own and formed the
Great Council, which was made up of important and wealthy men and is described by many to be
the “engine of the Venetian Republic.”220 This body had internal elections and acted as a sort of
“gatekeeper” for entering into higher offices in Venice. This body increased in size with the
number of wealthy citizens, which caused anger from the original members who wanted to keep
the Great Council restricted. In 1289, Pietro Gradenigo was elected as the next Doge and devised
a plan to deal with the situation.221 The problem with the great council was that there were too
many families who wanted to enter and not enough space. In order to deal with this, Doge
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Gradenigo reformed the Great Council by making it easier for men to join it, and what had been
a few hundred man council became one with 1,100 members by 1300 AD.222 To compare this to
a larger country, it would be as if 1 percent of an entire populace worked and served within the
government. However, this did not fully solve the problem of those who wanted the council to be
more limited. Therefore, in order to appease both sides, in 1323 the Great Council was closed
and accepted no more members, meaning that only ancestors of the members already within the
council could enter. This event is known as the Serrata, or closing.223 Some viewed this event as
a defeat for democracy, however, others, like Madden, view this as a step in the right direction.
Despite the closing:
“The reforms that led to the Serrata had dramatically increased participation in the
Venetian government, making it more representative in the world. The Serrata did not
create an oligarchy, since hundreds of families and well over a thousand members were
included in the council. Instead, it gave certainly to those important families that their
position in government and society could not be taken from them. The Serrata, therefore
had the effect of dousing the most virulent forms of factionalism in the Great Council.
And it was, in any case, never a complete closure. Venetians who distinguished
themselves by extraordinary service to the state could still gain membership for
themselves and their family—although this was appropriately rare.”224
Therefore, one can still acknowledge how this act did indeed expand the representation within
the Great Council. Even though the council was technically “closed,” some exceptions were
made for great deeds that certain citizens accomplished, such as the Polo family after their
expeditions into the East.
By the start of the 14th century, Venice had a specific hierarchy of government. At the
bottom (not to suggest this body is weak, but instead to imply the sheer size of this group and
exclusivity toward male citizens) was the Arengo, which consisted of all male citizens and
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confirmed the election of the Doge. Above them is the Great Council, who were responsible for
running the day to day activities within the city as well as electing members to the council of 40
and the council of 60, known as the Senate. The council of 40 served as a sort of court of appeals
and prepared legislation for the Great Council to debate. In addition, this body was responsible
for electing the three heads of the Great Council or Capi, who were the presiding officers during
the meetings. The Senate was tasked with commanding fleets, naming captains, and sending
emissaries, although, they still did require greater approval from the Great Council to decide
anything. Above the Great Council and their sub groups were the Doge’s Council, which
consisted of 6 men from the 6 districts of Venice and served for one year in office. The highest
position of government was the Doge and the Signoria, which consisted of the Doge, his council,
and the three Capi which created a body of 10 members who commanded the Great Council.225
Genoa did not have an easy time creating a government during this century. In 1216, with
the continual rise in factional and civil strife within the city, the Genoese began giving their
Podesta additional powers. This did create some stability, however it did not end the crime
spreading across the city from factional feuds.226 This continued throughout the century. In 1257,
the Genoese saw the rise of the Popolo, or people who held two fundamental beliefs that forced
them to act in the face of all this civil strife. These beliefs were that first, “the violence of their
self-proclaimed betters, the nobles, needed to be controlled because it weakened the city by
involving others in factional strife” and “second, the people paid for wars through excise taxes
on basic commodities like salt, while the wealthy profited from the ways taxes were leased to
them or pledged to pay the interests on loans. Thus the power of the nobles to upset the city and
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their control over its purse strings gave the people reason enough to rise.”227 This served as their
primary justification for creating additional unrest in a city plagued by war.
This is the environment that allowed Guglielmo Boccanergria to enter into the spotlight
and become known as the “Captain of the People.”228 He was a wealthy and skilled politician
who seemed to appease both the Guelf and Ghibelline factions. In 1257, conflicts began in Acre
and the Levant where 52 Genoese galleys were destroyed by Venetian fleets.229 This was a great
Venetian victory and greatly affected the Genoese’s ability to conduct trade within the Latin
states in the Middle East. Boccanegria saw this as a potential opportunity with which to unite the
people against a common foe, the Venetians, and inspired them with his promise of finding
friendly markets in the Middle East.230 This worked for a time and allowed him to also push
through some temporary reforms such as canceling some tolls, changed the old tithe system,
placing a check on the church, and with these changes, he was able to establish friends among
merchants.231
One major concern at this time, was that Genoa was reeling from debts and loans that
they owed. Due to this, Boccanegria attempted to reform the system of taxation by creating a
new shareholder system that turned the state’s debt into mortgaged revenue. This new found
source of income allowed Genoa to begin many building projects such as the Palazzo San
Giorgio, which was a new palace. Along with this, were additional wharfs, a new harbor (Molo
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Vechio), and the construction of a new public building, which served as the center for politics,
thus leaving the citizenry with an alternative option instead of using notable family’s homes.232
This allowed the people to become more independent from the aristocracy.
Boccanegria focused on a new foreign policy revolving around revenge toward Venice
and attempting to find new trading partners. Emperor Michael Palaeologus, who recreated the
Byzantine Empire after defeating the short-lasting Latin one, decided to befriend Genoa as they
were looking for a naval ally at the time.233 In return for this, Genoa received a plethora of trade
rights; however, this deal was not as well liked as Boccanegria had hoped. Pope Urban IV
excommunicated Genoa for their new Greek alliance. This also proved to be unpopular at home
for Boccanegria as several attempts were made on his life.234 This effectively ended
Boccanegria’s rule and brought Genoa back to a government headed by a Podesta. The war with
Venice continued until 1270 when the Pope intervened in a 15 year truce, most likely in the
hopes of attempting to start a new crusade.
Like clockwork, when relations with Venice turned peaceful, the Genoese once again
began erupting into civil and factional strife. Caffaro reports that in 1270, the very same year
they achieved peace with Venice, Genoa:
In that same year the Genoese city, with all the countryside, lived in bitterness. Such
division reigned between citizens and countrymen that poisonous actions proliferated
throughout the villages and localities of the commune of Genoa. Homicides and thefts
were committed indifferently, because of which banishments from both [city and
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countryside] were innumerable for those who caused riots in public streets, insulted men,
and committed murder and despoiled their enemies and other travelers.”235
Political divides widened with people either siding with the Papal authority or the Holy Roman
Emperor, as this was still a point of intense contention in the city. It appeared that no matter what
the Genoese tried, they were ultimately unable to quell the unrest. In 1310 Henry VII, emperor of
the HRE, traveled to Italy to be crowned in Rome. Due to decades of continues economic and
political strife, the Genoese willingly gave up self-rule to Henry for about 20 years. They did this
“not in the face of external force, for Henry’s power and resources were limited, but because
self-rule no longer worked.”236
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3 “A Clash of City-States: Rivals Confronted”
By the start of the 13th century, the basic framework of Venetian Empire had been
established and was invigorated by the wealth of the Venetian people and economy. Besides the
multitude of different trade ports and destinations merchants had, Venice also underwent a
cosmetic and functional transformation. The canals that weaved throughout the city experienced
new clearings as the people drudged out the silt that had formed for decades within these
waterways.237 To add to this, the Venetians also managed to better stabilize the land that the city
rested on as the shifting tides within the lagoon posed a constant threat to the security and
support mechanisms of the buildings, and also better defined the districts of the city.238 These
were important improvements that the city required in order to operate the trading empire Venice
has finally became after the 13th century. As far as trading is concerned, this information is best
conveyed by Crouzet-Pavan who states:
“The overall picture of the Venetians’ merchant ubiquity runs thus: Venetians were active
in the Black Sea, where commercial exchanges intensified thanks to the constitution of
the Tartar Khanate of the Golden Horde in Southern Russia. They had a foothold at
Sudak, on the east coast of the Crimean Peninsula, from which they exported grains, furs,
and slaves. An agreement with the Sultanate of Rum facilitated trade with the Asia Minor
Coast. We also find them in markets in Egypt, still their preferred source for goods from
the Orient. They ruled as masters in Acre and Tyre. In the Adriatic their monopoly was
undisputed. Finally, they ventured more bravely into the western Mediterranean.
Although a Venetian presence cannot be attested in Spain at this date and they did not
manage to bring the Genoese and the Pisans to their knees, they nonetheless intensified
their relations with Tunis, Bejai, and Ceuta.”239
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However, this commercial prosperity did not last forever. However, up until this point of
economic downturn for Venice, both Genoa and Venice were essential to the thriving and vibrant
economy of the Mediterranean Sea. These two city-states were critical in creating this trade
network that spanned throughout the Mediterranean, including the very profitable lands and trade
routes of the Eastern Mediterranean, which served as the gateway to the Black Sea, Palestine,
and Egypt. Furthermore, during this century, both city-states will be “locked in a deadly battle to
preserve their own sea lanes and destroy those of their rival[s].”240 Furthermore, both Genoa and
Venice have been described as vanguards who “geographically…tried to reach as far as possible
in Asia…Institutionally…tried to devise better ways to do business to accumulate larger amounts
of less risky capital, to administer companies, and to monopolize the markets for commodities
and money,” and “technologically… developed impressive sophistication in navigation,
shipbuilding, and armaments.”241 In truth, these city-states did not appear at first to be major
players in the Mediterranean context, but proved over the course of history that these small
republics could and did expand, mostly commercially but also territorially.
Due to the Mamluck invasions in the Levant along with Genoa’s new role of protecting
the newly conquered Constantinople, Venice saw herself cut off or severely restricted when
dealing with areas in and around the Middle East. Despite this however, Venice’s commercial
prowess can be seen extending farther than any other city-state within the Mediterranean. The
wealth of Venetian merchants is illustrated by the adventures of Marco Polo and his father
Niccolo Polo. The Polo family consisted of good businessmen and were well respected in the
city. Upon an excursion, Nicolo Polo saw himself trapped on the wrong side of the Black Sea
240
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shortly after the Greeks recaptured Constantinople from the short lasting Latin dynasty that had
situated there. Without an easy way to return home, Nicolo traveled east. He ended up living
with the Mongols for a few years until he arrived at the Great Khans palace where he met Kublai
Khan, the leader of the Mongol Empire.242 Kublai Khan showered Nicolo with gifts and riches
and talked incessantly about his fascination with the West and Christianity in general.243 Due to
his fascination with Christianity, Kublai Khan requested Nicolo do a favor for the Great Khan.
His request was for Nicolo to personally deliver a message to Pope Clement IV. This message
requested that 100 scholars who could teach his people about trivium and quadrivium (advanced
courses of study) as well as those who could convince his people about the true faith of
Christianity.244 Nicolo returned 1 year later and personally delivered the letter to Pope Gregory
X, as Pope Clement IV had recently passed away. The new Pope saw this as a potential
opportunity to fight the Muslims and save Europe from further invasions. The Pope sent back a
reply accompanied by Nicolo Polo, Marco Polo, and two Dominicans.245 They eventually made
their way to Beijing where the Khan was thrilled to see them. He was especially intrigued by
Marco Polo who he grew quite close to. While in Beijing, Marco Polo served as Kublai Khan’s
ambassador as he “particularly liked Marco’s very Venetian approach to his ambassadorships. In
Venice, ambassadors were essentially spies; in fact, it was their job not only to relate information
to a foreign court but also to send back to the Venetian government dispatches reporting
everything of importance, be it customs, rumors, or even local foods.”246After two decades in
service, the Khan granted permission for the Polos to leave, and after escorting an important
Princess to her future husband, the Khan of Persia, both Marco and Nicolo made their way back
242
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to Venice accompanied by an escort of many ships filled with letters for European leaders, gold,
and a multitude of different gems and presents.247 With this, the Polo family became even more
wealthy and more importantly, the city of Venice prospered from the accomplishing relations
with the Khan that not many Europeans would even dare to imagine, thus displaying the reach
and wealth of the city and its citizens.
For Genoa, the 13th century was a turbulent year for trade as kingdoms rose and fell.
Trade declined for Genoa within the Levant due to a series of invasions from the Mamluks and
attacks by the Venetians during the first half of the 13th century. Furthermore, a great divergence
began to appear as Eastern trade routes began to become more dangerous. This divergence was
the product of what began in 1258 “when the Mongols destroyed Baghdad and established their
rival capital at Tibrez,” which decreased the attractiveness of trade routes leading to Baghdad as
risk had grown considerably.248 In addition, trade virtually stopped with the Byzantine Empire
and Frankish states after the forth crusade and shrewd negotiating of the Venetians in excluding
Genoa from these markets. Trade in Sicily and Naples fell to virtually nothing due to their
uneasy relationship with Charles of Anjou who now ruled both of these territories.249 Finally,
Genoa also suffered in Alexandria and Romania, in part, due to the Venetians, but also, due to
the fact that the attention of the Genoese was never solely fixed upon trade. Instead, Genoa was
forced to pay attention to constant rebellions and uprisings that were occurring within Genoa
herself and the surrounding countryside.250 Therefore, with the traditional trade destinations no
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longer serving as prosperous ports, the Genoese chose to look elsewhere. With this, the
merchants looked to North Africa, Sicily, Catalonia, and Province in order to continue the trade
revenue into the city.251 Catalonia and Venice both became significant rivals to Genoa during
this century as far as commercial enterprises were concerned. However, despite “the rapidly
changing political situation in the Mediterranean, the Genoese continued to find ways to prosper
through long distance trade,” which “took some Genoese to the Black and Caspian Seas and the
Atlantic Ocean in search of favorable markets in an increasingly competitive world.”252
In addition, Genoa saw a series of industrial changes within the city. For example,
weapons and ships were in high demand due to the crusades that occur during this century. They
began creating structures that could produce weapons and reorganized the maritime shipbuilding
jobs into the shipbuilders or master shipwrights, rope and sail makers, provisioners and coopers,
followed by the stevedores who loaded and unloaded the vessels.253 Despite reorganization and
finding new destinations for trade, the economic situation remained dire as the commune
remained in almost constant debt to creditors. In 1214 the commune of Genoa appointed a
council of Nobles to look into the finances of the city and essentially proposed a tax overhaul in
order to fix the growing debt.254 This overhaul was actually quite effective, although short lasting
as Genoa’s constant shifting between civil unrest and warfare caused the commune to spend
immense amounts of money throughout this century.
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Now that the previous chapters have established a historical context along with an
overview of the institutions in which these city-states were built and relied upon, we can now
begin to explore specific moments in history that will demonstrate a city-state’s level of
eagerness to engage in military conflicts and their resolve to see these wars through. These
patterns will be revealed by exploring a city-states adaptive nature in responding to varying
degrees of threats, in which city-states have a plethora of options in their arsenal, and will
respond either militarily, politically, diplomacy, or with commercial incentives to achieve their
goals. To be more specific, this chapter will focus on the Venetian-Genoese wars that occurred in
the latter part of the 13th century and continued through the 14th century. During this time
interval, three large significant wars broke out between these two polities: in 1294, 1350, and
1378. This pattern of debilitating wars that Venice enters over the course of the 14th century
helps to explain the path Venice chose to take in order to build their Terraferma, or land based
empire, which can be seen in the 15th century. In addition, these wars explain Genoa’s weakened
state entering the 15th century and why that city-state ultimately succumbed to foreign
intervention and why they chose to accept foreign rule in place of independence. This period of
time, stretching from the end of the thirteenth century through to the fifteenth century, serves as a
perfect lens with which to view both Venice and Genoa as their institutions and cities will be put
to the test while attempting to navigate these perilous times, which saw many wars break out,
economic crisis ensue, and also the appearance of the “Black Death” in the mid-fourteenth
century, which would rock the very foundations of the Mediterranean world.
According to John Martin and Denis Romano who wrote Venice Reconsidered, a book
that offers a fresh look at the Republic of Venice with the most recent documentation on the city,
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illustrates that this was a particularly trying and troubling time for Venice who found itself over
extended and without many allies close to home. They further asserted that this century was:
“Sandwiched between these two periods of expansion and growth is the problematic 14th
century. Venice’s claim to dominance of the Adriatic and the Mediterranean had come
under siege. The decisive defeat of Pisa and the hands of the Genoa in 1284 and the
resurgence of Byzantine power in the eastern Mediterranean once again made Genoa a
formidable threat to Venetian commerce in the East. Venice’s hegemony in the Adriatic
were challenged by Bologna and Ancona. The key port of Zara, on the Dalmatian coast,
essential to Venetian control of the Adriatic, was in rebellion, encouraged by the
Hungarians. At home, food shortages and a constricting economy resulted in general
unrest marked by sporadic uprisings... The badly deteriorating political situation in the
latter part of the 13th century resulted in the much discussed piece of legislation that has
come to be called the ‘Serrata’ or ‘closing.’”255
As one can see from this, Genoa at the end of the 13th century saw their position increasingly
strengthened from a badly defeated Pisa and a strong alliance with the newly formed Byzantine
Empire centered in Constantinople. Although Venetians had gained considerable diplomatic and
naval recognition for their efforts in the fourth crusade at the beginning of the 13th century, these
benefits seem to have begun to fade and decline once the Genoese gained the upper hand after
1260. However, in the 15th century, these conditions seem to have been reversed with Venice
appearing to have regained much of their lost territory along with additional territorial
acquisitions in the Italian peninsula. Venice it seems, began to shift its attention from that of a
maritime empire to that of a more land based domain, a response to the war of Chioggia that saw
Venice herself besieged by enemies allied against her. This shift in attention is in part
responsible for the growing political, social, and cultural developments that will lead and inspire
the early Renaissance. At the same time, Genoa seems to have slid back to their old ways with
incessant civil conflict and uprisings debilitating the abilities of the Genoese commune and trade
fleet.
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Now it is important to take into consideration the fact that city-states view their
commercial operations and trading ventures as some of the most important functions of the city.
This will be explained and demonstrated at length such as during the opening phases of the
Battle of Chioggia when Pisani abandons a good portion of his fleet in order to save the Venetian
cargo vessels. With that in mind, one can see that over the course of this hundred or so years that
city-states like Venice and Genoa will risk everything and spare no cost in attempting to ensure
the protection of these financial routes. Venice and Genoa in particular, show an uncanny ability
to offer a significant number of varying responses that ended in only 3 major wars between these
two states, which, when looked at over the course of the entire history, shows a period in which
these two city-states acknowledge the fact that wars can be extremely costly and crippling to that
of the integrity of their spheres of influence.
Despite such beneficial economic booms in the 13th century, Europe and the
Mediterranean suffered near the end of the 13th century and continued until the 15th century when
this economic downturn was finally lifted. By the end of the 13th century, Charles of Anjou was
in Southern Italy attempting to create his kingdom, the Latin Based Empire in Constantinople
had fallen, along with the fall of Baghdad in 1258. When kingdoms are at war or when they fall
to ruin, chaos and uncertainty take hold, which leads to troubling economic times for that region,
despite any prosperity that had ensued prior to the downturn.
In addition to these events, further dramatic political shifts occurred due to the high
degree of change that ensued within the thirteenth century which helped ensue and create the
foundation for this period of “troubles” (14th century) as Abulafia phrases it.256 To begin with, a
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good number of crusades led by various European leaders, attempted to, in vain, secure and
protect the Latin Kingdoms of the Levant. Land continued to “shrink” in this area as Muslim
Kingdoms slowly began systematically wiping out the Latin Kingdoms of the Levant.
Several crusades were even aimed at Egypt, as many European leaders believed that the
Ayyubid Dynasty posed a greater threat to the Latin cities. A crusade launched in 1219 gained
brief success in capturing Damietta, but was ultimately repulsed, only to have the same thing
happen in 1248 when Louis IX, the King of France, also failed in conquering the city.257
However in 1250, military commanders of slave origin toppled the Ayyubid Dynasty in Egypt,
which ushered in a period of Mamluk rule in both Egypt and Syria.258 The Mamluks were
determined to drive out the Latin Kingdom and achieved their goal in 1291 when Acre, the last
Christian city, fell in the Levant, cutting off access to trade conducted by the Italian city-states
that had achieved monopolies in this area. In 1261, this situation intensified with the fall of the
Latin Kingdom situated in Constantinople by the Greeks of Nikaia, who sought to reclaim the
old capital of the Byzantine Empire in return for trading privileges and Black Sea trading
ports.259 However Egypt was also a pace for commercial expansion and not just military
conquest. The Venetians decided to refocus on this location during the latter 13th century. Venice
reportedly, in order to outmaneuver the Genoese, decided to “strengthen her relationship with the
new military caste of slave and former slave soldiers, a strategy that assumed heightened
significance in 1291 when the Mamluks” captured Acre, the last crusader city left in the
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Levant.260 The Genoese, “shifting their effort to the diplomatic front… allied themselves [in
1260] with Michael Palaeologus, one of several Greek claimants to the throne in Constantinople
and the one who seemed most likely to succeed in regaining that city”.261 The Greeks of Nikaia
accomplished this goal with the help of the Genoese who chose to act diplomatically instead of
engaging excessive hostilities. This of course, refers to the reasoning behind Genoese support for
the resurgence of Byzantine rule. Venice had achieved much from the forth crusade, placing
Genoa at a distinct disadvantage which they hoped to correct. Instead of engaging Venice headon in an all-out war, Genoa instead, chose to act through the Byzantines, which helped them
achieve their goals, which in turn, helped achieve Genoa’s goal of a weakened Venice.
Diplomacy alone, it seems, expanded Genoa’s trading options and simultaneously placed Venice
at a distinct disadvantage, as they were no friends of the new Byzantine Empire.
In the western Mediterranean, the situation was not any more tranquil. In the mid to latter
13th century, wars broke out between the Papal States and Frederick of the Holy Roman Empire
over claims to Northern Italy.262 Civil uprisings and internal conflicts spread throughout Italy and
Sicily. According to the Sicilian Vespers, on March 20th, 1282 in Sicily, men and women woke
up “to the sound of bells” where “messengers ran through the city calling on men of Palermo to
rise against the Oppressor [(French)]” and at once the streets “were full of angry men, crying
‘Death to the French.’”263 These uprisings are a result of both polities attempting to assert control
over Southern Italy. In addition, this naturally sparked unrest in a number of city-sates, as old
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political divisions between loyalties to the Guelfs and Ghibellines began to intensify. This was
further complicated by the wars to the South of Italy between Charles of Anjou and King Peter
III of Aragon over Sicily.264 This along with conflicts in North Africa, left a fractured
Mediterranean divided, due to internal conflicts and exterior wars.
During the latter 13th century and into the 14th century, three main wars were raged
between the Italian city-states of Genoa and Venice that significantly weakened their strategic
positions within the Mediterranean and placed even greater strains on their already stressed
institutions. These moments of conflict occurred due mostly to disputes centering on control of
the strategic Black Sea trade routes and their financial gains. Genoa, who had a trading base at
Caffa, focused on slaves, grains, dried fruits, local products, and good quality wax, whereas the
Venetians, located at Azoz, were more focused on luxury items.265 The fact that these rival cities
both had trading bases in such close proximity to each other within the Black Sea, caused
inevitable conflict. In order to wage war, city-states tended to favor preying on rival city-states
trade conveys, which economically can cripple a city-state if enough valued merchandise is
plundered. City-states were keen to develop strategies for assaulting these merchant vessels.
Susan Rosan who wrote Medieval Naval Warfare: 1000-1500, concludes that:
“Sailing was confined to the summer months between April and October, meant that
ships on trading voyages could be reliably found at certain “pinch points” on their routes
at well-known times. The effect of this was that an opposing fleet need only be ‘on
station’ for a short time to have a good chance of taking a high proportion of the enemy’s
trading vessels. Since trade was… of vital importance to both states, a successful actor
like this was not just commerce raiding but a severe blow to the losing states security.”266
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From this, one can see that the successful mastery of ascertaining these locations could yield a
city-state or an aggressor considerable income and severely weaken the security and well-being
of that city-state’s economy and social integrity.
Therefore, in the mid-thirteenth century, one can see the differences in responses and
tactics when hostilities were at a height between Venice in Genoa. In order to protect their
merchant vessels, the Venetian government organized there trade ships into conveys with armed
escorts called a muda.267 In terms of Genoa, they attempted to go on the offensive, sending large
fleets against large Genoese navies. Venice scored significant victories at Acre in 1258, near
Settepozzi in 1263, and at Trapani in 1266.268 Genoa in response to this, adapted and began
sending out smaller raiding parties targeting Venice’s merchant ships. In 1262, Genoese ships
managed to plunder a years’ worth of cargo and merchandise for the city arriving from the Black
Sea. In addition, in 1264, Admiral Simone Grillo tricked Venetian escorts into a false route and
captured the Venetian muda heading from Constantinople to Venice.269 Genoa and Venice both
realized that these conflicts were in fact working against their greater interests of trade
domination as they hurt their overall spheres of influence. After this decade on fighting, Abulafia
notes that Venice and Genoa had now achieved some level of relative peace. This chapter will
specifically address those instances of major conflict in 1294, 1350, and 1378, but will also
directly acknowledge the reasons as to why these moments occurred.
i.
The War of 1294: The Beginning of a New Era
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Before explaining the events of the first significant conflict between Venice and Genoa, it
is important to first understand the strategic positions and resources available at the time. This
influences into a number of factors such as fleet size. Fleets, which had numbered once over 100
during the ties of the early crusades, were reduced to about 60 galleys with a few notable
exceptions.270 In Genoa, ship production was mostly private, instead of a state enterprise.271 In
contrast, the Venetians, which had a state monopoly on shipbuilding, which were built in the
Arsenale and then the Novo Arsenale, which was constructed in 1304.272 By 1324, this shipbuilding complex was fully reformed and modernized to produce ships with the utmost
efficiency. This state monopoly created an environment that was not particularly nurturing of
innovation or technological advancement, which gave the Genoese an edge when fighting
Venetian vessels. Genoese ships during this time were “larger and better equipped” than the
Venetians, which could be due to lack of funds or the possibility that Venice was falling behind
in the technological race.273 The Venetian Senate chose to build the Novo Arsenale in response
to an increasingly dangerous shift in power toward the Genoese. In 1301, they also “declared that
it was necessary to arm a permanent squadron for the protection of ‘the Gulf’ (Adriatic Sea).”274
This further demonstrates the nature of city-states to adapt in varying degrees to the threats posed
against their city and holdings.
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Although as previously stated, these two city-states did engage in extensive naval and
military operations. Both Venice and Genoa engaged in “complex naval operations over large
stretches of the Mediterranean involving a sophisticated understanding of time and geography,
utilizing the intelligence gathering, subterfuge, and variety of stratagems to bring enemies fleets
to battle on favorable terms.”275 These complex naval operations included extensive preying on
each other’s commercial shipping, which offers an explanation as to the severe decline of their
commercial and military power during various portions of the 14th century. By 1294, Genoa was
unquestionably the dominant force as far as western traders were concerned in Romania.276 This
was made possible by good relations with the Byzantines, which became essential for those
seeking to access the profitable waters of the Black Sea. This was made even more important
after the fall of the last Latin Kingdoms along the Levant. Genoa, by this time, also had major
colonies in Pera, adjacent to Constantinople, Caffa in Crimea, Tana within the Sea of Azov, and
Chios in the Aegean.277 Venice, on the other hand, had many colonies and bases along the
Aegean and the Peloponnese, the Island of Crete, and several islands within the Aegean that
were controlled by Venetian noblemen but were not a part of the Serenissima.278 This gave
Venice extensive control over the waters of the Aegean, Adriatic, and those around Crete, which
they feared safety for, due to the rising threat of Genoa. That, and the fact that Venice was
increasingly interested in reestablishing trade routes through the Black Sea, which were being
blocked by the Genoese.
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This in turn resulted in the inevitable war in which Venice felt the ever growing presence
of the Genoese. By the end of the 13th century, one could see that “Genoese tactical superiority
was as overwhelming as the Venetians’ had been at mid-century.”279 This in part is due to the
utter defeat of the Pisans at the hands of the Genoese navy during the battle of Meloria in 1284,
granting them partial supremacy in the west. During the onset of the war in 1294, the Genoese
base at Pera “raised a scratch fleet of hastily armed merchant ships…though outnumbered….[the
Genoese] inflicted a severe defeat on the overconfident Venetians, capturing most of their
vessels.”280 In addition, the Genoese also caught the Venetian muda bound from Armenia off the
port of Lajazzo and captured the majority of the goods the convoy contained.281 This
demonstrates a tough start for the Venetians who have fallen victim to several of the advantages
that Genoa possessed, including skilled sailors against over confident ones along with the
strategy of preying on Venetian muda. This was in truth made more complicated with the
“extension of the sailing season year round… made the task of choking off an enemy’s
commerce by interception of a single convey impossible. The galley’s limitations as a
blockading craft were considerably more evident in these new conditions of navigation.”282 This
explains why Venice was still able to operate in this war despite these two significant defeats.
For Genoa however, one of their most controversial “victories” occurred in 1295. During
this year, Genoa “dispatched 165 galleys and 35,000 men,” a sizable maritime fleet the likes of
which the Mediterranean would not see again for another 300 years, “but the Venetians evaded it
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and the armada was forced to slink home.”283 The armada had been sent to Messina in Sicily, and
had “dared” the Venetians to engage them, who were not so foolish to accept. However, this
endeavor was not without a high price. Shortly after the return of the fleet and following the
news of this “unparalleled and fruitless effort, and to some extent as a result of strain of
financing and manning it, bitter internecine fighting broke out among the opposing parties at
Genoa. No fleet at all was sent out that year while a Venetian fleet of some 70 galleys attacked
Genoese processions in Romania, including even Pera and Caffa.”284 This shows how city-states
must balance victory and defeat with the rising tide of civil unrest that the communes must learn
to control in order to survive.
In 1298, the ‘deciding’ battle of the war occurred. This was not necessarily deciding in
the manner of utter destruction of one side’s fleets followed up by the invasion of the capital
city; instead it was due to continuing unrest in Genoa that made them unable to continue the
fight. The Battle occurred at the island of Curzola within the Adriatic, which was uncomfortably
close for the Venetians. The battle consisted of 96 Venetian galleys led by Andrea Dandolo and
77 Genoese galleys under the command of Lamba Doria.285 Genoa won a crushing victory over
the Venetians sinking or capturing most of the Venetian galleys. Genoa also captured thousands
of Venetian sailors, including the notorious Marco Polo, who was then imprisoned in Genoa.286
However, after this great victory, the Genoese fleet did not continue onto Venice and besiege the
city. Instead, they had to return home to deal with the growing civil war “between the Guelfs and
the Ghibelline government of the metropolis growing increasingly dangerous and with the
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expense of maintaining hostilities growing increasingly burdensome, [Genoa] needed to end this
war on two fronts.”287 Genoa found this not to be too difficult to cease hostilities as all parties
seemed to want to bring an end to the conflict. This in part is due to the large number of
prisoners the Genoese now possessed both from Venice and Pisa during their conflicts. People
are a resource that city-states must be very cautious and aware of so as not to find themselves
under populated and vulnerable. Furthermore, “the Venetian failure to achieve decisive results by
their attempt to destroy all of Genoa’s eastern commerce in the strenuous campaign of 1297 and
the inability of Genoa to follow a naval victory with an attack on the enemy home city led to the
peace.”288
In the end, not much was resolved as the balance of power had not shifted significantly
due to these military ventures. Pisa was still too weak to threaten Genoese dominance, and all
three city-states agreed to exchange/ransom prisoners. However the main problem and key
source of the conflict which was, the question of control over the Black Sea and Romania, were
left unresolved. During the course of this conflict, both sides “were able to put out substantial
fleets as great costs.”289 This was the first of a number of wars that prove to be more costly than
beneficial as they realize that neither side is able to gain substantial progress against the other.
Roger Crowley who wrote City of Fortune believes that the war “was conducted beyond the
point of tactical reason and was immensely damaging to both parties” and that even “when the
Pope attempted to arbitrate and meet half the costs of the Venetian claims personally, the
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Republic was seized by irrational emotions and refused.”290 Despite the fact that both sides
understood the risks and costs of extended naval warfare, it appears that neither was willing to
enter into serious peace negotiations until they absolutely had to. This could be a result of
desperate efforts on the part of the Venetians in order to curb the growing power of the
Venetians, thus enabling them to allow a high degree of risk in order to achieve this goal.
ii.
The New Century and “The Black Death”
Before discussing the second major conflict, it is essential to first look at the 50 year gap
between the end of the first war in 1299 and the beginning of the second in 1350. Several
significant political events along with disasters brought by the Black Death, wreak havoc on the
Mediterranean state of affairs. The first of these events occurred in 1308 between three brothers
seeking control of Ferrera, located along the Po River. One of the individuals seeking control,
“Fresco, sought and received Venetian military support. For the Venetians, this seemed a golden
opportunity to gain substantial control over the commercially important Po.”291 In Medieval Italy
at this time, most political factions were split between the Guelfs and the Ghibellines. Madden
reports that “these groups dated back to the eleventh century and the dispute is between the
popes and the German Emperors of Italy. Since those same disputes regularly resurfaced and
were often mixed liberally with Italian city-state independence, German wealth, and the freedom
of the church…broadly speaking, the Guelfs were pro-papal, while the Ghibellines were proimperial.”292 The Venetians aligned with the Ghibellines in an effort to subvert Papal control
over the region since they technically were the overlords of the city. Therefore, it is not
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surprising that when Pope Clement V opposed Fresco’s claim and instead supported his Guelf
brother, hostilities ensued. The Papacy had offered Venice control over Ferrera as vassals who
paid an annual rent, but the Great Council refused this, seeking to avoid undermining their
authority to some foreign ruler.293
This did not bode well with the Papal States. In response to their refusal, Clement V
issued a formal Bull of excommunication against Doge Gradenigo and placed the city of Venice
under interdict. Despite this move, Doge Gradenigo was under the opinion that “Venetians…
need to safeguard their future in a dangerous world” thus “an opportunity like this to acquire firm
control over shipping on the Po would not likely present itself again” and should be sought after
by all means.294 Shortly thereafter, Venice annexed Ferrera. The pope, enraged by the Venetians
actions, issued a crusade against the republic in 1309, and placed a devastating bull against the
people of Venice, further excommunicating the Signoria and all Venetian citizens. Property
throughout Christian lands were seized. Venice had acquired many enemies, grown jealous from
Venice’s monopoly over much of the East, and thus many nations flocked to this crusade. The
course of the war did not last long. The Venetian garrison at Ferrera was struck by disease, and
quickly defeated by the crusader forces. Venice was unable to respond due to an unsuccessful
coup in June of 1309 that left the people and government shocked.295 Due to the recent coup
attempt and internal unrest, the Venetian commune created a new council charged with
overseeing the security implementations passed by the Great Council. This new body was called
the Council of Ten, whose responsibilities included overseeing the Signori di Notte—city guards
who ensured no citizen entered the city armed, organize security for great council members,
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intelligence gathering, diplomatic missions, investigating treason, and seeing that each sestieri of
each district could provide enough well trained guards to ensure protection and maintenance of
peace within the districts in addition to being able to respond to emergencies on behalf of the
city.296
The Venetians risked much in their efforts to expand their territory in the Italian
mainland, which is the first instance of many that this city will undertake in order to enable their
home-field security. In the wake of their defeat, they realized exactly how much they risked
when the Signoria witnessed a portion of its city rise up against them. The Signoria proved
robust along with their institutions sound, which allowed them to weather this coup and
implement reforms like the Council of Ten, which they hoped would rectify the potential future
unrest.
This conflict with the Papacy will continue to surface well into the 15th, 16th, and 17th
century as Italian city-states, such as Venice and the Papal States vie for control of the Italian
mainland possessions. For example Pope Sixtus IV established an interdict on Venice in 1482,
which brought about a short struggle between these two entities over the Venetians claim and
siege of Ferrera. The interdict by Pop Sixtus read as:
“If within 15 days the lords of Venice fail to raise the siege of Ferrera, they themselves
and their subjects, supporters, advisors, and adherents, together with other specified
cities, lands and places subject their rule, not to mention all persons both lay and clerical
dwelling therein, shall, if they fail to obey the prescribed admonitions, orders and
commandments, be accursed and excommunicate in their persons, while their possessions
be laid open to plunder by all nations.”297
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This demonstrates the Papacy’s power when going to war with any Christian nation under their
religious sovereignty as states must be cautious when dealing with the Pope due to this ability.
As we will see more in the next chapter, the Venetians are able to enter into conflict multiple
times with the Papacy while walking the fine line of excommunication and hat that will mean for
their city.
Venice, now seeing the East become increasingly dangerous, began to look elsewhere to
supplement any potential losses due to the fact that they were now beginning to lag behind the
Genoese in trade. In 1317, Venice “set up regular maritime routes between the Mediterranean
and the North Sea (Flanders and England)…Venetian ships could carry goods from the East far
into the West taking on cargos of metals, wool, and textiles for the return voyage.”298 Routes like
these become more prevalent among city-states as the Atlantic begins to open up due to
technological advances in shipping. This in turn brings about more interlopers entering the
Mediterranean world.
In 1329, a new growing threat emerged near Venice within the Italy mainland. Verona
had fallen to the Della Scala family who were openly hostile to Venice and other city-states in
the area, and eventually expanded their territory adjacent to traditional Venetian lands.299 This
family imposed stiff taxes on Venetian goods, causing a potential threat as this caused grain
prices to rise. The city of Venice along had over 100,000 mouths to feed, which explains the
potential economic and social crisis that could erupt should there be shortages of food. Their war
cries for open conflict with some pushing for Venice to expand into the mainland. However, the
Venetians, overall, preferred to not have outright war. Doge Francesco Dandolo did not truly like
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the idea of expanding Venice onto the mainland and believed they were “sailors and
businessmen, not soldiers and farmers.”300 Even though Venice had decided not to engage into
open war with the Della Scala family, word spread throughout Italy that it had. It is not fully
known whether this was intentional or not, however, what is certain, is that Venice greatly
prospered from this news.
The Della Scala family had wasted no time in creating enemies throughout the mainland
through their territorial conquests and harsh taxes. Many enemies of the Della Scala family sent
money and various forms of support in the hope that Venice would be powerful enough to
eliminate this threat. In addition, the Visconti of Milan, Estes of Ferrara, and the Gonzagas of
Mantura, offered military assistance and formed a league with the Venetians to crush the Della
Scalas.301 The war was over by 1337, which saw Venice come into procession of Padua and
Treviso. Upon this victory, Machiavelli reports that the Florentines did not benefit much from
this alliance with Venice because the Venetians, “like all who enter into league with less
powerful states than themselves, having acquired Trevigi and Vicenza, made peace with Mastino
[della Scala] without the least regard for the Florentines.”302 Padua was awarded to the Carraras
Family that had helped Venice throughout the war, but Treviso was added to the Venetian
Republic, making it the first of many future mainland acquisitions to come.303 Despite the fact
that Doge Francesco Dandolo had opposed open war, he was not amenable to the fact that
fortune seemed to have turned against the Della Scala family and was quick to act
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diplomatically, securing alliances in Italy and allowing Venice to reward herself with Treviso for
committing a “service” for the Italian mainland overall.
By 1314, Genoa had finally reasserted itself for Imperial rule, which it allowed itself to
come under due to the ongoing civil unrest that had begun at the end of the 1294 war with
Venice. However, from this period of 1317 to 1330-31, Genoa was engaged in a bloody civil war
with various families and political factions vying for control.304 This in turn could provide a
reason for a growing new presence in the western Mediterranean, the Catalans, which were a
new conglomerate of city-states under the central authority of Barcelona. The major outcomes of
this civil war is the heavy financial burden placed on the citizens of Genoa along with new
fortifications that were erected around the city as Genoa saw itself attacked considerably from
insurgents along its countryside, providing an excuse to reinforce the defense of the city.305
Around the same time in 1332, Venice set out again to expand its trade operations into
the Black Sea. After normalizing basic relations with the Byzantines, the Venetians sent Nicolo
Giustinian, and ambassador and businessmen who “journeyed across the winter steppes to the
Mongol court at Saray to request an audience with the Khan of the Golden Horde.”306 This was
granted in 1333, where Nicolo spoke to the Great Khan on behalf of the Venetians “to beg the
khan to allow the establishment of a trading colony and to grant commercial privileges at the
settlement of Tana, on the Sea of Azoz.”307 This was an important site that Venice hoped to
acquire. Tana, was within a location “well situated at the heart of the western Mongol Kingdom,
ideally placed for journeys north to Moscow and Nizhni Novgorod, the river routes of the Don
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and the Volga, and at the very head of the trans-Asian silk-road” in addition to the Sea of Azov
being familiar terrain for Venetians who were used to “estuarine lakes with a mean depth of 8
meters, whose channels and hidden shoals made travel difficult” for those not raised on the
waters of the Venetian lagoons.308 This new trading base did not sit well with the Genoese, who
was already battling the Venetians in other regions for monopolies in trade. The Genoese had felt
the Black Sea and Sea of Azov to be their domain and resented the Venetians for interfering in it.
The Venetian Senate also acknowledged the dangers of this new site, and they viewed Tana “as
being precariously positioned ‘at the limits of the world and in the jaws of our enemies.’”309 In
1341, the Great Khan, whom Nicolo Giustinian negotiated with, died, ushering in a period of
uncertainty for the Italian city-states doing business in this region.
The next major political events that ensued and rocked the foundation of the
Mediterranean were brought about by the Black Death or Bubonic Plague, which threw both the
European and Islamic worlds off balance. For the Islamic world, the Bubonic plague struck here
first, presenting a new natural disaster that these states must deal with on top of the Christian
attacks from the west and internal conflicts within their respective states. Ibn Khaldun, an Arab
historian from this time, writes in 1348 that “A destructive plague…overtook the dynasties at the
time of their senility…it lessened their power…Their situation approached the point of
annihilation and dissolution…Civilization decreased with the decease of mankind. Cities were
laid waste…The entire inhabited world changed.”310 Khaldun also had previously noted that this
crisis was preceded by a period of economic downturn, which were caused most likely by the
economic crisis growing in the Mediterranean at this time. Trade it seems, concerning gold and
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commercial routes were cut drastically. The trade routes between North Africa and “the Sudan
declined considerably, then almost ceased completely” as a result to this biological crisis.311
Leading up to this at the beginning of the 14th century close to the 1340s, Europe
appeared to be on the verge of an economic crisis. Famines were widespread due to population
increase and financial institutions appeared to be failing.312 The culprits for those responsible for
bringing the plague to Europe were, in fact, the Genoese, who caught the plague at their “trading
base at Caffa in Crimea not by merchants but by Mongol Armies, who besieged Caffa in 1347”
thus prompting “several Italian ships to flee from the war in the Crimea. Their path took them to
Constantinople, but, even if they were not infected, there were stowaways onboard who were—
black rats who relished the grain that filled the holds of the Black Sea fleets and who carried
plague flees, which also found homes in the bales of cloth in the cargo hold.”313 By 1347 the
plague was devastating the Byzantine Capital, as it began to spread from there as people tried
desperately to flee the disease. Later that year, those Genoese merchant vessels had reached
Messina, the first European port to be infected.314
The Black Death spread across European in a matter of years. It is said that potentially
half the population of Europe perished in this crisis and major effects on the “social, economic,
religious, and political life of the people of the Mediterranean.”315 In some places, such as
Catalonia, up to 60 to 70% of the population perished as its spread intensified, taking on
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“pneumonic form that could kill within hours of breathe-born infection.”316 This plague of the
14th century might have been “the main agent in transformation within the Mediterranean and the
lands beyond that led to the creation of a new order.”317 However, this was not the only factor
and severed as an unbiased and independent variable in the grand scheme of affairs.
The Black Death served to alter the framework, severely depleting populations of cities
and severing lines of trade and communications, but also lessened the severity of the strain on
the commercial, political, and social institutions of the state that were already under pressure
from the growing populations. As such, although famine initially broke out as a result of the
Black Death because there weren’t many people left to work the fields, this corrected itself
quickly as there were fewer demands for foodstuffs in general. The great trading city populations
of Venice and Genoa collapsed as the disease spread quickly through their narrow alleyways and
tight streets.318 Venice alone had lost up to two thirds of its population along with losing the
blood lines of 50 noble families. Roger Crowley writes that:
“During the summer of 1348 the black-draped pontoons punted slowly through the fetid
canals. The terrible cry rose up: ‘Dead bodies!’ ‘Dead bodies!’ Every house was
compelled by punitive edicts to bring out corpses. Extraordinary measures were put in
place to try to stem the death rate. A special health committee was convened; ships
suspected of being infected were burned; all trade ground to a halt; the sale of wine was
prohibited, taverns closed; criminals were let out of prison for lack of warders. The
Rialto, the docks, the busy canals fell silent. Venice was gripped in gloom…the dead
went on being tipped into pits—‘a layer of earth, then a layer of bodies, then another
layer of earth’—‘just like lasagna’ an one Florentine writer unnervingly put it.”319
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A Venetian artist Paolo Veneziano wrote, “Death himself motions the donor toward the Virgin,
while an angel warns him that Man may die at any moment,” in describing how uncertain life
and death had become in Venice.320 Another Florentine writer, Boccaccio, wrote that when the
“pestilence” had arrived in Florence, as it did “over every other [region] of Italy… men and
women alike, there appeared, at the beginning of the malady, certain swellings either on the
groin or under the armpits, whereof some waxed of the bigness of common apples, others like
unto an egg…name plague boils” would eventually appear “in every part of the body” and after
such boils appeared, a “very certain token of coming death” would loom on the horizon for the
victim.321 However, life went on. People within the Mediterranean knew that they had to move
on from death; in fact, death was so common during this time, especially after the Black Death
that people just went on with their lives. A Venetian Merchant named Andrea Contarini wrote
his family member about the passing of his wife and son within months of each other. He states
that he feels as if “a blade passed through [his] heart…as [he is] writing, one tear does not wait
for the other.”322 A few years latter this same individual talks about bringing home his new 14
year old “bellissima, bona he pura” thus demonstrating the relative speed with which individuals
respond and recover from significant lose such as this. The old institutions, such as the merchant
Fonduk, was still in place, city-states still raided and attacked each other, and European powers
drew up elaborate plans for crusades against the powerful Mamluks in Egypt and Syria.323
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Economic life began to recover anew as more land became available. New agriculture
was cultivated, varying the commercial and economic life. By the 1400s, the population levels of
Europe had begun to rise to pre-plague levels, thus prompting the Venetians, Genoese, and
Catalans to not only continue to explore for new granary locations, but also increase
specialization in trades of “all manner of goods” thus provoking the Mediterranean economy to
take new shape.324 The collapse of the old banks in Italy allowed for the rise of new banks like
the Medici Bank, which was tied to the political power and fame of the family.325 In the end,
there is no question that the Black Death contributed to lasting psychological and political effects
that have far reaching consequences. Fortune now begins to appear more frequent, or the
perception of chance. Benjamin Kedar, who wrote Merchants in Crisis, asserts that:
“Fortune appears as a major source of events, mostly unwelcome, also in the Genoese
Annales of Stella and in the Cronica Venetiarum. This emergence of Fortune as an
independent, largely amoral force indicates that the traditional perception of human fate
was no longer adequate: Fortune, the personification of Chance, came to determine
Man’s fate to a very large extent, and neither his sins nor righteousness were of much
effect in face of her decree.”326
This shows a new threat of fortune and will be the guide for many city-states when deciding how
to proceed in the future. Fortune is usually associated with negative phenomenon that are used as
tools to guide leaders with caution, in light of the greater unknown.
iii.
War of 1350
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With the Venetians and Genoese still vying for control of trade in the Black Sea, tensions
again began to rise. Due to the “intermittent opportunistic taking of vulnerable vessels and their
cargo by both sides flared into a more serious conflict between a Venetian fleet of armed galleys
sent east under the command of Marco Ruzzini to deal with the quarrel over trading rights in
Tana.”327 The Venetians caught 14 Genoese galleys in the harbor of Castro and captured 10 of
these vessels, thus officially starting the next major war between Genoa and Venice in 1350. In
response to these initial Venetian victories, Genoa dispatched a fleet in 1351, of 64 galleys to the
Aegean under the command of Paganino Doria in an effort to disrupt Venetian shipping.328
Venice had difficulties initially responding to this despite preparations in this region. Much of
this difficulty, ultimately, came from a severe lack of man-power brought on by the decrease in
population due to the Black Death. Frederick Lane estimated that “the usual Venetian draft
would man about 25 galleys. Additional manpower had to be sought in Dalmatia and Greece.”329
One could further acknowledge this fact by reviewing the “reduced size of these fleets, compared
to the huge ones mustered in the 1290s, is more evidence of how both cities suffered from the
plague.”330 If Venice was in fact suffering from a lack of man-power which it was, and every
other state in Europe was dealing with the same situation at the time, one could conclude that
since Venice lacked sufficient resources of people, they, therefore, could not easily launch large
fleets which would then explain the reduced fleet sizes in Venice.
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In light of this, Venice chose to make several diplomatic and military alliances in order to
garner enough power to take on Genoa. In 1351, Venice entered into an alliance with the King of
Aragon and the Byzantine Empire.331 The King of Aragon had a special relationship with the
Catalonians and thus provided Venice with their resources. This demonstrates a larger pattern of
city-state behavior. Upon entering into a conflict with another city-state or state, Venice, tends to
branch out diplomatically in an attempt to gain additional allies which they hope will tip the
power-scale in their favor. This can be done by all sorts of means; however, Venice seems to be
learning from this action over time and has, in the 14th through 16th centuries at least,
consistently turned to the King of Aragon332 and the Catalans for aid when fighting the Genoese.
Both of them act as rivals to Genoa and would be perfect allies. Venice’s goal in attacking Genoa
is to cut off her shipping and commercial routes, and in order to do this, Venice needs allies
closer to Genoa that can directly interfere with her commerce.
The Catalonians have been mentioned briefly before but not in any great detail. The
Catalans were an important conglomerate of city-states under the authority of the wealthy city of
Barcelona. In the 1220s, these cities saw a significant rise in power as they entered into the scene
as a rival to both Pisa and Genoa. Catalans benefited greatly from the leadership of the Count of
Catalonia, James “The Conqueror” I, who was the King of Aragon.333 He provided substantial
protection and resources in return for their alliance. James I was a more enlightened ruler in the
sense that he had the capacity to perceive and understand both threats and opportunities. For
example, instead of banishing and barring Jews and Muslims entrance from his cities, he instead
encourages them to come as he receives economic incentives such as extra taxes and fees on
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imports and exports.334 This in turn encouraged religious tolerance, even if it is for financial
reasons. Catalans were skilled sailors, and by the end of the 13th century, “Catalan ships had a
good reputation for safety and reliability.”335 Most of the trade that the Catalans focused on,
occurred in the Western half of the Mediterranean, which brought them into contact and conflicts
with both the Pisans and Genoese. Abulafia reports that Catalans were skilled entrepreneurs,
muscling “into the Mediterranean trade networks through piracy as well as honest business.”336
This made them a very valuable ally to Venice, especially after the city was so badly weakened
from the Black Death.
With the Alliance formed, the powers that created it attempted to mass a fleet in which to
assault Genoese galleys in the Aegean and near the Golden Horn. The fleet numbered to about
60 ships, with 12 coming from Catalan/Aragon, 8 Greek ships in Venetian pay, 12 Greek ships
funded by the Byzantines, and the rest were Venetian, all under the command of Nicolo
Pisani.337 In order to be effective, however, these ships had to link up in order to count their
numbers to their advantage. In February of 1352, the Allied Venetian and Catalan ships
attempted to meet their Greek and Byzantine allies in the Golden Horn. However, a Genoese
fleet intercepted them near the Bosporus.338 This battle was mostly indecisive with both sides
taking heavy casualties; however, the Genoese did manage to turn the Venetians back so as to
prevent them from reaching the Greek ships. With this allied fleet failing to address the Genoese
in the Aegean, the Byzantine Empire was forced to withdraw from the war. In 1353, Pisani once
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again engaged a Genoese fleet, but this time off the coast of Sardinia. In August of that year,
another allied fleet of 80 galleys under the command of Nicolo Pisani “inflicted a crushing defeat
on Antonio Grimaldi off the harbor of Alghero in Sardinia” and managed to capture “41 of the
60 Genoese galleys… along with their crews,” which had further consequences back home in
Genoa because the “Guelfs and Ghibellines blamed one another for the disaster and civil war
again threatened.”339 This was only averted due to the Genoese “placing the government in the
hands of the ruler of Milan, its archbishop Giovanni Visconti.”340 Although Genoa lost some
independence in this move, the Milanese still continued to carry out the war with Venice by
helping them fund and man a fleet to send out the next year. Prior to this, however, the Catalans
in 1353 sent a fleet to the Bosporus, losing one of its admirals, but inflicting damage on Genoese
vessels.341
With Genoa now under the authority of Milan, Venice hoped that it would be able to sue
for peace. Due to this belief, Venice gave Nicolo Pisani orders not to engage Paganino Doria,
whom he had been hunting for over a year. Pisani chose to wait out the winter in Porto Longo,
near Modon. Shortly after arriving, Doria and his fleet appeared off Modon, sneaked passed the
Venetian galley at the mouth of the port, and engaged the Venetian fleet, taking most of the crew
prisoner including Pisani.342 According to the Genoese, they captured “36 Venetian galleys and 5
large ships” which was a great achievement because “Doria’s fleet consisted of only 25 galleys,
probably all the plague stricken, recently defeated city could scrape together—another testimony
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to Genoa’s reduced resources.” Despite this victory for Genoa, “both sides were exhausted, and
in June 1355, the nephews of the late archbishops of Milan, Maffeo, Bernabo, and Galeazzo
Visconti, mediated a peace” between the too severely weakened city-republics.343
In the end, it is clear that the war benefited neither side. The war left Venice beaten
badly, and it was not in a position to hold back the Hungarians who were now beginning to
threaten both the Istria and Dalmatian coasts. Genoa no longer was fully independent, and was
fully reliant on the Milanese to keep peace within Genoa and the countryside. Although Genoa
was now quasi-dependent, they still benefited from resources of the overlords and there relative
well maintained trade routes during this time period. Venice was in a lot worse shape. Elisabeth
Crouzet-Pavan explains that for the Venetian State of affairs:
“Venetian interests in Dalmattia and Istria had been weakened by a coalition of Venetian
enemies, old and new. Rebellion broke out in Zara at regular intervals. Venice lost
Dalmatia after a war with Hungary (1358), and the doge was reduced to being merely dux
Veneciarum et cetera, losing the title of dux Dalmatie, which had been his since Pietro II
Orseolo had added it to the doge’s title. When it lost Dalmatia, Venice lost ports for its
ships, bases of operations against pirates, and a reserve of naval manpower. A serious
revolt was put down in Crete only at the high cost, paid by the public treasury, of sending
a contingent of mercenaries. Competition with Genoa remained bitter. Enemy merchants
confronted one another in the Black Sea, especially at Trebizond, a port on the northern
coast of Anatolia and a starting point for routes to Persia, and at Tana in Crimea, a major
slave market.”344
This does not paint a good picture when pondering Venice’s position as shipbuilding, an
essential process that the city must be able to do, which has just become incredibly more difficult
due to their loss of significant territory along the Adriatic. In addition, one can see how
politically unstable Venice had become during this war. Before peace was formally negotiated, a
coup was attempted in order to overthrow the ruling Doge. Marino Falier was the mastermind
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behind the coup attempt and initiated it in 1354. This excerpt from the Morosini Codex shows
how the government chose to react:
“Either for this reason or because he was urged on by the spirit of the Devil, he collected
some men of the people, sailors and other persons of the lower class, and plotted to have
the city of Venice subjected to his domination like a tyranny, but God and the Evangelist
St. Mark, who by their divine grace have never allowed this to happen, nor will they ever
allow it, inspired some men who were in the conspiracy to reveal it, so at one the doge
Signoria, as quickly as they could, secured every entrance of the square, and the doge was
brought to justice on the staircase of the palace, and was at once decapitated.”345
This shows how well the social and political institutions of Venice work because, conspiracy
attempts like this genuinely fail to succeed or occur frequently throughout Venetian history. In
addition, it calls upon the very foundation of the Venetian state arguing that true Venetians want
liberty and would do anything in their power to stop Tyranny in their city. This was shocking as
the coup was attempted whilst in the middle of a war with their main rival Genoa, but still
demonstrates exactly how the Venetian Signoria is able to deal with threats like this. Genoa and
Venice maintain a relative peace until the next great conflict which erupted in 1378.
iv.
War of Chioggia
The war of 1378, or War of Chioggia, was initially caused by “a quarrel over right to
control Tenedos, an island in a strategic position at the mouth of the Dardanelles, which as a
fortified galley base could control access to Constantinople and the Black Sea.”346 Both citystates had claims to this island and feared the amount of control the other city could impose on
access to the Black Sea. This location was even more important to the Venetians as they saw the
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island of Cyprus come under Genoese influence. Genoa felt the island was theirs as Emperor
Andronicus IV of the Byzantine Empire granted them the rights to settle.347 However, at the
same time, another rival faction seeking power in the Byzantine Empire promised Venice the
same island.
These events allude to yet another pattern between Genoa and Venice upon entering into
conflict that revolves around their desire to control specific choke points and their resolve to
ensure the other did not succeed. Both city-states are attempting to create monopolies or boost
their power in specific regions in order to push out rivals and better control the trade. The War of
1378, and the wars prior are a result of city-states carrying out this duty until they arrive at an
impasse that can only be resolved militarily, at least in their eyes. City-states, Venice for
example, are exceptionally skilled and adaptable when negotiating with larger states; however,
this same skill and tenacity appears to fall short when negotiating with other city-states.
Although Venice and Genoa stay mostly at peace during this century, this is negated by
devastating wars that both suffered through in order to make negligible gains in the end.
Furthermore, another pattern that is exhibited from this onset are the strategic diplomatic
alliances that both sides attempted to make. This again is a result of city-states limited power and
their fear and insecurity in mounting wars alone due to their incapacity to conquer and hold large
swaths of territory at great distances from themselves. Although city-states are able to make
substantial territorial gains, these gains appear to be mostly temporary, with few exceptions,
thereby prompting city-states to attempt to make more long lasting effects by cumulating allies.
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During this conflict, both Genoa and Venice made a series of diplomatic moves in an
effort to change the balance of power in the war. Genoa made an alliance with Venice’s
traditional enemy, Hungary, who was willing to launch another war effort against Venice in
order to further secure their hold over the Dalmatian coast. In addition to this, Genoa formed an
alliance with Francesco Carrara, the Despot of Padua, who felt threatened by Venetian
dominance in the region.348 Other Italian cities for this same reason chose to side with Genoa. In
addition, Genoa furthered their chances of victory by neutralizing Aragon by agreeing to not
interfere in Sardinia.349 A high price, but one Genoa thought was worth it. This essentially left
Venice surrounded, leaving only its fleets and lagoon for protection against a siege. Upon
discovering news of this, Venice ordered all Galleys back to the city and the lagoon, under the
command of Vettor Pisani, nephew of Nicolo.350
Venice also had a few diplomatic moves, but not to the same extent as Genoa. With
Aragon and the Catalans firmly out of the war, the Venetians had few allies to choose from. The
Venetians did manage to form an alliance with Milan, led by Bernabo Visconti, who had
expressed a desire to reassert control over Genoa after they reasserted their independence shortly
after the last war. To further add to this, Peter II, King of Jerusalem and Cyprus, who was angry
over Genoese interference and invasions of his island, joined with Venice as a common enemy of
Genoa.351 Despite successfully creating an alliance, Genoa was in a far greater position as far as
allies were concerned and their strategic locations. Milan was close to Genoa but could not do

348

Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Rochester, NY, 2003. Pg.
130
349
Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Rochester, NY, 2003. Pg.
130
350
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 107
351
Hattendorf and Unger, War at Sea in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance. Rochester, NY, 2003. Pg.
131
109

much aside from launch a land invasion on Genoese assets in Italy, making them strategically
placed but not the best allies.
The first main battle occurred in 1379 within the Adriatic. Venice, who knew its strategic
position was compromised due to the high volume of enemies in their immediate vicinity, had
tried to recall as many galleys as it could, sending the rest to the Aegean and Golden Horn to raid
Genoese possessions. After linking up with Hungarian ships at Zara, Luciano Doria, an admiral
for Genoa, discovered 21 Venetian galleys.352 These galleys were under the Command of Vettor
Pisani who was attempting to transport his mude back to Venice and had stopped here to conduct
some repairs on his ships. The Genoese appeared off Pola in Istria. Pisani had 16 galie sotil and 5
galie grosse ships under his command, but the Genoese outnumbered them forcing Pisani to
abandon 15 Venetian vessels and crews in order to protect the 5 galie grosse ships which held
the merchandise and booty Pisani would have been responsible to protect at all costs.353 Genoa
captured the crews of the 15 galleys which was a major blow to Venice, already hurting for
manpower. However, this was not all good news for Genoa as their admiral, Luciano Doria, was
killed in the fighting. Pietro Doria was sent from Genoa and assigned to take command of the
fleet upon arriving a few weeks later with additional reserve ships.354 With this fleet destroyed
and an enemy fleet so close to Venice herself, the city found that it was in the worst position it
had ever been. The Hungarians threatened from the North, the Carrarese occupied the Venetian
Terra Firma to the west, and the Genoese fleet had complete control of the Adriatic, and “with
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supplies cut off, Venice was threatened with starvation.”355 Upon his return to the city, Vettor
Pisani was imprisoned by the Senate. They believed his actions during the previous battle
accounted for his cowardice, and he was not only jailed but stripped of his command.356 Due to
this, Venice now not only lacked a significant fleet with which to defend the lagoon, but had just
imprisoned the most experienced commander they possessed in the city, as Carlo Zeno, another
skilled Venetian admiral, was raiding the Genoese and would not return home until next year to
relieve the siege of Venice.
In August of 1379, Paduan and Genoese forces attacked and occupied the Chioggia,
located at the Southern entrance of the lagoon.357 This had never before occurred in Venetian
history, were a foreign army controlled a portion of the lagoon. Venice however, fought back
with resilience. Vettor Pisani was immediately released from prison, and placed back in
command of 6 galleys to defend the lagoon, and immediately upon release, Pisani began
formulating plans to use the lagoon and waterways to isolate Genoese forces.358 In addition,
Venice prepared tremendous defenses. They sunk ships at large openings of the lagoon to create
chokepoints, rallied the residents of Venice to arms in defense of the city, and maintained an
overall sense of order despite “staring starvation in the face.”359 One thing was certain in the
minds of the Venetians, if they were to come under siege, Venetians were ready to fight back and
defend their city till the end. This is a tribute to the urban legends surrounding this city that the
residents of which are willing to commit so much to protect themselves. This in part can be
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accredited to the social and political institutions that help formulate myths and legends which
develops a sense of patriotism and nationalism. An institution any city would need if faced with
an attack from an enemy army. The Genoese found themselves isolated and unable to make
further progress as the remaining forces prepared for a siege.
Finally, after facing siege for some months, help arrived. In 1380, Carlo Zeno returned
with a fleet of Galleys and began to blockade the Genoese in the lagoon.360 The Genoese now
found themselves besieged. They held out in hopes of relief from home, but ultimately their
efforts were in vain as they tried desperately to clear the canals. Months of skirmishes ensued
until finally, in June of 1380, “running out of food and ammunition, the Genoese forces in
Chioggia surrendered. The Venetians captured four thousand Genoese citizens and 19
galleys.”361 This battle lasted in total a few months, and as this was occurring, some Milanese
forces captured a few Genoese processions. Both Vettor Pisani and Pietro Doria fell during these
months.362
The Morosini Codex in the Patrician Chronicles portray a distinct account of the battle
from the Venetians point of view. During the months of battle as Pisani initiates his night raids,
an account reports that:
“It was great marvel that after the Genoese seized Chioggia, their galleys had never been
so united that some of them were not at sea, also two galleys or one alone were
accustomed to stand guard over the harbor, but on this day all of them were enclosed at
Chioggia; and it was even more remarkable that our fleet stayed for several days within
the canal of St. Mark, and remained there, and all this was not hidden from the
enemy…And the eyes and understanding of the enemy could not believe that they had set
out with such a fleet of galleys, because they were awaiting the noble captain misier
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Carlo Zeno who was expected to return from overseas…The enemy…aroused themselves
at once, astonished at so many galleys and regretting their own negligence, and realizing
that at that very moment that they were keeping us besieged conditions had now changed
and they were enclosed even more closely, and in such a manner that the seas and rivers
which had previously been closed to [the Venetians] were now open, and now the
[Genoese] were at a disadvantage…Hearts and stones would have been moved to
compassion, seeing two such notable and powerful communities which for the sake of
destroying each other had placed all their forces on land and sea, and on one side and the
other were well supplied with noble Lombard men, cannon, mangonels, and crossbows
with which many were killed, among them the brave captain misier Pietro Doria of the
Genoese who, wishing to go outside from the galleys, was killed by cannon fire.”363
Much hope had clearly returned to the city with the release of Vettor Pisani and his new tactics.
That along with his successful night raids allowed Venice to not only turn the tides on Genoa,
but also hold out until Carlo Zeno arrived with reinforcements. The Genoese were clearly
surprised by the attack from within the city, as one can see from their positioning, which would
have been suited to confront an opponent attempting to enter the lagoons, such as Carlo Zeno.
The Genoese clearly underestimated the resilience of the Venetian people. From this one can
also see and acknowledge the strenuous conditions both armies must have faced as both
eventually faced starvation from sieges. Not to mention that the entire population of Venice also
had to be fed, thus put the city in a very precarious place. Clearly both sides suffered and lost
much during this battle alone.
The War of Chioggia ended in 1381 with the peace of Turin. Further conditions of the
treaty required Tenedos to be granted to the Genoese, after the Venetians destroyed all
fortifications on the island, and that Venice was to agree not to interfere in the conflict between
Cyprus and Genoa.364 In addition, Venice had to acknowledge the loss of some Dalmatian
territories to the Hungarians; however, they were still left with the trading disputes over the
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Black Sea and Romania.365 Although the Genoese and Paduans were badly weakened, there were
still the Hungarians to the North to worry about. The Venetians also lost Tenedos, failed to
recover Dalmatia, had to recognize Genoese rights in Cyprus, and lost its grain lands of Treviso
to the Austrian Duke.366 Although these conditions appear harsh on Venice, their shrewd
negotiation saved their city.
v.
Conflict: Tactics and Diplomacy
In the end, Venice ultimately recovered, surviving this period of downturn and launched
the initiative to expand the Terrafirma so as to ensure Venetian security. Genoa in contrast began
“to slip into a period of foreign domination, first by the Milanese, and then by the French.”367
This is partly a result due to the very nature of the Mediterranean Sea. Faruk Tabak explains that
the differences with Venice and Genoa stem from:
“A larger order into which the Mediterranean itself dovetailed: the Inner Sea derived its
main features from the historical attributes and qualities of two disparate worlds of which
city-states were a part. One existed on its eastern most edges ‘with a well-developed and
rich money economy’ into which the Venetian merchants were drawn. The other, where
‘the development of a money economy had hardly begun,’ was a world the Genoese
opened up and shaped in accordance with the requirements of the moneylenders and
capitalists who led the colonization”368
This meant that Venice and Genoa were both created and nurtured in different worlds that
eventually came head to head with one another. But more importantly, this also signifies how
these two maritime city-states were inherently different and enjoyed different advantages and
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disadvantages. Venice will also further prosper during the 1380s and in the long term as this war
created an atmosphere that saw Genoese power in the East decline due to internal strife and
Genoa’s difficulty with staying independent from the Spanish and later, French Empires. Venice
on the other hand will expand economically after this war because Venice will reestablish control
over the Byzantine Empire and will take advantage of the Genoese withdrawal from the East.369
Another result of this conflict was that “while [Venice and Genoa] had been locked in
rivalry, preying on one another’s commerce and undermining the financial stability of their own
state as much as that of their rival by incurring the enormous expenses of galley warfare,
Ottoman power in the region had been steadily increasing.”370 This will be a mistake that the
Venetians will be to weak and too late to correct, as they enter the 15th century. Aside from these
conflicts, Venetians and Genoese still managed to maintain stable relations in commerce as is
shown in Constantinople where merchants from both cities traded alongside one another. This
shows a complicated multilayered relationship that has created an environment were both parties
respect the other city, and to a certain extent, expect them to follow equal rules in war.371 These
city states also knew the importance and value of following these rules. For example, capturing a
prisoner instead of killing him in battle offers your city a ransom, and some leverage over your
enemy, whereas, his death, would yield you nothing but further anger. Also people were valuable
to city-states and, therefore, both preferred to have their citizens captured instead of slaughtered.
This same dynamic could be applied to trade in foreign cities as the continuation of this practice
was not only profitable but necessary, especially, since raiders cannot seize enemy ships until
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they’ve been gathered and collected onto ships in these cities, unless they could completely
eliminate the others presence altogether. Furthermore, relations seemed to have improved after
these three wars. After 1381, both city-states took caution “to avoid entanglements by defining
their trading spheres and commercial interests with care: Venice remained the prime centre of the
Levant trade, sending its galleys to Alexandria and Beruit in search of spices, the Genoese laid
more emphasis on bulk goods carried in round ships—alum, grain, and dryfruits—searching out
those products in Asia Minor, Greece, and the Black Sea.”372 This eventual achievement of
separate spheres of influence demonstrates the final solution to their external struggle.
Throughout these wars, both city-states responded differently to threats presented to their
cities and interests. Both Venice and Genoa did, however, respond either militarily,
diplomatically- by successfully negotiating with larger states-, and through their defensive
measures. Even after these crushing conflicts between Genoa and Venice, other states in the
Mediterranean “from the house of Osman to the house of Aragon and from Byzantine emperor to
the Mamluk Sultan, were forced to rely on the sea-going city-states to an extent greater than
before, on their amphibious arsenal, their command of the sea lanes, and their ability to extend
significant loans without difficulty or hesitation.”373 From initial observations of the three wars,
it is clear that one could place a value on a city-states sizable fleet. They are important, but not
essential. They are helpful, but costly, which could lead to civil strife. Susan Rose suggests that:
“The elimination of a war fleet, while serious, did not spell ruin for the maritime cities.
Great naval victories seem to have brought only minimal results. The capture of the entire
Genoese fleet at Trapani in 1266 did not end the war, nor did other seemingly stunning
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victories by one side or another. The loss of trained manpower that such a defeat entailed
was apparently more damaging than the loss of the galleys.”374
Even then, too much man power losses in war usually only led to a temporary suspension of
hostilities, nevertheless, this would not enable long-term control of the Mediterranean to any one
city-state.
During the wars, Genoa focused mostly on raising money for wars and enabling private
enterprises to build ships for the city. In fact, Genoa’s main concern during periods of conflict
was its ability to raise funds, which they were usually able to do, but at times with the price of
civil unrest/war.375 Genoa would impose forced loans and special taxes on its citizens. Shipowners were also made to place their ships at the commune’s disposal, who would then seek and
shell out compensation to the owners for time used. This could employ a heavy financial burden
on that of the Genoese citizenry and people.
But the Genoese were innovative in their actions pertaining to methods of conquering
territory where no state funded fleet or army could invade. For example in February of 1347, the
Genoese were planning the invasion of Chios and how to pay for the operation. In the end, “after
long deliberations and planning of the invasion of Chios, an agreement was concluded…
between the commune and a group of creditors represented by Simone Vignoso” with the
association called “Maona of Chios.”376 The Commune also decided that “the debt owed to the
ship-owners were repaid in shares, or luoghi, to an amount of 203,000 lire genovesi. This was
less than the commanders of the ships demanded, but nonetheless they got property and the
administration of Chios and the two Phocaeas, in addition to the revenues provided by the
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luoghi.”377 This essentially created a state war, funded by private creditors, who, in return for
their money and risk, would fund the war and potentially be rewarded with shares of what is
gained. This represents a system that values private innovation and enterprise as opposed to firm
state control.
Building ships in Genoa was also centered on private enterprise. Genoa did not even
attempt to have a state funded fleet until the 1370s under Doge Campofregoso. By 1402, the
Commune possessed 4 galleys; however, private ship-owners with larger fleets could impose
there will over the decisions of the Commune.378 The ensuing result of this is that the Commune
is less powerful and carries less authority in important matters such as war in the face of
powerful families or individuals.
Venice in contrast, focused on state shipbuilding and control of merchant ships, planning
for the future, and ensuring a calm population. What is truly remarkable is the extent to which
the Venetian government attempted to keep tabs on their merchant and military fleets. The
Venetian Commune did their utmost to “keep themselves informed of what was going on and
even attempted to control events despite the distances sometimes involved and the difficulties
with communications with vessels at sea,” which contrasts sharply with the Genoese
commanders who had a much freer hand.379 To Venice, organizing a merchant or war fleet was a
public matter of state, meaning that the State would act on behalf of the people in order to
undertake this venture. In Venice, merchant ships benefit from the Venetian muda system that
escorted merchant ships in convey with armed escorts. This was in addition to the standard
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Venetian galley patrols that guarded Venetian waters.380 Venetians were also known for seeking
out and destroying pirates within the Mediterranean so as to keep their waters calm and safe.
The Venetians could also call upon the state run Arsenale. The Venetian Arsenale was
the largest and best managed industry in the entire city, potentially the entire Mediterranean.381
The Arsenale was designed to build, repair, and dismantle ships of various sizes. By the 14th
century, this shipyard was well established and the old Arsenale which could hold space for
twelve galleys, was expanded and modernized into the Arsenale Novo, which could produce
three large merchant galleys a year.382 The Arsenale Novo could also produce the new great
galleys. These new ships were “lateen-rigged triremes that could load up to 150 tons of cargo,
though they also carried very large crews of maybe 200 sailors.”383 Venetians were well known
by now for their skills in shipbuilding, as well as navigation. Abulafia reports that Venetian
sailors had plenty of “exact information” about coast lines and seas, along with navigating more
confidently with the increased efficiency and use of the compass, thus allowing Venetians to
extend the sailing season across the year. This placed Venice among Genoa and Majorca as
centers of cartography.384 In 1435, the Venetian Senate had declared that “out Arsenale is the
best in the world.”385 Indeed they believed there Arsenal great as they invited many political and
military leaders to marvel at its magnificence. By 1473, the Venetian Arsenal was “the greatest
shipyard in Europe and the essential foundation of the state” built upon a system reliant of
380
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commercial sea trade.386 Venice also had Arsenals built in several of its important colonies
including Negroponte, Nauplia, and Candia.387 This created a system where Venice could pump
out a substantial number of ships in a short time and in many different locations within the
Mediterranean.
Venice also had an excellent ability to prepare for the future and see conflicts on the
horizon. Several historians have concluded that one of Venice’s most important attributes that its
government chooses to employ is its ability to handle some levels of fortune effectively. Susan
Rose cites historian Fredric Lane when arguing that, “‘the outcome of the Venetian-Genoese
rivalry was not to depend on superiority of seamanship or naval operations’ but instead the
deciding factors would be ‘their relative skill in social organization.’” Furthermore, Lane argues
that, “in his view the Venetian Republic, for all its faults, was a more robust society than Genoa
where factional rivalries were often out of control.” 388 This is a fair assessment as Venice’s trait
of preparing for potential future problems have proven that the Republic is significantly more
robust than Genoa, who had to, on a number of occasion, submit to foreign rule. An example of
this can be seen in April of 1349, a year before the war of 1350. The Venetian Senate “required
all the captains of Venetian armed galleys in [the Aegean], the Venetian authorities in
Constantinople and the Consul of Tana to consult together about the damage done to Venetian
merchants and their goods by the Genoese.”389 This was more important than ever since Venice
had just been ravaged by the Black Death and their population numbers were more than likely
highly depleted.
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On the subject of man-power, Venice had various creative ways of luring individuals into
manning galley crews due to man-power shortages. Permission was given to galley captains in
Dalmatia to recruit men, in addition to an “issue of decree to be read out on the Rialto which
gave detail of the better diet to be offered to galley-men, including 4 meals a day, good bread,
and meat three times a week.”390 Usually men were recruited from Venice and not given such
luxuries as was just described above, two signs that signal shortages of able-bodied men.
Throughout this time, the “Senates main concern was to keep trade flowing as freely as possible
provided this could be done without running undue risks.”391 One step that the Senate undertook
was that they ordered the Arsenal to increase production of galley class ships. Furthermore, they
also ordered their ships to avoid Caffa and Pera as not to antagonize the Genoese as they wanted
negotiations, which they always “preferred to battle.”392 This shows a number of signs of
insecurity and steps taking by the state to help better safeguard Venice and her assets.
Lastly, Venetians excelled in calming their population and ensuring the benefits of state
to go along with their rule. During the ‘Serrata’ or “closing,” the Venetian government saw its
ruling body to expand and encompass a large amount of the nobility and wealthy families. This
was not necessarily to fix once and for all the defining governmental group, but to instead allow
for the “social and symbolic identity of the nobility to be refined and defended” from this point
forward.393 According to Crouzet-Pavan, “by defining and ‘closing’ a dominant class, the
aristocratic republic admittedly employed violence (at least symbolic violence) and worked to

390

Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 107
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 107
392
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 107
393
Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane,
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 216
391

121

produce obedience.”394 This in turn, assuming she is correct, would allow for Venice to produce
a calmer more compliant population by simply expanding and then enclosing the ruling body.
In the countryside too, Venetians employed tactics to appease and control the peasants
and middle class folk living in the rural countryside, especially in districts like Treviso that was
part of the Terrafirma and not in the capital Venice, herself. In the eyes of the Peasants living
under Venetian rule, “it was not the Venetian landlords they liked so much as the access to
Venetian markets…Venice was a huge consumer that drove up prices of all kinds of products but
especially agricultural staples such as grain and wine.”395 Venice, had at its disposal, an
immensely prosperous economy that people from all over sought to take part in. This provided
an attractive market incentive to the peasantry that they had been denied prior. This was also
seen in a later conflict which this thesis will discuss revolving around the war of the League of
Cambrai in 1508. Pietro Bembo, a Venetian historian writes that upon Venice’s defeat at the
hands of the French and the subsequent invasion by French and German forces in 1509, Padua
responded in favor of Venice, the party that appeared to be on the losing side. Bembo reports that
when the people of Padua heard of the horrible news of the Venetian defeat and saw “the
Republic under pressure from all sides, they convened a citizen council” where “they passed a
proposal to collect 500 gold pounds without delay and send it to Venice” along with appointing
ambassadors to the Senate to let them know that Padua will “do everything to help [Venice] that
might be commanded of them.”396 In short, in return for participation in the Venetian market, the
peasantry and cities under Venetian authority remained calm for the most part and willing to help
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Venice in moments that their overlords come under threat. It is because of institutions and
systems of state control such as this that allow Venice, and not Genoa, to continue to survive and
thrive independently into the 18th century while facing a new and dangerous adversary, the
Ottoman Empire.

4 “The City-State That Withstood a Millennia: Venice’s Adaptive and Resilient
Course”
Many different states and polities exist within the framework of the Mediterranean world.
As we have seen through the progression of time, new and foreign entities continue to emerge
within or outside of the Mediterranean altering the current state of affairs and upsetting the
balance of power. During the 1300s, as Venice was locked in a desperate struggle with Genoa for
commercial domination of the Mediterranean, a new threat in the East had begun to arise and
develop. This new danger was the Ottoman Empire. In addition, we can see how Venice slowly
begins to turn away from her traditional place at sea, as the city begins to expand on the Italian
mainland, which they hoped to expand in order to ensure that the events surrounding the War of
Chioggia would never occur again.
Venice, one of the few thriving city-states left by the 1500s, was thrown into a new set of
affairs where dangers lurk around every corner for this small maritime republic. In order to deal
with these varying turn of events, Venice employed a strategy of appeasement and cooperation,
while leaving physical conflict in the reserve, to be used at the paramount time, in order to deal
with the mighty Ottoman Empire and various other European states such as the Spanish,
Germans, French, and Austrians, who all hope to lay claims on Northern Italy. In this chapter,
although Venice emerged weakened from the 14th century, one can still see the lessons learned
from the Genoese war of Chioggia. Venice has now faced adversaries far stronger than they
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themselves were, and survived, not from utter military domination, but instead by varying
degrees of responses by engaging in diplomacy, appeasement, and then ultimately cooperation,
which they find to be widely acceptable when attempting to preserve their commercial presence
in the Mediterranean.
The city-states of Venice and Genoa emerge from the 14th century in a very cautious
manner. They are both weakened, as previously stated, due to their debilitating wars in the
previous 100 years, along with the economic crisis accompanied by the emergence of the Black
Death. Yet despite all of this, both Venice and Genoa survived in one form or another. The
previous chapters of this thesis have analyzed both Venice and Genoa simultaneously through the
Mediterranean history. This chapter will divert from that pretext due to the fact that Genoa, from
the 1400s onward, loses a significant amount of her independence due to constant civil uprisings
in the city. Although Genoa had the most “powerful merchant marines of the Mediterranean
world,” her commune, in desperation, will turn to Milan, Spain, and France at various times to
step in and assert control over the situation. 397 Genoa’s commune will suffer from a lack of naval
strength as the commune has no efficient system of calling up galleys for war and must instead
rely upon their citizens and families. Genoa during this time will focus instead on the Western
Mediterranean, leaving the East mostly to the Venetians and Ragusans. Genoa did however, see
some economic resurgence with the opening of the Atlantic, its innovations in sugar cultivation,
their discovery of new alum deposits, and Christopher Columbus’s (a Genoese born merchant)
discovery of the New World in 1492.398 In addition, during the 16th century, Genoa enters into a
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period of time known to historians as the “century of the Genoese.”399 This period marked a time
for Genoa, where their merchants hold supremacy throughout many European markets and
institutions. Much of this was made possible, however, due to the fact that Genoa no longer
existed as a purely independent entity and instead relied upon other European powers, like the
French and Spanish, to run the city. For example, Thomas Kirk, a modern day historian on
Genoa, notes that much of Genoa’s economic revitalization and dominance stemmed from how
the Genoese “overwhelmingly dominated the Spanish Crown’s finances.”400 Some of this is due
to Genoa’s close relationship to the Spanish as the King of Spain wanted to use Genoese
shipping in the Atlantic.
In light of this, Genoa’s actions over the course of the next two hundred years and
onward, will reflect not necessarily those of the city, but of the larger national interests of Europe
at play within northern Italy. Therefore, for the purposes of this thesis, this chapter will instead
solely focus on Venice and her interactions with the Ottoman Empire and the various other larger
states within Europe. Venice was never conquered during her time as a state until the time of
Napoleon Bonaparte at the end of the 18th century, thus ensuring a clearer picture as to the
motivations of the city-state specifically. Just like Genoa, Venice also thrived economically
during the 15th century. Although Venice was at first cautious about approaching the Sublime
Porte (Ottoman Empire), trade flourished during the 1400s and 1500s because of the Venetian’s
relationship with the Ottomans and the acquisition of “fortunes in presence of Ottoman
power.”401 This was the case because unlike Iberian and Italian polities that abide by a strict
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Catholic doctrine to restrict access to their cities by Muslims, the Ottoman Empire as well as
many other Islamic states “allowed for diverse settlement” thereby inviting foreigners to come
and enter into commercial activities within their cities.402
Besides this acquisition of fortune throughout the 15th century, Venice continued to focus
on the expansion of their land based empire, or Stato de Terra(Terrafirma), which was enlarged
due to a series of wars that the Venetians fought in the first half the 1400s. In 1425, Francesco
Foscari became Doge, and Venice began establishing new alliance within the Italian mainland in
order to challenge Milanese dominance.403 The war that ensued in 1426 lasted until 1428.
However, this was not the end. Many additional short wars will follow in northern Italy between
these two powers so that Venice could “enlarge its territorial state, not just nearby
territories…but in Lombardy.”404 These conflicts initially went quite well for Venice who even
had the hopes of capturing Milan itself. However, war carries a heavy financial burden, and due
to this, Venice opted for peace. In 1454 with the Peace of Lodi. “the rights of Venice, La
Dominante, over Brecia and Bergamo were confirmed, and Crema too became a Venetian
possession.”405 In addition, Venice also acquired Apulia, and took Trieste and Fiume. In the end,
thanks to “a skillful political opportunism and a firm expansionist policy, Venice played a
winning game for some time.”406 This allowed the city’s territorial processions to expand

402

Goffman, Daniel. The Ottoman Empire and Early Modern Europe. Cambridge University Press, 2002.
Pg. 137
403
Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane,
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 129
404
Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane,
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 129
405
Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane,
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 13
406
Crouzet-Pavan, Elisabeth, Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of Myth, translated by Lydia Cochrane,
John Hopkins University Press, 2002. Pg 131
126

dreamily, thus bringing Venice into the position of a dominant land and sea based power at the
top of the Adriatic.

i.
The Emergence of the Ottomans and the War for Negroponte
Whilst this land-based expansion of Italy was occurring, the Venetian Empire is entering
into a period of panic. Venice, like the rest of Europe, understood that “the advance of Turkish
power in the Balkans was made plain… by the crushing defeat of a crusading army, mainly made
up of French and Hungarian contingents, at Nicopolis in 1396.”407 For the Mediterranean, the
“failed crusade of Nicopolis would have two important ramifications,” the first being that
“Serbia, Albania, and Bosnia would come directly under Ottoman control” and the second being
a significant physiological blow to Europe who was militarily bested by the Ottomans.408 Venice
somewhat benefited initially from the Ottoman advance. The Ottomans, who were derived from
Asia Minor, had already extinguished the rival Turkish factions in the home region and had
begun outward expansion. This came at the expense of the Byzantine territory, as the Byzantine
Empire was located adjacent to the Turks. Many coastal towns within the Aegean and Asia Minor
sought the stable Venetian’s oversight and protection in the face of the “declining [Byzantine]
Empire” which brought “Durazzo and Scutari in Albania, Lepanto, Patras, Argos, Nauplia, and
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even briefly Athens” all under her authority.409 Due to Genoese and Catalan reluctance to enter
the Eastern trade, Venice was able to in part, reassert her control over the Levant trade, although
new rivals such as the Ragusans were beginning to emerge. This also occurred due to the
Ottoman’s attention being turned toward the East to fight the Persians in central Asia.410
During this time, Venice exerted no eagerness to confront the Ottoman’s conquest into the
Mediterranean. Despite being mostly Christians, Venetians did not see themselves as the
frontline of defense for the West. Instead, Venice hoped to “maintain as good relations as
possible with the Ottomans consistent with maintaining their positions as merchants and control
of their bases, particularly Negroponte and those in Morea.”411 However, at the earliest decades
of the 15th century, the Ottoman naval strength was quite weak. We can see this in the year 1416
when Pietro Loredano of Venice, was initially successful in destroying the bulk of the Ottoman’s
ship Gallipoli, and Venetian bases in Morea, Modon, and Coron were “extensively refortified.”412
Despite the Ottoman’s inadequacy in the seas in the very early 1400s, Venice still acknowledged
Ottoman power on land and their potential to pose a significant threat to Venice herself, as the
Ottomans were annihilating what was left of the Byzantine Empire. The maintenance and
defense of the stato de mar is essential to Venice’s adaptive strategy of responding to military
threats at a relatively fast paced speed. For example, in the Ottoman Empire, the Sultans could
rely on slaves to fill the scores of rowers that each vessel required. In contrast, Venice “had its
Milizia da Mar, a government agency [designed] to organize conscription in Venice and its
dependencies; nearly 4,000 oarsmen were owed by the Venetian guilds and confraternities, and at
any time over 10,000 conscripts were on the books, from whom galley crews would be selected
409

Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 109
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 110
411
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 111
412
Rose, Susan. Medieval Naval Warfare 1000-1500. Routledge New York, 2002. Pg. 111
410

128

by lot.”413 The concerns of the Venetians were warranted as Cyriac of Ancona, who was a
traveler and Renaissance humanists, writes that due to Ottoman invasions near the Peloponnese,
the Hungarians “transported some troops of cavalry and infantry from the Peloponnese into
Anatolia and Ozolean Locris and Parnassian Phocis in order to set free places and cities that had
long been occupied by the barbarians [(Turks)], and fought bravely and vigorously against the
onrushing barbarian enemy.”414 The Peloponnese is a location of strategic importance to Venice
as the city as dozens of fortresses, harbors, and ports within the Aegean.
These fears were only compounded by the 40s and 50s, as the Ottomans begin claiming
swathes of territory that were either conquered or given to them through gifts in the Balkans. In
1453, Constantinople fell to Sultan Mehmet II who assumed the throne, establishing
Constantinople as his new capital and began on a path that he believed would lead to a
“revitalized Roman Empire controlled by Muslim Turks who would combine Roman-Byzantine,
Turkic and Islamic concepts of rule.”415 This shows early signs of Mehmet’s intention to create a
mixed city and empire that encompassed more than just his Muslim subjects.
It is after the fall of Constantinople that terror seized the Venetians. This is evident
because between “1456 and 1479 the Council of Ten authorized 14 attempts to poison Mehmet,
via a string of unlikely operatives.”416 Venice also began immediately reinforcing its naval bases
along the Aegean and other Eastern Islands in a desperate attempt to dissuade the Ottoman
Sultan from assaulting these positions. Venice also felt the need for the construction of more
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galleys and warships to protect the stato de mar and called for the extension of the Venetian
Arsenal by adding 8 hectares of land to the complex, thus making it the “the greatest shipyard in
Europe and ‘the essential foundation of the state.’”417 To add to this, “first, Negroponte and
Nauplia, and then the Arsenal of Candia, an important strong point on Crete, were completely
renovated between 1467 and 1470.”418
The weakened state of the Venetian navy was made apparent from a Venetian Census of
naval forces which determined their naval inferiority. A Venetian chronicler Marino Sanudo,
explains that this is the case because “there are few ships, because until now, we had no fear of
the Turks.”419 Despite the growing fears, Venice was still able to adjust and react to the turn of
events. The result of these changes in the Venetian navy was “that the obligations imposed upon
the captains of the Mude increased continually” for example in 1496 when “the galleys of the
Barbary Coast convoy participated in a massive counter-attack, launched to limit the audacious
actions of the Barbary Pirates.”420 Furthermore, galleys were armed “by the port cities” and “in
the event of conflict these Dalmatian, Albanian, Greek, and Cretan cities were required by the
terms of submission to Venice, to provide one or more galleys for the naval draft as was due to
the metropolis.”421 This shows a clever, albeit risky, solution to amassing a great numbers of
skilled sailors in times of danger posed toward the stato de mar. The risk posed to less defended
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naval cities and mude naval convoys that could potentially be carrying exorbitant amounts of
merchandise could prove costly in the long run.
In 1463, after relatively peaceful relations between the Ottomans and the Venetians, both
sides entered into conflict. The Venetians, despite calls to Europe and the rest of Christendom,
were left to fight the Ottomans alone. Most rivals hoped that the Venetians and Ottomans would
wear each other down; in fact, this is a grave misperception on the strength and stamina of the
Ottoman Empire. Muslim naval power had grown considerably since the early 1400s. In the
West, “Mamluk fleets off Egypt and Syria, Moroccan ships” patrolled the coasts, and “Turkish
emirs within the Aegean” patrolled the East, “Muslim sea power had expanded outwards on a
massive scale.”422 Constantinople had become a command center for an enormous Ottoman fleet.
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Venetian State “busied itself with the distribution of
cannonballs, gunpowder, and oars to various strategic hubs, the construction of galleys and
conscription of men; the supply of ships biscuits; urgent requisitions of masons and materials for
the repair of fortifications; instructions of the Captain-General to track the Ottoman fleet, but
‘only from afar and with discretion.’”423
During this war, the Venetians faced stark lessons and hard times. The Ottomans, learning
from earlier naval engagements, refused to fight the Venetians in the open sea, thus depriving the
city-state of its superior naval skill. In the Peloponnese, the Venetian advance had been halted
and reversed due to a new Turkish advance.424 However, this was just a side theatre. The real
heart of the struggle lay in Negroponte, a Venetian stronghold located on an island used as a
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military, naval, and commercial hub for the stato de mar. In 1470, Sultan Mehmet II personally
led a fleet of 300 ships, 108 of them being galleys.425 Ottoman ships had recently received a few
upgrades, including improved artillery and better sails that allow their ships to sail faster with
larger crews. Venice did have 52 galleys and 18 nave vessels at Negroponte, but realized that
they were heavily outnumbered, and unable to break the siege, fled to Crete.426 Negroponte fell
later that year, and with it, the Ottomans obtained their real prize. During the conflict, Venice
suffered due to the fact that the supply lines for their empire were heavily reliant on open and
safe seas. The Ottomans used this to their advantage by initiating, raiding, and using the Barbary
Corsairs to interfere with Venetian shipping, thus finding a weak point in their system. This war
was also extremely expensive, costing the Venetians more than 1,250,000 ducats annually.427 To
place this into context, this war alone lasted for close to 15 years, which created a considerable
expense on any large state of the time, let alone a city-state.
In 1475, Mehmet successfully campaigned and destroyed the Genoese and Venetian
holdings within the Black Sea.428 With this, most of their possessions in the Aegean were lost
including Negroponte, as the Ottomans continued raiding up the Adriatic; therefore, the
Venetians finally began suing for peace. In 1479, the Venetians signed a harsh peace treaty
stating that:
“Scutari...was given up, Negroponte was gone forever and all other territories taken in the
war returned to the Turks. After 1479, the Republic controlled just 26 forts in the
Peloponnese; the Ottomans 50. In addition, they paid the Sultan 100,000 gold ducats
outright and a further 10,000 a year for the right to trade in the Ottoman Empire. The
bailo was restored to Constantinople.”429
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However, despite this more than a decade long war, the relations between the Venetians
and the Ottomans following the war were not adversarial. After the war, the Sublime Porte still
afforded Venetians trading privileges. For the Venetians, the message from Mehmet was one in
which they could tolerate “Christian merchants from overseas, just as Muslim rulers all around
the Mediterranean had done for centuries; but they regarded Venetian or Genoese territorial
dominion within the Akdeniz, or White Sea as unacceptable.”430 The Venetians continued to
coexist with the Ottomans, although, this will not be easy as long as Mehmet II holds the throne
due to his territorial ambitions.
ii.
Otranto and the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1499
1480 was an eventful year in the Mediterranean, as both good and bad news would arrive
to Christendom concerning major sieges that were underway. The good news for Europe was that
Rhodes remained in Christian hands despite the Ottoman assault.431 However, as the Venetians
had warned two decades earlier, bad news arrived to Europe that the Ottomans had attacked Italy,
and the Venetians, to weak and unwilling to oppose them, chose instead to help the Ottomans by
ferrying their troops across the bay. The Ottomans chose to attack the city of Otranto with 18,000
men, and 40 war galleys led by Gedik Ahmet Pasha who slaughtered the entire male population
of the city and enslaved the remaining populace.432 Marsilio Ficino, a Florentine humanist and
scholar wrote a letter to the King of Hungary in which he implores him to help save Italy from
430
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the “inhuman Turks” who are “unruly monsters who wickedly ravage the countryside, destroy
the towns, and devour the people.”433 The Ottomans held Otranto for a year until they were
eventually driven off by Alfonso V’s son Ferrante. This served as a shock to Europe and an alarm
to the whole of Christendom, although besides promises of action, Europe did not move rapidly
to stem the growing threat of the Ottomans. European nations will now slowly move toward the
realization that the Ottomans are a serious threat, although not all nations will openly oppose
them as some chose to maintain diplomatic relations such as the French. In the aftermath of the
attack, Venice took the opportunity to assert its control over a number of Apulian ports including
Traini, Brindisi, Monopoli, and Otranto, in order to guarantee free passage along the Adriatic
straits.434 This was most likely easily accomplished in the aftermath of the Ottoman attack due to
the need for order and the lack of power Ferrante commanded in the region, making it difficult to
oppose, openly, the Venetian actions.
The next significant conflict between the Ottomans and Venetians will not ensue until
1499, as a result of further Ottoman territorial ambitions in the Aegean. Venice was alerted to the
onslaught of this war by the Venetian bailo in Constantinople, Andrea Gritti.435 Andrea Gritti had
established a grain trade in Constantinople and sent back encoded messages stating that “The
Sultan continues to assemble a fleet.”436 Venice’s main problem was to determine where this fleet
was headed. According to the famous Venetian humanist and historian Pietro Bembo, the Turks
invasion of Zara “removed all doubt as to where the sultan’s fleet would invade, since he had
marched his land forces into the republic’s territory—up to that point there were some who
433
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believed that he was going to make war on Rhodes.”437438 Unfortunate for the Venetians, the
Ottomans were after their processions yet again. In response to the Ottomans building a fleet, the
Venetians commissioned one in April of 1499 and placed Antonio Grimani as the Captain
General of the Sea to head the fleet.439 However, despite this successful launching, once the fleet
had reached the Ottoman ships which had already set sail, the galley commanders refused to
listen to Grimani.440 Pietro Bembo remarks that during this same war, galley captains in other
squadrons also proved unable to engage the enemy due to cowardly fleet captains. He reports
that upon reaching the Turkish galleys, the galley captains of the Venetian vessels “were
hampered by fear and made the rower’s back-water…in a cowardly fashion.”441 With this, the
fleet returned home where Grimani and the other galley captains were imprisoned. Due to the
fleet not engaging the Ottomans, the Venetian strongholds all across Morea and the Peloponnese
fell. In 1503, the Ottoman Sultan allowed the Venetian citizens to ransom themselves for
freedom. One such individual, Andrea Gritti, did so and returned to Venice in March of that year.
According to Bembo, Andrea Gritti returned to the city with a letter from the Ottoman General
Admete proposing “that if they wanted to end the war which existed between them and Bayazid,
they should send someone to Constantinople to negotiate peace terms, in which Admete would
support him.”442 The peace treaty that occurred in 1503 stated:
“Venice accepted the inevitable and signed a humiliating peace with Bayezit that
confirmed everything he had won. Soon the Venetians would dip their flags to passing
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Ottoman ships in implicit recognition of a vassal status they were too proud to publicly
acknowledge. From now on, cooperation with their powerful Muslim neighbor would
become an axiom of Venetian foreign policy, and the city would turn its attention
increasingly to building a land empire.”443
With this, the second of the two significant wars ended, with Venice consistently losing
territory in the East. Yet at the same time, Venice’s economy is still going strong due to their
cooperation with the Ottomans in trade and other commercial activities, despite the outbreak of
hostilities in the years prior.
iii.
The Italian Mainland Wars: The League of Cambrai and the League of Cognac
By the time of the late 15th century, the situation facing Venice on the Italian mainland
had significantly changed. Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan describes this time as the “isolation of
Venice, which occurred as a direct result of expanding the Terraferma. She further describes the
situation by stating:
“The isolation of Venice was evident during the war with Ferrara. War broke out in 1481
because thee Venetians were no longer satisfied with their extensive privileges in that
city, traditionally its rival. Hostilities ended in 1484. The conflict, which marked by Pope
Sixtux IV’s declaration of an interdict against Venice, was long and costly, and its results
were mixed. Venice failed to take Ferrara, but at the Peace of Bagnolo it received Rovigo
ad the Polesine, the flatlands between the lower reaches of the Po and the Adige. This
chronicle ends with the short lived War of Rovereto in the spring of 1487 against
Archduke Sigismund, Count of the Tyrol. What it shows is that all of the neighbors of the
Republic of Venice were worried about its advance.”444
As one can read, these wars, in addition to the earlier wars with Milan, have greatly
expanded Venice’s territorial acquisitions in the Italian mainland, thus ensuring some sense of
security should an enemy wish to attack Venice. Or so this is what the Venetian Senate was
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hoping. However, one might argue that the inland expansion of Venice was in actuality the cause
of many a problem for that city in Italy. Take into consideration the land mass that Venice now
occupies. David Abulafia reports that “the Writ of Venice reached as far west as Bergamo, where
the lion of St. Mark brushed against the serpent of Milan.”445 This Terrafirma expansion has
brought Venice into close proximity with a good number of other Italian city-states, many of
which are hoping to expand, like the Venetians. Milan, specifically, was a powerhouse in the
region and constantly threatened their neighbors with their military superiority. This could prove
to become quite a problem for the newly conquered territory that the Venetians had just acquired.
In order to subvert some of the dangers posed toward Venice, Venice negotiated with France to
enter into a war on their side against Milan in the late 15th century. The French were eager to
accept since, as previously stated, they hoped to further assert their control and authority over
Northern Italy. By 1499, Pietro Bembo reports that “with Cremona brought under the sway of the
Republic, magistrates were sent to administer justice, Domenico Trevisan and Niccolo Foscarini,
and two ambassadors, Niccolo Michiel and Benedetto Giustinian … all four were told to go to
Milan together, there to welcome the king and congratulate him on his new realm in the name of
the Republic.”446 This demonstrates another successful negotiation by Venice with a larger
European state, France, where Venice is able to negate the threat of Milan, at least temporarily,
and at the same time, continue to expand Venetian territorial ambitions.
During the first half of the 16th century, Venice entered into two massive conflicts that
would change the manner in which Venice is viewed internationally, and therefore, influences
their tactics when negotiating with larger states. The first of these two conflicts is the War of the
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League of Cambrai that was launched in 1508. During this time, many of the powerful European
states to the north viewed northern Italy as ripe for the taking. Venice too attempted to take
advantage of this time by further expanding the Terrafirma, a move that was very unpopular with
the Papacy. In August of 1503, Pope Alexander VI died, ushering in a moment where Venetian
diplomats might be able to organize the election of a Pope who would be favorable to Venetian
expansion.447 Bembo states that Ligurian Julius II succeeded Alexander, which “the Republic had
very much wanted” since they had “taken great pains to secure this outcome.”448 The Venetians
believed they had won without causing any outbreak of hostilities with the Papal States.
However, Julius I had other plans. Several of the towns that Venice hoped to secure authority
over just so happened to also be under the interests of Julius I, who wanted to take them for
himself.
It is an interesting time for European states when they declare war on the Papal States.
Often, such states are still Christian and have no intention of changing their religion; however,
when warring with the Papacy, religion is usually never kept out of it. However, many states had
entered into conflict with the Papacy, therefore, Venice did not have to “reinvent the wheel” per
say, when explaining internationally, which is why it is acceptable to fight the leader of your
faith. Paolo Sarpi, one of the most important Venetian historians and religious thinkers of the
1600s, was “quick to admit the supremacy of the papacy in matters of faith, but concerned to
maintain that rulers hold their power directly from God, and that therefore the clergy have no
authority in matters of secular jurisdiction, being entitled to only preach the Gospel.”449 In
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1507/8, the Venetians began their march south hoping to acquire the new cities believing the
Pope would do nothing outright to stop them. However, the Venetians were wrong. Upon
Venice’s engagement of hostilities, Julius I immediately excommunicated Venice and secretly
began opening negotiations with the Germans, Spanish, and French, hoping to form a league
against the Venetians.450 In 1508, the major powers of Europe met in Cambrai, forming the
League of Cambrai whose ultimate goal, as Thomas Madden puts it, was to “turn back the clock
on the Venetian Empire, returning the Republic to its lagoon.”451 The league was composed of
the Papacy, the French, the Germans, the Spanish, and many Northern Italian city-states who had
grown angry by Venetian aggression of the past century. No independent, lone, Italian city-state,
or any city-state for that matter, had ever “faced such a formidable combination of European
powers as the league of Cambrai, which declared war against the Venetians in December of
1508, on the pretext of their ‘insatiable cupidity and thirst for dominion.’”452 Venice responded
quickly initially through diplomacy but then by raising an army which was ready to march the
very next year. The Venetian Senate, according to Bembo, initially attempted to negotiate for
peace with Rome by making the Papal States in charge and allowing Venice to serve as “Rome’s
vicar of those towns, which their previous masters had been.”453 Early in 1509, “an enormous
army led by Condottiere Nicolo di Pitigliano and his young cousin Bartolomeo d’Alviano met an
equally enormous French army just east of Milan at Agnadella.”454 Bembo reports that the
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Venetian army consisted of some “6,000 heavy cavalry, 4,000 light cavalry, and 33,000 infantry,
though by no means had all our forces yet arrived in the field.”455
Bembo’s telling of events shows that Venice could produce a large army, but was not the
best organized as they were having trouble amassing all their forces with haste. This battle will
come to be known as the Battle of Agnadello where the Venetian army was crushed by the allied
forces who quickly occupied most of the Venetian Terrafirma, leaving Venetians to watch and
wonder if their city would face a similar siege as in the War of Chioggia. After the onset of the
fighting, Bembo reports that:
“And so within a short time the French, who not long before had been very fearful of the
opposing army and had come greatly to regret making war on the Republic, now put to
flight the men they had feared—not one of the entire Venetian force stood his ground
once the first company had been routed and put to flight. [The French] also took
procession of a huge quantity of the very best artillery, which the captain Vincenzo Valier
and his aides had abandoned as they fled, leaving them unguarded in the middle of the
field for the enemy to plunder.”456
After this, it was said that Venetians “could see the watch fires of the enemy troops camped
along the lagoon flickering on the water.”457 This was a troubling position for the maritime
Republic to be placed in once again, proving how vulnerable they were when matched against
these growing European powers. However, Venice did still have a few towns under her
command, in addition to what was left of the stato de mar, so by no means was Venice out of the
fighting. Although, Venice, to some extent, acknowledged that they were out matched and would
require alternative means to emerge from this war alive, chiefly through diplomacy. But first,
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Venice had to win back some of its territory as to shows its people and the world that the city of
Venice was not weak.
That same year, Venice massed another large army and launched a surprise attack on
German positions in Padua, comprised of some 10,000 infantry and 3,000 calvary.458 This was in
part possible as the stato de mar always, except during times directly after plagues, possessed a
healthy supply of rowers to man the many galleys that the Venetian state runs off of. This army,
along with popular uprisings in some freshly captured cities who preferred Venetian rule,
threatened the very framework that with which the league was founded upon.459 All participants
in the league wanted Venice confined, but only in addition to their states being granted rights
over a portion of Venice’s old territory. Therefore, when uprisings began to ensue, some parties
to the league broke ties or switched sides. Starting with Padua, Venetians forces besieged the
city, and, with the use of artillery knocked down their fortifications and brought the Germans to
begin “negotiating surrender” as the Venetian “infantry crossed over the walls through the rubble
and took the fortress” of the city.460
Apart from a few military exploits such as this, the Venetian diplomats chiefly won the
war, because without their help, Venice would have succumbed to overwhelming force. David
Chambers further argues that the “recovery of Venice... lay in the devious diplomacy which took
advantage of the leagues’ disunity, in provincial reactions against the invaders and in the
enduring power of the Venetian wealth, trade, and empire overseas.”461 Bembo further notes that
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Julius II and Venice eventually came to terms with the understanding that if the Pope allowed the
“barbarian armies” to destroy Venice, then “Julius and all subsequent pontiffs would not be safe,
even in Rome.”462 This chilling message is mostly accurate since Venice, besides the Papal
States, served as the strongest maritime naval, and military land presence in the Mediterranean,
since its primary and historic rival Genoa, had fallen under the competing sways of the French
and Spanish. The very being of the stato de mar serves Venice as an additional institution which
they could utilize during wars. When fighting rival city-states or larger states on land, Venice can
use the stato de mar as a form of protection and a place to regroup. Venice at this time still
remains a major naval player in the Mediterranean Sea. In addition, Venice’s appropriately timed
diplomatic moves ushered in feelings of uncertainty for the allies, which fractured the already
wavering league, with which was created to “dial-back” Venice.
Over the next decade, this war will consist of various battles, betrayals, new allies, and
switching sides, but in the end, Venice survived. The events that led to the ending of the conflict
arose from discontent within the league and Venetian diplomatic moves who were aware of the
dissatisfaction within the alliance. Around 1512, Francesco Guicciardini, a noblemen from
Florence and Italian historian writes that “the King of France indeed had good Reason to be
jealous of the Pope, for Leo desired nothing more than the French should have no longer any
footing in Italy, either because he thought it most conducive to the common security, and to the
grandeur of the Church, or because he retained the memory of the injuries received by the Crown
of France.”463 As stated earlier, the Pope feared the power of the French and the resulting actions
they had taken into northern Italy in light conjunction with the league. Due to this, Julius II broke
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ties with the French and began to plot and work toward their removal from Italy. Venice noticed
this and began seeking to establish an alliance with the French who were already considering this
in light of recent events. Andrea Gritti, who had been captured by the French, negotiated a treaty
of alliance with the King of France, Louis XII, which read:
“By this treaty Bartolomeo Alviano and Andrea Gritti obtained their liberty, the Venetians
were bound to assist the King of France with eight hundred men at arms, fifteen hundred
light horse, and ten thousand foot [infantry] against all who should oppose his recovery
of Afti, Genoa, and the Duchy of Milan; and the King was obliged to assist the Venetians
till they had intirely recovered all that they possessed in Lombardy and in the Marquisate
of Treviso before the League of Cambray.”464
This demonstrates the skill and optimal timing that Venetian diplomats are able to make, even
when held in a French prison. Gaining the French as an ally proved to be quite effective. The
French reasserted their authority over northern Italy and kept both the Holy Roman Empire and
Papal States at bay, although the Spanish proved more difficult to confine as is alluded by
Guicciardini in volume 6 of his history. With the help of the French, the Venetians are able to
negotiate all parties to begin seeking peace.
Two peace treaties concluded the war. The first of which is the Peace of Cambrai,
negotiated by the French who were now one of the only allies the Venetians had at the conclusion
of the war. Upon the arrival of the peace agreement in Venice, the French king, Francis I, and the
German Emperor made it “crystal clear that neither monarch considered the Venetian Republic a
serious player in international politics,” and all that was agreed to, including “to return [to]
Charles V within 40 days everything the French and Venetians had conquered in Southern Italy,
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without even informing their Venetian allies.”465 Venice was not even included in the peace deal
and was made to negotiate a separate Peace of Bologna. This treaty confirmed Venice’s loss of
Ravenna and Cervia, along with her territorial claims to Apulia.466 By the time both of these
treaties were signed, the year was 1516, and the balance of power “was soon redressed, however,
in an Italy that displayed a new alignment of foreign powers, and after a hard fought campaign…
Venice regained its dominion over the Terra firma in June 1517.”467 It was not until late 1516
when Guicciardini finally reported that “at last the Sinews of the war were slackened, and the
Course of affairs manifestly tended towards a Peace” once the Emperor “restore Verona
according to the form of the articles of the agreement.”468 This concluded the hostilities that
brought a majority of Europe to arms.
At the conclusion of hostilities for this war, Venice had the realization that new European
powers such as the English, French, Spanish, and to some extent, the Germans were beginning to
surpass Venice’s strength forcing them to reevaluate their relations with other European states.
Yet at the same time, by the end of the 15th century and the conclusion of the War of Cambrai,
Venice had become one of the chief naval and military powers within the Italian mainland and
along the Italian coast. According to Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan the Venetian territorial state looked
something along these lines:
The Venetian stato di terra stretched from Friuli to Ravenna and from Lombardy (Crema
and Bergamo) to the Adriatic. Moreover, in order to conquer and defend this state,
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Venice, the ‘maritime republic,’ whose ships fought on the Po and on the Lago di Garda,
also proved itself capable of putting a powerful army into the field. In the early 15th
century, some ten thousand to twelve thousand men fought under the banner of St. Mark.
This figure grew when war became an almost permanent state. At midcentury, Venice
commanded some 20,000 men, by 1509, that figure had risen to 40,000, with a permanent
army of some 8,000.”469
Venice also adopted a new political outlook at the conclusion of the War of Cambrai. Individuals
such as Andrea Gritti will eventually pave the path for Venice “to represent herself as a center of
a peace-loving state that could not only offer Italy and Europe a fresh vision of political,
intellectual, and artistic life, but also play a key role in European culture.”470 This is the role
Venice chooses to accept in a region where Venice is no longer the strongest player and must
now learn to cooperate and further adapt should she hope to survive. It is also relevant to note the
actions of some of the client cities and towns under Venetian rule and how they acted during the
conflict. While it is true many cities and towns immediately surrendered to the foreign invaders
as they viewed their situation hopeless if they stayed with the Venetians. However, many cities
chose to not rebel against the Venetians and stay loyal such as Padua in 1509. In addition,
Guicciardini alludes to the “inexpressible… was the joy and satisfaction of the Venetian nobility
and people for having at last seen a happy end of so long and dangerous a war, tho’ after infinite
costs and trouble, for, as some of their historians assure us, they expended in the whole war since
the League of Cambray no less than five million Ducats, of which five hundred thousand were
raised by the sales of places. Incredible also were the rejoicings of the Veronese and all the other
cities and People within the jurisdiction of the Republic, since they now promised
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themselves…the benefit of peace.”471 Provided here is yet another report of cities welcoming of
Venetian rule, and preferring it over that of the foreign invaders as the Venetian commercial trade
network and market provide considerable monetary incentives for those who are allowed to
participate in this sphere.
The next significant war was the War of the League of Cognac, lasting from around 1525
through to 1530. This chapter will not fully cover this war such as the last one, but it is important
to acknowledge that Venice’s participation in a league, which they used to further their territorial
ambitions and to attempt to weather the growing military storms, was caused in part by the
Northern European states such as the France. This war also encompassed a good number of other
city-states, including to some extent, the Genoese, the Florentines, and the Papacy, all of which
are attempting to utilize stronger European powers in order to use them to achieve their goals.
It is also important to note some Venetian actions in the onset of the war. As has been
witnessed in earlier conflicts, Venice continues to demonstrate a pattern of preparedness for
entering into this conflict due to their moves and actions before the league of Cognac was even
fully established. Guicciardini remarks that “wherefore it was jointly concluded that the
Venetians fould order the Duke of Urbino to march with all expedition to their frontiers toward
the river Adda with their men at arms, and six thoufand Italian foot, and that the Pontiff fould
fend Count Guido Rangone, with six thoufand foot, to Piacenza, and because it appeared
neceffary to have a large body of Swifs, no lefs than twelve thousand, as the Duke of Urbino
fignified to the Venetians, in order to obtain a compleat Victory.”472 In addition, we also know
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that these plans and assignments were given out prior to the outbreak of war because both Venice
and the Papacy because they were willing to “fend into Swifferland Agents of their own to levy
them” in order to ensure that the Holy Roman Emperor did not “difcover [The Venetians and
Papacy] fo openly againft Caesar.”473 This early state controlled planning allowed for the
Venetians to essentially gain a head start on their enemy which they try to do whenever they are
thinking of entering into military conflict. The League was also not concluded till later that year
“on the seventeenth day of May, 1526…between the Pontiff, the King of France, the Venetians,
and the Duke of Milan” in order to ensure that the HRE did not interfere in the affairs of Milan
and Northern Italy.474 The danger of introducing so many large European states into Italy to fight
wars on behalf of city-states was later realized during the war when in 1527, Imperial forces sent
by Charles V attacked and sacked the city of Rome as is told by Guicciardini who was actually in
command of the Papal forces during the siege.475 Bourbon, who had been placed in charge of the
army was killed during the initial assault, which served to enrage the army that at last entered the
suburb after fighting on the walls for “Two Hours,” and upon entering the city, the Imperial army
now leaderless, began “to run in all hafte and diforder to plunder, without the leaft regard not
only to the name of the friends, and to the authority and dignity of prelates, but also to Churches
and Monafteries, to Reliques honored with the Concourfe of all world, and to things
confecrated.”476 This was a disaster for Rome as the Pope and his cardinals found themselves
imprisoned and their capital city brutally sacked by a seemingly uncontrollable army. This war
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concluded a few tears after the sack and created a somewhat stable peace between competing
bodies in Northern Italy.
iv.
The Rise of Corsairs and the Holy League of 1537
Upon his father’s death in the 1520s, Suleiman the Magnificent took the throne,
proclaiming himself Sultan of the Ottoman Empire. In 1522, Suleiman laid siege to, and
conquered Rhodes, one of the last major naval powers left in the Eastern Mediterranean to
confront the ever expanding Ottoman Empire.477 During this time, the Ottoman Empire
controlled much of the Eastern Mediterranean, yet still, their navies could not be everywhere in
order to ensure the safety of their convoys to downgrade the very real risks that comes with naval
passages. So in order to expand Ottoman power in the region, the Ottoman Sultans began hiring
corsairs into their service. Two of the most famous corsairs were the Barbarossa brothers, which
acquired their renown by raiding along the Aegean. Their main base of operations was Jerba.478
This was also a somewhat chaotic time for the Ottomans. The sultan constantly had to “switch
their attention back and forth from the Mediterranean, to the Balkans, to Persia, and their
struggles with the Safavid Shahs in the East,” which often distracted them from Mediterranean
affairs.479 Selim I, father to Suleiman, acknowledged these corsairs uses and due to this, the
Ottomans employed Barbarossa, naming him the official emir of Algiers, giving him 2,000
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Janissaries, along with enough supplies and weapons to carry out his work.480 Despite moves
such as this, Turkish influence in the Western Mediterranean world consisted not entirely in
confrontation, but also in accommodation, such as when dealing with Francis I who agreed to
work with the Ottomans instead of opposing them when he sent 12 French vessels to resupply
100 Ottoman ships under Heyrettin.481
Throughout the rest of the 16th century, 3 major events will occur, which help dictate
Venice’s decisions by the end of that year, and brought about by their ability to approach new
and uncertain threats with innovative strategies that other states at the time could not hope to
reproduce. These three events are the Holy League of 1537, the Siege of Malta, and the Loss of
Cyprus/Battle of Lepanto. In 1537, Suleiman launched onto a new advance, sending Hayrettin to
lay siege to Corfu, which would provide the Ottomans with a Launchpad for further assaults into
the Adriatic.482
With this realization in mind, Venetians grew alarmed as their safety within the Adriatic
was being placed in further jeopardy. To confront this, the Papacy called for a Holly League
which formed in Nice, bringing together the Spanish (along with Genoa), Portuguese, Venetian,
Hospitallers, and papal forces together in 1538.483 Due to Venice’s participation, the Ottomans
launched a series of raids targeting Venetian processions. While the Holly League was being
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formed, Hayrettin began a series of attacks along Venetian holdings in the Aegean.484 These
bases were extremely important to Venice as they served as supply lines and harbors of safety for
Venetian merchants and all Christians. By eliminating these, the Ottomans effectively began to
whittle away at Venice’s naval strength, stripping them of their tactics which won them their
empire back in the 13th century. The Holy League fleet set sail that same year, comprised of some
200 or so ships from various states, including Andrea Doria’s 61 Genoese vessels. The fleet met
the Ottoman navy on September 28th of 1538 off Corfu in what will come to be known as the
Battle of Preveza.485 The Ottoman fleet was about the same size as that of the Christian Holly
League, however, the main problem for the allies was that there were leadership problems along
with leaders not wanting to risk their ships in open engagement. Naval battles were still chaotic
and could result in heavy damage to one’s galley fleet. Building galleys was an expensive
enterprise for a state, thus leading some rulers to offer fewer ships during times of conflict, or
even attempt to keep those ships out of harm’s way once committed to a fleet. The latter can be
seen in the Battle of Preveza. Andrea Doria, a Genoese admiral brought 61 of his own ships to
fight in this conflict.486 The Christian fleet was badly beaten due to Doria’s actions when the
fighting appeared to turn against the allies. According to David Abulafia, once the Holy League
fleet had engaged the enemy, Doria, unwilling to lose his ships, retreated, causing the allies to
fail and the remaining ships to retreat.487 Since no fleet was able to reach Corfu or the Aegean,
the Ottomans were able to make great gains in the region, further strengthening their hold on the
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Eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans appeared unstoppable at this point. No European power at
this time has been able to stop and then push back an Ottoman advance, for any significant
amount of time. That is, until the siege of Malta. Before continuing with Venice’s historical path
of dealing with threats, we must first acknowledge how significant this event is in the
Mediterranean context.
v.
The Siege of Malta, Ottoman Conquest of Cyprus, and the Battle of Lepanto
For many historians, the time of 1550 marked a period in history where control of the
Mediterranean was up for grabs.488 Venice, after the conclusion of the failed Holly League lost
much of their processions in in the Aegean, yet still had control of Cyprus and Crete. Due to the
last conflict, the Venetians were in no rush to help other Christian nations fight the Ottomans
because of their extremely fragile empire, seemingly surrounded by Ottomans at times. The
control of the Sicilian straits would give either the Spanish, Ottomans, or whoever held them,
significant power over the commerce and commercial flow of that region. This left Malta, a
strategic island directly in the sights of Suleiman the Magnificent. Malta had previously been
used as a base from, which to attack the Ottomans, leaving not many to wonder why the
Ottomans wish to attack this location besides its strategic importance.489 On March 30th, 1565,
170 warships, 200 transport ships bearing 30,000 men set off from Constantinople and arrived on

488

Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA,
2011 pg. 429
489
Abulafia, D. The Great Sea: A Human History of the Mediterranean. Oxford University Press, USA,
2011 pg. 429
151

May 18th of that year.490 However, do to mismanagement by the commanding Ottoman admiral
and general, along with some timely reinforcements from the Spanish Empire, the Turks failed to
capture Malta and were forced to retreat. This broke a long string of defeats served to various
European nations by the hands of the Ottomans. No more did Europeans see the Turks as
invincible. They could and were, defeated. Do to this sudden halt and defeat, the Ottomans
reevaluated their position, observing that in the Eastern Mediterranean, the large islands of
Chios, Crete, and Cyprus were still in the hands of Italian city-states.491 The latter two were
specifically held by the Venetians, placing Venice once again in the center of the Ottoman’s
warpath.
This brings us to our next major event, the Ottoman Conquest of Cyprus and the Battle of
Lepanto. Due to the Ottoman’s defeat at Malta, Selim II, son of Suleiman the Magnificent, began
preparing for an invasion of Cyprus in the late 1560s. However, rumor of this invasion had not
escaped the Venetians. The Senate had heard rumor “of the attack already being disseminated in
January of 1566, when the Venetian Bailo in charge of his fellow-nationals in Constantinople
reported that plans were being drawn up.”492 Cyprus was not only important to the Venetians, but
also to most Christians in the Mediterranean Sea. This location served as a harbor of protection
for Christian pirates, which attacked Ottoman grain exports and imports to the Empire.493 Selim
II knew this shipping line needed to be protected and would be under threat as long as Cyprus lay
in Christian hands. The Venetian diplomats in Constantinople raised diplomatic concerns to the
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Ottomans over the growing threat to Cyprus, however, the Ottomans were “not moved by the
reminder that the Turks had cultivated good relations with Venice over many decades.”494 In light
of this potential threat, as no fleet had been launched by the Ottomans as of yet, the Senate
ordered the organization of an additional, “8000 fresh infantry sent da Mar, preparations for a
fleet of over 150 light galleys, 12 great galleys, and a good number of transports.”495 This
demonstrates the usual nature of Venice and how the Senate prepares in advance for Fortuna, in
the event that unexpected or expected threats assault Venice’s interest, the government is at least
somewhat prepared should the worst happen. This was easier for a single city like Venice to
organize independently and then implement their plan throughout the stato de mar.
In July 1570, the Ottomans finally launched their fleet and attacked Cyprus, bringing
with them some 100,000 men, along with 400 sailing vessels including 160 war galleys.496 This
naturally brought about a significant response by Christian nations in Europe, invigorated by
their first victory against the Ottomans and alarms of concern over the potential loss of Cyprus,
one of the last Christian islands in the Eastern Mediterranean. Like last time, Europe gathered
together and negotiated the creation of a Holly League. This league was comprised of the
Spanish Empire, the Papal States, the Venetian Empire, and other states that offered a few ships
to the main fleet, which was commanded entirely by Don John of Austria, demonstrating how
significant this event is to the Hapsburgs.497 Their goal was to save Cyprus, which all knew to be
a Venetian possession. The Holly League fleet set sail in mid-September of 1570, right at news
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had arrived of the fall of Nicosia to the Ottomans, one of two significant strongholds on
Cyprus.498 With that news, the fleet set sail, headed for Famagusta, the last fortified Venetian city
on the island, and their only hope to now holding the island against the Ottoman advance since
that city could be resupplied by sea allowing the Venetians to utilize, once again, their superior
naval skills.
Venice also had other plans for how to hold Cyprus. In addition to the preparations made
in the previous years and the establishment of the Holly League, the Venetians also set out in the
Winter of 1571, sending “1,319 additional soldiers bringing the garrison to about 8100 men” to
defend Famagusta.499 In addition to these reinforcements, Venice also embarked on a number of
raids against the Ottomans and were even able to recapture Durazzo. The beginning to this war
went much better for Venice than in past conflicts with the Ottomans. Despite the fall of half the
island of Cyprus, Venice was still holding their own, had acquired allies, and even had made
back some of their lost territory with their reclaiming of Durazzo. It is perhaps because the
Venetians had been doing so well that caused the Venetians to outright reject a peace deal with
the Ottomans. This deal would have granted the Venetians a trading post in Famagusta in return
for the island of Cyprus.500 Now although this does not appear to be a good deal, it is the best
deal the Ottomans had offered to the Venetians yet, especially when comparing these terms to
past treaties with the Sublime Porte as they tend to be heavily sided in favor of the Turks and
extremely greedy in seizing possessions from the Venetians. Yet still, the Venetians declined,
most likely because their hope rested on the 200 ships sailing forth to Famagusta.
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In response, the Ottomans went back on the offensive. In addition to their siege of
Cyprus, the Ottomans began raiding Venetian processions along Crete, the Ionian Sea, and up the
Adriatic as far as Zadar.501 This is the second time in Venice’s history that the Ottomans have
made it this close to their capital. However, even the Ottomans most likely could have pressed on
and attacked Venice, the Sublime Porte only intended to “scare, rather than smash Venice—to
convince the Venetians that their Empire was fragile and that resistance to the Ottomans was
futile.”502 In addition, on August 5th, 1571, the Whole of Cyprus fell, including Famagusta.503
The Battle of Lepanto occurred in the Gulf of Corinth, marking the largest military event in the
16th century, which unfortunately for Venice, occurred after the fall of Cyprus. The men sailing
onboard these ships received the news while on route to Cyprus.
The Ottoman fleet consisted of about 300 ships, 30,000 men, and rowers that were mostly
slaves to power their vessels. Their ships were mostly equipped with few cannon, but mostly
crossbow men.504 These ships were small and navigable, yet they also had weak wood making
them not the most formidable warships. The Holly league on the other hand consisted of 206
light Galleys, 6 galleasses and 20 supply vessels. 65 light galleys and 6 galleasses were supplied
by the Venetians.505 This fleet also most likely consisted of about 30,000 men, but had twice as
many cannons as the Turks. For example, the Spanish “flagship, the Real, carried 400 Sardinian
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arquebusiers, the Ottoman flagship, the Sultana, only half the number.”506 When both fleets met
in the Gulf of Corinth, Mallet and Hale of The Military Organization of a Renaissance City-State
reports that:
“The opposing fleets used similar tactics with vessels comparably designed and crewed;
the only major discrepancy was the allies’ possession of the Venetian galleasses, whose
superior firepower helped to shake the otherwise parade ground regulatory of the
oncoming Turkish lines of battle.”507
This battle went quite poorly for the Ottomans. The Turkish bowmen were unable to be effective
due to the smoke and fire from the canons and ships all around. The Turkish admiral
Muezzinzade Ali was attacked onboard his flagship and died fighting. In the end, some 12,000
Christian slaves were freed along with the destruction of the Ottoman fleet.508 This was seen as a
great victory for the Christians against the Ottomans. Finally, Western Europe appeared to have
caught up with the Ottomans and perhaps even surpassed them due to considerable funding from
Spain, due to the riches gained in the new world, a nice perk that was also boosted during the
time they held sway over Genoa. Yet in the end, this victory did not translate into a great deal for
the Venetians. Cyprus was still lost as the Holly League fleet did not feel well equipped enough
to continue with an invasion. In addition, in order to make sure their city lost nothing else, the
Venetians made peace with the Ottomans effectively turning their back on the Holly League and
confirming their loss of Cyprus to the Ottomans. According to Abulafia, this “victory was, in
strategic terms, no more than a stalemate, for in the coming years neither side would have the
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manpower, timber, and supplies to fit out new fleets on this scale” or risk them in great battles if
they were constructed.509
With the Battle of Lepanto over, Venice had once again faced and survived another major
onslaught from the Ottoman Empire, despite losing some strategic positions along the way.
Venice still held Crete and some small processions within the Aegean and along the Adriatic. In
addition by the start of the 17th century, the Ottomans were no longer invincible, yet they still
held dominance in the East, after rebuilding their fleet by the end of the year, and the Spanish
dominated the Western Mediterranean. Because the Ottomans gave up their interest in expanding
westward after the siege of Malta, the Sultans of the 17th century would allow their Barbary
pirates in pay, a much freer hand.510 The nature of naval warfare was also in a period of
transition. The great ship was slowly replacing the galley in naval warfare as it offered a better
platform with which to place guns and artillery.511 Furthermore, the situation within the
Mediterranean will begin to be further complicated as new players, such as the English, Dutch,
and German seamen will begin to appear more frequently in this region as their empires begin to
grow.
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Negotiating Borders: The Venetian Nation in Constantinople
By the end of the 16th century, Venice still held a fairly decent position within the
Mediterranean. They still possessed a significant territorial state in the Italian mainland along
with their stato de mar, which still included the important island of Crete, which Venice will hold
until the mid-17th century. In Constantinople, Venice also will continue to maintain a large
presence, with there being at least 12 merchant houses established at this time in that city
alone.512 After the 16th century, although Venice’s economic and commercial strength will still be
sound due to cooperation with the Ottomans, the Venetian state will be in a time of decline until
their call at the very end of the 18th century. Venice benefitted from an increase in manufacturing
and Western trade, which only increased after the Venetians made peace in 1573, which will
mark the beginning of the longest period of peace between the Venetians and Ottomans. With
Venice losing their monopoly in the East due to the Ottomans, the Levant trade began to open up
to more states and cities looking to make profits. Part of the explanation to Venice’s decline is
due to their slow adaptation of naval warfare with abandoning lateen-rigged ships for larger more
powerful vessels, and by 1619, the Venetian state navy now only possessed fifty bertoni
alongside fifty galleys.513 In comparison, the English and Spanish will acquire much larger
vessels that will make their fleets far more powerful than anything the Venetians launch. Yet still,
the Venetian state continued for more than another 200 years. The question of how and why will
be the subject of the rest of this chapter.
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Part of the reason the Venetians, and city-states, were so effective at dealing with threats
lay in their ability to successfully negotiate with larger and more powerful states, and at the same
time approach potential dangers in creative and adaptive methods. Much of this will focus
around trade and diplomacy. After the 15th century onward till the fall of Venice, the “VenetianOttoman border was extremely porous, as the religious and political dividing lines crossed a
society that was wound together economically and culturally.”514 Due to this fact, VenetianOttoman relations became extremely complex. Past historians who simply analyze this period as
one of animosity and religious conflict between Christians and Muslims fail to acknowledge the
full realization of complex and ever changing relations that were, at times, confrontational, but
more often than not, were accommodating and cooperative. Venice serves as a perfect example to
study this intertwined and complex relationship for a variety of different reasons. However, the
first and one of the most important facts is that Venice, similarly to Constantinople, is “uniquely
situated to function as both boundary and cultural middle ground, ‘a place of transition’ in which
people throughout the Mediterranean and from every corner of Europe come together.”515
Geographically, Venice is located in an area that helps foster relations between the East and West,
although in reality, Venice was far more entrenched and engaged in Eastern Mediterranean affairs
than that of the West. In fact, due to their expansion of trade and the variety of places traveled
too, Venetians were encouraged, financially, to be able to develop relations with other foreign
peoples in order to garner further profit for the city-state. Dursteler, who wrote Venetians in
Constantinople, which offers an in depth exploration of the Venetian nation within
Constantinople during the time of the Ottomans, stated that culturally diverse groups of
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“merchants, travelers, and officials regularly mixed in the cities of the Venetian Empire, and
indeed, many travelers felt in entering the lagoon that they had already arrived in the exotic
‘Orient.’”516
The initial beginnings of diplomacy cantered around commerce. Dursteler reports that
Venice nearly monopolized trade in the East due to their relationship with the Sultan for part of
the 15th century.517 In addition, despite troubles growing in the East, many Venetians believed
that their cities future and fortune lay in the East.518
Venice’s initial strategy during this time was to avoid confrontation. The Ottoman Empire
was powerful; in fact, there was no point in denying this fact and Venetians knew that for their
empire to survive, they would need to deal with the Ottomans, either militarily, or diplomatically.
Gregory Hanlon, a Professor of Italian History explains that “Venice considered it sufficient to
maintain an infrastructure capable of raising a field army at short notice.”519 This provided the
basis for Venice to begin maintaining a standing army in the 16th century. During the Battle of
Lepanto, Venice was able to place 130 galleys too sea with 23,000 infantry men.520 This is quite
a feat for a small state such as Venice which has become considerably weaker since their
prominence of the 13th century. During the 16th and 17th century, Venice played a game “of
balance and equivocation,” attempting to “play one power off the other” by utilizing a system “of
ever-shifting alliances, and control over the dissemination of information to both the Hapsburgs
516
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and the Ottomans in a sometimes desperate effort to appease and manipulate both states into
positions favorable to the weakened republic as it confronted a brave new Mediterranean
world.”521 This thought process goes along with the idea that for Venice’s economy to prosper,
the city-state must have good relations with whatever power is dominant at the time. In addition,
this too shadows Venice’s policy in the Italian mainland during the 17th century. Hanlon observes
that Venetian policy during the 1600s was that after the Castro War of 1643, “Venetian policy
never wavered from an attitude of non-intervention in the great power struggles that engulfed its
neighbors,” which arguably resulted from more than “three generations of pressure by the
Ottoman Turks on the Mediterranean Empire.”522 For the 15th, 16th, and 17th century, this
increasingly became the Spanish and the Ottomans until both powers begin to decline. In fact,
after hostilities ended in the 16th century, the Venetians earned the nickname “The Turk’s
Courtesan” bestowed by Europe on Venice due to their close relationship with the Sublime
Porte.523 From 1500 to the fall of Venice in 1797, Venice and the Ottoman Empire “were at peace
save for several relatively brief interludes of open hostility, punctuated by raiding and other
corsair activity,” which for the most part has been covered above.524
Before diving into the Venetian nation that existed in Constantinople, it might first be
helpful to further understand the various identities that people associated to at this time. Contrary
to popular belief, the ideological clash between east and west, Christians and Muslims did not
alone, dictate states and individual actions during this time. Daniel Goffman writes that there is a
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contrast in attitudes between different people within a specific nation “which produced a chronic
and fascinating tension in Venice between a religious ideology that conceived a perpetual crusade
against the Islamic world and a situation that demanded bonds with Islamic states that controlled
the international commercial routes to the East.”525 Dursteler reports that “many individuals
moved easily between religious poles, and indeed polities were never averse to allying with a
perceived infidel if the stakes were right…they intermarried and formed alliances across
denominational lines; when it suited their worldly aims, they changed faiths easily.”

526

This

paints the portrait of a society, which definitely believes religion to be essential, but also one that
preaches accommodation and compromise in order to fulfill their larger goals. An excellent
example of this comes from Venice herself, who was famed for “the position expressed by the
Senate after Lepanto, Prima semo Veneziani, poi cristiani [First we are Venetians, then
Christians].”527 Even after the Ottomans defeat at Malta and Lepanto, the Venetians still felt it
best to break with most of Christendom and end their crusading stance, which the Papacy still
preached. This independent policy allowed the Venetian State to be more flexible when dealing
with the Ottomans, giving them a leg up with other European states when it came to commercial
enterprises. Luckily for Venice, the Ottoman Empire was accepting of both Christians and Jews
and allowed non-Muslims to assume posts of significance within the Empire. Ottomans governed
and derived from their frontier milieu, which consisted of “a cultural mix of classical Islamic
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legal traditions joined with Byzantine and there Inner Asian elements.”528 Thereby allowing an
already diverse empire to further expand and accept other cultures, while demonstrating theirs to
be better through their empires great feats.
Next, the idea of associating oneself with their nation can be a difficult subject to inspect.
Nation could refer to a variety of different sizes and groups. For example, the Venetian
community in Constantinople was considered a “nation” until itself by the manner in which
Dursteler refers to it. Nation, is used to express community as well as one’s home state.529
Constantinople, specifically, had a large number of “nations” within their city. These nations or
communities were from a variety of different countries, and served as “trading and diplomatic”
centers, which “were juridical[ly] defined, and membership was limited, at least in theory, to a
small cadre of individuals who met certain specific legal requirements. In practice, these
communities’ borders were much less clearly delineated, and they contained individuals of many
different religious, linguistic, political, and geographic backgrounds.”530 The Venetian nation in
Constantinople was one of the largest the city possessed and should reflect their adaptive nature
as the Venetian State has maintained a nation in Constantinople since the Byzantine Empire
existed, and these trading communities served as excellent commercial hubs with which
Venetians can utilize to further prosper.
One aspect of life in the Venetian Nation in Constantinople has become abundantly clear,
the more complex Veneto-Ottoman relations become, the more possible it is for people to
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identify with various aspects of different beliefs or cultures. In other words, individuals could,
and did, possess multiple loyalties and could feel connected to multiple groups or be willing to
change identities completely. One could be loyal to one’s state, religion, commercial
organization, family, geographical location, and more. The Venetian Empire was quite diverse
and at times, encompassed more than 100 bases, cities, and islands scattered throughout the
Eastern Mediterranean. In light of this, the population comprising the Venetian people, have
consequently become more diverse and will automatically bear loyalties to their home region or
place of birth. Loyalty to one’s home was not necessarily a “trump” when dealing with individual
affairs. For example, Dursteler notes that:
“Loyalty to the home community—the 16th century patria—was not inherently
incompatible with the extension of loyalty to a wider community, so long as the
advantages of political union… outweigh[ed] the drawbacks.” This is evident when
looking at some Greek subjects of the Venetian stato de mar who came to
“Constantinople to trade or work in Ottoman shipyards and galleys, and often married
and settled in the city, never to return to their lands of birth.”531
In other words, loyalty to one’s home can be significant, if not total, but that is not to say that
these loyalties have the opportunity and ability to change, depending on the influences and
motivations for doing so. The Venetian State was fully aware that Venetians took up work in
Constantinople, however, they still required all official members of the Venetian nation to
register at the embassy. If nothing else, this has created the opportunity for a widely diverse
mixing of peoples to encompass a relatively small space in Constantinople. This city will not just
become diverse due to Muslim Ottomans and Christian Venetians mixing, but due to all manner
of folk from across the stato de mar and the Ottoman Empire. As far as Venetian loyalty is
concerned, Venetians had no “natural geographic, religious, linguistic, or cultural coherence to
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the state’s ‘heterogeneous totality of distinct territories,’ except that provided politically by
Venice’s governing institutions.”532 This places a heavy importance on the political institutions of
the state that provide economic and commercial incentives. These incentives will usually take the
form of being included in the Venetian economy, which for most in the stato de mar, was
sufficient as people understood from Venice’s past history that their trade, although accompanied
with some risk, can be extraordinarily profitable. This sums up a broad understanding of some
loyalties and can serve as a foundation for approaching the complex and ever-changing relations
that the Venetians possessed with the Ottomans.
The Venetian “nation” in Constantinople was the largest and most vivacious foreign
community within Constantinople during the 16th and 17th centuries. By analyzing this nation,
one can challenge the pre-assumed animosity tendencies between Venetians and Ottomans, and
instead argue that “although dissonance and strife were certainly part of this relationship,
coexistence and cooperation were more common.”533 Alternatively, this relationship was not one
where individuals were trapped into a specific loyalty or way of life, but could instead represent
a continuing process of fashioning and refashioning to describe how loyalties can be obtained,
then lost, and reasserted once more.
The nation of Venice, located within Constantinople, has had a long history of being an
established colony in the city, stemming back into the times of the Byzantine Empire. At its
height, this colony consisted of up to 1,000 official members.534 In reality, the colony was
considerably larger, as those individuals who aren’t merchants or a member of the bailate were
532
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not considered members of the official nation. After the fall of the Byzantine Empire, “Venice
lost its commercial monopoly, but its merchants continued to enjoy the favor of Mehmed the
Conqueror, who granted them several lucrative privileges.”535 This patronage will not last
however, ending in 1463 when the Venetians declared war on the Ottomans. During moments of
hostilities such as this, the Venetian population comprising the nation will dwindle to almost
nothing, a pattern that will repeat itself in 1499, 1537, and 1570 to some extent during their
major, but brief times of conflict.536
Life, for the nation, revolved around the Venetian embassy, or bailate. The bailate used to
have a grand location within the Golden Horn of the city of Constantinople. However, after the
fall of Constantinople and between the outbreaks of hostilities in 1499, the Venetian embassy
was permanently relocated to Galata across the bay, in addition to constructing the Vigne di Pera
in the hillside serving as a retreat.537 The bailate was responsible for everyone with a connection
to Venice. The embassy is home to the bailo and his famiglia. The vast majority of other
Venetians would live outside of the embassy, whether near or far in distance.538
The Bailo is the head of the Venetian nation in Constantinople.539 This position became
quite powerful and influential over time, making it a position that could bring the holder
significant rewards. For Venice during the early 1400s, the bailo was “at once consul,
commercial agent, and ambassador to the Ottoman Court, tasked, above all, with ensuring that
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commerce in the empire continued as smoothly as possible. It was fear of losing valuable trade in
Mehmet’s realms with stayed Venice’s hand.”540 Simone Contarini, a former bailo in
Constantinople, described his former duties in a report to the Senate as: “the task of the bailo in
Constantinople… seems to me to be contained in two offices: one ambassador, the other
Consul”, in addition to maintaining “extensive networks of friendships and patronage through
which… to establish relationships with influential Ottomans in positions to benefit and protect
Venetian interests.”541 In other words, the task of the bailo was to act as the Venetian
ambassador, and spymaster simultaneously, all the while promoting Venetian trade interests over
other European powers such as the English, French, or other city-states. The maintenance of a
spy network and moles in strategic positions greatly benefited Venice as this served as their
system of warning in the event that the Ottomans decide to go on the offensive. The bailo also
held an important symbolic role as protector of Roman Catholicism in the Ottoman Empire until
after the 1600s when the French, supported by the Jesuits, usurped that role.542 This was a
significant role and honor for Venice to possess, which demonstrates their importance in
international affairs, but also within the realm of Christendom. Lastly, the bailo took charge in
the matters of redeeming former slaves of the Ottoman Empire who were Venetian.
The bailo, with all these tasks and responsibilities, requires considerable help to achieve
his goals. The famiglia is a group hired by the bailo to help him run and manage affairs for the
nation.543 There are many different positions within the famiglia, some far more important than
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others, but all vital to operating the many functions of the embassy. The famiglia that the bailo
hires was hierarchical organized, with the secretary, coadiutore, ragionato, chaplain, doctor, and
barber, as well as the dragomans and the giovani della lingua “ making up “the famiglia alta, or
upper family” with the “famiglia bassa, or lower family, comprised the remainder of the
household—servants, pages, squires, couriers.”544 The Doctor and barber, along with the
chaplain both have self-explanatory jobs, except the barber was a term for a medical practitioner
who was limited on what duties he could perform. The Rasonata, kept the financial records of
the nation and kept track of all goods by land or sea.545 Due to the nature of the Venetian nation,
a significant amount of correspondences flow in and out of the bailate. That being said, the
Coadiutore, or assistant secretary, was responsible for “maintaining notarial protocols, writing
and copying correspondence, and enciphering and deciphering letters.”546
Despite these important roles, the two most significant members of the famiglia alta were
the Secretary and the Dragomans. The Secretary served as the notary for the nation. This
extremely time-coming job was meant to ensure “the regular transfer of information between the
baili and their numerous correspondents: the Senate, Council of Ten, and other magistracies in
Venice” and the greater stato de mar in general.547 The Dragamons were potentially one of the
most useful and at the same time dangerous, members of the Venetian nation. Dragomans were
masters of the Ottoman “idiom” or language and are separated into many different classes of
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Dragomans. The Grand Dragoman are charged with “treating the most important issues of state
and spent his days in the divan and the palaces of the Ottoman hierarchy.”548 Next is the little
Dragoman. These individuals will normally spend their days in the ports or along the “loggia of
Galata and were charged with interpreting for the merchants and the ragionata and dealing with
any commercial matters involving Ottoman officials and magistracies.”549 Another important
Dragoman is the Dragomano di strada or traveling Dragoman. This individual served as a
traveling translator. He also would accompany the bailo on trips away from Constantinople.
Other Dragomans include the apprentices who attended to unexpected matters or dealings at the
embassy.550 Dragomans are significant not only because of their essential attributes in the
Ottoman tongue, but also because, “in contrast to most other members of the bailo’s team, they
were permanent residents of Constantinople, and indeed almost all of them were subjects not of
Venice, but of the Ottoman Empire.”551 This at first glance, could pose a significant problem of
questioning Dragoman’s loyalty to either the Venetians or the Ottomans. The Senate clearly
recognized this potential threat in 1551, and attempted to create a program that raised Venetians
in the Ottoman vernacular; however, this ultimately failed.552 Yet still by the 16th century,
Dragomans were still considered essential. This is witnessed by the fact that “Venetian
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diplomatic missions to the Porte usually included a dragoman who accompanied an ambassador
on his trip from Venice.”553
The famiglia bassa is comprised of lower level individuals yet still, nonetheless,
important. The most important of which being the Maestro di casa or Majordono. This individual
“Oversaw the provisioning, staffing, and maintenance of the physical structure of the bailo’s
household.”554 Thus the Majordormo acted as a house watchmen and caretaker, looking after the
members of the famiglia so that the bailo was left a freer hand. Another member was the
Cavaliere Marshal. The Marshal mostly assisted in consular and judicial duties. Dursteler
explains that his position encompassed a responsibility for “delivering summons and other legal
communications; conducting investigations and interviewing witnesses in civil and criminal
matters brought before the bailo.”555 These represent the two most important positions within the
famiglia bassa. An important aspect of the Famaglia bassa is that, unlike the famaiglia alta with
the exception of the dragomans, the former is allowed to possess Turkish individuals. Therefore,
many Ottoman subjects resided within the famiglia, the most import of which are the Coza556,
Janissaries557, and couriers, other than the Dragomans already discussed.558 This shows the literal
mixing of peoples as they work alongside one another for common goals, regardless of their
opposing places of birth. Bailo and famiglia, along with the merchants essentially created the
core of the Venetian nation, or the “official” nation, meaning that they were allowed to be there
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both by the Venetian and Ottoman states and that their assignments and positions were
“recognized and sustained.”559This maps out the bailate, the institution that allowed the
Venetians to sustain a colony within Constantinople/Galata. Due to this, a series of mixings
began to ensue in which a middle ground is created that creates an ever changing and very
personal relationship between Venice and the Ottomans.
vii.
The Mingling of Venetian and Ottoman People in the 16th and 17th Centuries
Interactions between nations and states were “inherently messy, contradictory, and
variable [in] nature,” there was no easy divide like East and West or Christian and Muslim.560 Yet
one can still attempt to approach the subject of Venetian-Ottoman relations by identifying the
geographical, commercial, social, and religious connections that complicate the clarity.
Geographically, Constantinople was a perfect location for the mixing of peoples from
both the East and West. This city was also the largest within all of the Mediterranean, Europe,
and the Near East at the time. Censuses conducted in 1535 and 1555 both show a population with
a ratio of Muslims to Christians of 60 to 40 percent.561 Constantinople’s compact and crowded
streets provided an excellent setting to establish trade and develop relationships. If looked at in
this image, Constantinople could be seen as a one “conformed to the model ‘Oriental city,’
composed of ‘an array of closed and compact societies, each leading lives separate from the
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other.”562 Geographically, Constantinople was divided across the golden bay, facing opposite
Galata. Historians refer to this separation as giving Galata the name “City of Infidels” facing the
“City of Ottomans.”563 This interpretation is both right and wrong. The Sultans of the Ottoman
time did relocate most foreign embassy and residences to Galata, but this was by no means in
total and should not signify Galata as purely comprised of Christians. There was physical
separation, yet also mixing in taverns and streets. When Mehmet II conquered Constantinople, he
left the suburb [of Galata] relatively untouched so as not to interrupt its commerce, but he did
incorporate it entirely into the larger metropolitan institutional structures of his new capital”
because of his greater understanding of the financial capability of this part of the city left
intact.564 This further demonstrates the understanding of the importance of city-states and
commerce to the Ottoman Empire, a reputation which has been fostered over a long period of
time has now paid off once again for these small but mighty Republic. Trade in the
Mediterranean was still monopolized in part by small city-states with growing or shrinking
empires, which, nonetheless, prove significant to take into consideration, even during times of
territorial conquest. In addition, to dispel the notion of the purely Christian face of Galata,
Dursteler reports that the settling Muslims in Galata was a deliberate part of the Sultan’s
demographic policies: Suleyman established a community of Egyptians in Galata, and waves of
Moor and Morisco refugees from Granada settled in the city in the 16th and 17th centuries.”565
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This demonstrates the physical separation for strategic purposes instead of one that pushes
foreigners away.
Another significant arena for mixing is commerce. One of the chief areas of cultural
exchange with Galata occurred by commercial interactions.566 In fact, not just Venetians or other
Christians but “Ottoman officials” in addition “appear to have been among the most active
participants in the Veneto-Ottoman trade; although they rarely traveled outside the Empire, they
nonetheless invested significant capital in this lucrative enterprise.”567 This should not be too
surprising after all. Ottomans too, participated in trade within the Mediterranean. The great
Ottoman historian Naimi even acknowledged that “when he concluded political authority,
emaret, as one of three main ways to gain wealth, the other two being agriculture and
commerce.”568 This shows Ottoman cultural inclinations to entering into trade, hence why they
would seek out the Venetians who are known to conduct trade in these waters. In fact, Ottoman
trade within the Mediterranean can be seen as early as 1453 during the conquest of
Constantinople when “Candarli Halil Pasa traded with prominent Venetian merchants
immediately following the cessation of hostilities;’ in fact, he was accused by some to have
favored peace early in order to further his own business interests.569 This demonstrates the
multitude of loyalties within the Ottomans, as this illustrates a high ranking official placing his
individual commercial interests over that of the state to achieve further military gains.
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Another example can be seen in the actions of Ca’fer, an Ottoman citizen living in
Constantinople during the late 16th century. With this example, we can see that the Venetians
worked with certain Ottoman officials to further achieve their goals. Ca’fer was a merchant who
“personally managed his commerce and intervened with Venetian authorities on his own behalf,
he employed a variety of Greek, Muslim, and Jewish agents to carry out the actual trading.”570 In
addition to this, Ca’fer also helped Venice by informimg the bailo “on matters in the divan and
worked to free Venetian slaves and to protect Venice’s interests in the Ottoman Empire, no doubt
to curry favor for his own interests, both political and economic.”571 This is an excellent example
of the Venetian nation working with local elements to achieve gains for their state's greater good
back home in Venice. This bailate truly acted as an arm of commercial and diplomatic interests,
ensuring that Venetians needs are heard and met as far East as Constantinople. This example of
freeing slaves can be seen in Ca’fer’s personal correspondence to bailo Marco Venier, when
Ca’fer writes “‘that [he] had not forgotten [their] friendship and promises’ as Ca’fer divulges his
“efforts to free a number of slaves and his intervention with the kapudanpasa to protect Venetian
territories.”572 This of course was not done out of the generosity of Ca’fer’s heart. Instead, Ca’fer
had a special relationship with the Venetians where he enjoyed special treatment in trade and
conversed with the Doge of Venice personally.573 Utilizing agents of the Ottoman Empire in this
manner manipulates their individual interests to cause multiple loyalties to shift priorities.
Venetians are excellent at this tactic and used the very same when negotiating with the Byzantine
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Empire before their fall. Actions like this in truth are not that uncommon. According to Dursteler,
Ottoman officials “regularly requested special treatment for their goods and agents.”574 If nothing
else, this represents a certain level of comfort and closeness between the two nations. Although,
it is also true that Ottoman official did at times get caught “with contraband, or goods on which
the appropriate duties had been paid.”575 Moments like this had to be handled with care as
commercial actions could have counter diplomatic and political reactions. The fact that the
Venetian State had so much control over commercial transactions would definitely help ensure
caution and the correct handling of events in situations such as this. Dursterler father explains
trade with the Ottomans as:
“Despite such incidents, Venice’s policy was to facilitate all Ottoman trade, regardless of
who brought it to the city. With Ottoman officials this was accomplished by sending
secretaries and dragomans to register their commercial transactions, by providing safeconducts and letters of introduction, and by obtaining a range of special privileges for
them. The policy was maintained in recognition of the reciprocal nature of the
relationship between Ottoman and Venetian officials.”576
The reciprocal nature of these events represents the importance the Ottomans place on the power
of the Venetian commercial trade network. As history progresses through the 16th century
onward, Venetian dominance in the region shrinks with each decade. Yet still, the Ottomans
chose to make their economic relationship on a more even level, which shows the still powerful
economic system that is controlled by the Venetian State. Until the capitulation of the state in
1797, the Serenissima worked toward the restoration of Venice as the “’most favored nation’
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trading status” that the Ottomans took from them.577 They wanted this in order to stay
competitive with the English, French, and Dutch who were all competing with the Venetians in
Constantinople. This goal by the Venetian state set the main objective of the century which
would be to exploit the Ottomans during times of vulnerability toward them in order to regain
their lost possessions from the Turks due to their quest for ever increasing profits and not
because the Ottomans were simply an Eastern and Muslim polity.
Venetians also further their interests with the Ottoman Empire by establishing social and
personal relationships with high ranking, or strategically placed, Ottoman officials. The past
narrative of animosity between these two peoples would reject this statement as contrary to the
manner in which good Christians or Westerners should behave or act. However, Dursteler argues
that despite this view, these types of relationships were possible because “they already had much
in common with numerous others in this society, in which migration and conversion were
common. There was a shared discourse even beyond the migrants and converts, because there
were shared interests.”578 This is a plausible foundation which would provide the Venetians, and
potentially other negotiating city-states to begin to develop relations. This has been seen
historically, most notably by the French and Venetians who both worked and cooperated with the
Ottomans. In fact, most European nations at one point or another had some dealings with the
Ottomans other than war, so the current mantra that this time period saw only animosity between
Muslims and Christians bears little basis in fact. Furthermore, due to the regular contact that
occurred between members of the bailate and Sublime Porte, “it was not uncommon for the baili,
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secretaries, and other official members of the nation and important figures of the Porte to become
friendly, even intimate.”579
An example of this can be seen through the relations of Grand Vizier Mehmed Sokullu
and Bailo Marcantonio Barbaro. These two enjoyed a friendship with one another prior to and
during the Venetian-Ottoman war over Cyprus in the 1570s. When Barbaro was imprisoned
during this war, Sokullu permitted him to visit the baths twice weekly for his health and sent
regularly ‘to inquire about my status, to comfort me that I might be in good spirits.’ Barbaro
wrote, ‘I could not nor would I know how to desire a better disposition from the Magnificent
Pasa, who on many occasions, with me and with others shows himself to be very humane and
affable.’”580 This is an excellent example to show that relations between the Venetians and
Ottomans surpassed political and cultural differences and managed to manifest in physical
relationships between peoples, even when their two states are at war with one another. Although
the opposite is known to occur as well. For those individuals who did not have high status and
good relations with the Ottomans, their treatment during times of war can be quite different.
During the Ottoman-Venetian war that lasted between the years 1463-1479, Crowley, the author
of City of Fortune, states that:
“Venetians within the Ottoman Empire suffered badly. The bailo died in Constantinople
prison; captive soldiers and resident merchants were publicly executed, their bodies left
to rot in the streets. Trade in the Ottoman Empire was dying; commercial establishments
collapsed.”581
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Yet still, the Ottomans understood the importance of the Venetians as well as other city-states in
the Mediterranean. Even after the worst conflicts between these two polities, the Venetians and
Ottomans always seem to maintain some level of relations, and usually one that benefits both
sides economically. This has added to the incentive of not warring between themselves, except
for the exception of Ottoman interest in territorial expansion. The Venetians in particular realized
that they had far more to gain from the Ottomans through cooperation than through
confrontation.
Venetians and Ottomans also interacted through other means than just meeting with high
officials. Mixing occurred at parties, balls, banquets, and taverns; individual Ottomans would
also come to the bailate for a variety of reasons, not just business but also for personal ones as
well.582 It was also important to follow and acknowledge certain Ottoman customs as a way in
which Venetians made connections with the Turks. The bailo Paolo Contarini, for this reason,
valued an open door policy for the bailate “to preserve an honorable reputation in the Porte, it
was necessary to ‘feed whomever desires it; and I can say with truth to have had a continual
tavern in my house, and I very often needed to set three or four tables a day, because in this way
friends are conserved and new ones acquired, and the greatness of this Most Serene Republic is
made known to the world.’”583 This was a public diplomatic move that not only would improve
the attitude of the Sublime Porte to the Venetians but also make the people of Constantinople
favorable to a Venetian presence in the city.
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Subjects of either empire would also use play competing institutions off of one another in
order to achieve some personal gain. Officials would use their position to either help themselves,
their country, or even their friends or family. An excellent example of this involves one Pietro
Fortis, an Ottoman subject living in Istanbul who held the position of Dragoman. Rothman, the
author of Brokering Empire: Trans Imperial Subjects between Venice and Istanbul, reports that:
Pietro Fortis who, unlike previous holders of the position, this Istanbul-born subject
created a trans-imperial dragoman dynasty that bridged Venetian understandings of the
patrimonial state with Ottoman dragomans’ expectations about patrilineal succession in
office. Fortis, his brother Giacomo, and sons Giacomo and Alvise not only resettled in
Venice after two generations in Istanbul but trained in languages from a young age,
specifically in anticipation of their entry into Venetian service as dragomans.584
This shows cultural and institutional mixing between the Venetian and the Ottoman systems and
people, showing a family in Istanbul who is Ottoman, specifically preparing his life and that of
his family member’s lives for Venetian service as Dragomans.
Another two centers of cultural mixings occurred, somewhat surprising for the latter,
through employment but also worship. It is already well known that the Venetian and Ottoman
Empire was comprised of a diverse group of populations. Some Venetians traveled to
Constantinople, found work, and then never returned. Under the terms of their commercial
agreements, Venetian subjects and Ottoman subjects were free to travel to each other’s city,
although with some restrictions at times. This in part revolves around states efforts to curb the
spread of the opposing religion of the city. For example in Venice, the Senate took steps to ensure
that Muslim visitors were not only confined into one area of the city, but that their building was
also crafted in a manner that stemmed the visitors inherent unintentional or intentional spread of
their faith. The Senate passed a law explaining the guidelines and rules for the manner in which
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the Dei Turchi(The Turkish house built in 1621) is to be constructed and operated during the day.
In this bill, the Senate also included:
“Turks who are now in this city, and those who shall in future come to it, must go to live
in the exchange house in full conformity with the decrees of the Senate and with the
Collegio of 2 March last. Nobody, therefore, even if he is a broker of [the Turks], may
give lodgings to Turks in contravention of the said legislation on any pretext whatsoever,
on pain of those fines or corporal punishments that may be deemed appropriate by the
magistrate.”585
This shows yet another example of Venetians placing business and state goals over religion, since
clearly it is unpopular to allow the spread of other faiths, even with the Venetian people. In 1553,
a Venetian diplomat named “Catarino Zeno, visited the Orthodox Monastery of Milesevo and
reported witnessing both Musims and Jews who came to hear prayers read by monks and offered
alms in return.”586 This demonstrates curiosity and the spreading of religious tolerance during a
time in which past historians argued that Christians and Muslims were mostly if not all in
abhorrence of one another. This mixing, both on a religious level and social one, was made
possible because “individual and group identities were composites, constructed of concentric
circles or multiple layers,” meaning that “identity was more than sum total of its various parts: it
was malleable, instrumental, a dynamic process of negotiation rather than a static, essentialized
object.”587 This served as a basis for inviting various cultures, religions and peoples to meet and
find some semblance of common ground to begin further relations.
The Venetian Response to Threats
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Venetians were able to respond to the Ottoman Empire and the overwhelming power of
European alliances by approaching these threats in unique and adaptable strategies that oft times
resulted in favorable outcomes for the city-state. These lessons were learned over the course of
history and through their struggles against Genoa. During her wars with Genoa, Venice utilized a
wide range of military tactics, most notably with shipping and the state organization to help
mobilize and protect their fleets. The Venetian mude is an excellent example of state interference
in Venetian commerce that yielded benefits of protection from pirates and other raiders in the
Mediterranean. The authors of War at Sea in the Middle Ages, explained that:
“In this way it is possible to discern the main lines of power that lead the Republic of
Venice to dominate a large portion of the Mediterranean. The senatorial nobility, uniting
the most important investors and committed merchants in the maritime economy,
patiently forged a tool without equal among the rival nations and competitors: the system
of regular navigation routes plied by convoys of merchants galleys. The modest shipowners, nobles or not, were discouraged by the regulatory and fiscal obstacles that
favored the mude and by the permanent insecurity of sea-borne commerce, but were
powerless to compete efficiently against the mixed private and public management of the
naval potential.”588
The Venetians were problem solvers, who shifted their position in order to survive and
manipulated factors in order to alter the current state of affairs. Towards the end of the 17th
century as Venice maintains a consistent posture of military retreat within the stato de mar, the
mude system, which had been so vital to the lucrative transactions of the state, begins to receive
less and less attention as the system is all together abandoned over time. The Venetian state was
also essential in managing Venetian subjects while they interact with their Ottoman counterparts.
This strategy could and was applied to other European states that posed potential threats to
Venice; yet it can be clearly seen in the Ottoman course of events, due to the fragile position the
Venetians were placed in by the emergence of the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, Venetian officials
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were given strict instructions to not offend or cause conflict with Ottoman officials. Venetian
officials were also known for sending presents to Ottomans upon their initial appointment or for
special occasions in order to garner favor with them. In some ways, and some historians have
argued that “due to the Venetian empire’s pragmatic approach to empire had expanded outward,
encompassing its powerful neighbors as well as it subjects.”589 If one believes this theory or idea,
it would entail that the Venetian empire formed a sort of symbiotic relationship with the Ottoman
Empire, encompassing both polities into one grand commercial network enterprise, which would
explain the economic resurgence of both Empires after the War of Cyprus. In addition, this is
further plausible when examining the Ottoman Empire's position that states “provided the Turks
continued to believe that the Venetians were strong, and the Venetians were prepared to pay
tribute, it did not seem that conflict was inevitable,” and that instead, coexistence was not only
plausible but worthwhile to both parties.590 This is one of the most successful achievements of
the Venetians merchants and diplomats, which is in fact, that the Venetian State cultivated a
thriving merchant class which allowed their diplomatic core to negotiate and become invaluable
to larger states and polities. This same idea could serve as a reason for the outbreak of uprisings
in favor of Venetian rule that spread across the former Terrafirma when the League of Cambrai
conquered the area in the early 16th century. One of the chief reasons for these uprisings was not
only the presence of foreign troops but also the benefits and economic incentives these cities and
towns received under Venetian rule.
On that note, the very creation of the Terrafirma represents a Venetian response to the
perceived threat of the Ottoman Empire, and the fact that the people of Venice wanted to ensure
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that the events surround Chioggia, resulting in the siege of Venice, would never again occur. To
add to this defensive posture, the Venetians cultivated their very own army. By the 1450s, during
times of peace, Venetian maintained a standing army of some 10,000 soldiers.591 In addition,
these forces comprised of a mix of cavalry, infantry, artillery, military engineers (for building
fortifications, bridges, etc.), and river fleets. Of special note to Venice are the infantry and river
fleet units. By 1508, the Venetian Senate decided that “the infantry,” which mostly acted as a
garrison force, “should be essentially a national force…composed of Venetian subjects.”592 This
places Venice in a somewhat different position than other European and Asian armies and many
states of the time started to become increasingly dependent on mercenary armies, which although
saves the lives of your subjects, comes with a slew of potential downfalls and problems that
could result in the loss of the military conflict. Mercenary armies should be avoided, and the
Venetian Senate understood this. The river fleets of Venice acted as an extension of the
Mediterranean fleet, into the Italian mainland by utilizing the various rivers within the mainland.
These river fleets maintained supply lines, contributed to defensive postures, and acted as troop
transports for rapid deployment.593 All in all, the Venetian Empire created an effective land based
military to guard the Terrafirma and to compliment the strength of the stato de mar.
The diplomatic and military options surrounding the Venetian State through the
institutions that this city implemented allowed for a variable and calculated decision making
body to navigate the ever changing and turbulent waters of the Mediterranean for over 1,000
years, from its creation at the end of the 7th century through to its demise at the hands of
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Napoleon in 1797. In a note written is 1618 from the Spanish ambassador, who was living in
Venice, to his King, the ambassador explains:
“Furthermore, it is the most ancient state in Italy today… it has grown so much in the
course of time, through a continual influx of people from every corner, that it has
acquired a vast and spacious empire of great wealth and power, both maritime and
terrestrial. Hence, it can truly be called a great and powerful commonwealth, more amply
endowed with population, weapons, and riches than is any other state in Italy…Let me
only say to Your Majesty that in matters relating to the defense of their processions, in
keeping them supplied with provisions, munitions and victuals for many years, the
Venetians have spared no trouble or expense. Hence they are fully secured against
invasion, especially in Lombardy, where they are well equipped not only to resist, but to
destroy, any powerful army.”594
After more than a thousand years of constant changes in fortuna, environmental disasters, rival
city-states, and menacingly strong and polities endangering the city of Venice, the city-state
turned empire not only survived, but dominated the history of this region for a majority of its
time in existence. Even during the cities decline in the 1600s, this Spanish Ambassador to the
powerful Spanish Empire still describes and represents the power and accomplishments of the
Venetian city-state.
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5 Conclusion
In Fernand Braudel’s now famous characterization, the Mediterranean is a world
“composed of a series of compact, mountainous peninsulas, interrupted by vital plains” and also
there “lie vast, complicated, and fragmented stretches of sea, for the Mediterranean it is not so
much a single entity than a ‘complex of seas.’”595 This is a vast land, home to a vast number of
different environments, and peoples which interact and develop a sense of unity within this
context due to the commercial resurgence after 800 AD. Predrag Matvejevic sees the
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Mediterranean as a locations whose “position and homogeneity of its space make it seem a world
in and of itself or the center of the world.”596
This thesis has been a close case study of specific city-states, focusing on Venice and
Genoa and analyzing their various abilities and actions when dealing with varieties of threats.
Analyzing the Mediterranean serves as a perfect example, as this is a region ripe with both
history, and a plethora of powerful and long lasting city-states intersecting with large polities
which gives us a solid number of centuries in which to study them continuously. My initial
question when starting this venture was: “How do city-states, such as Venice and Genoa, respond
to threats?” This question led to the initial task of identifying exactly what a city-state is, and
both the physical and political characteristics of the city’s founding. As research progressed, this
question eventually evolved into “In what manner did the two most significant Italian maritime
cities choose to react and respond to various threats, including rival city-states, the environment,
and larger states such as empires?” and “What institutions allow for the adaptability of Venice
and Genoa to be able to initiate comprehensive responses that seemingly evolve to accommodate
the specific threat endangering the city?” “Did the two cities manifest fundamental similarities
and or differences?” “Where they able to adapt and be successful by different means?” “Can we
learn about Venetian - Ottoman relations by examining the Venetian-Genoese conflicts during
the 15th century, specifically looking at the War of Chioggia in the 14th century?” These
questions were more specific, allowing for further research into the field. City-states, such as
Venice and Genoa, created and established a variety of political, commercial, and economic
institutions, which although were used for a variety of different purposes, enabled these polities
to rapidly deploy the city’s resources and helped them achieve technological advances that, for
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the most part, only the organized, urban, and industrialized center of a city-state could obtain at
this time.
The most important feature, and the most vulnerable, is the commercial trade that
maritime city-states always take part in. During the period of 800 to 1600 AD, city-states helped,
unintentionally, to reunify the fractured Mediterranean world by creating efficient and farreaching trading networks in order to establish commercial empires in which revenues would
fund and expand the home city’s political, commercial, and military power, not only at home but
also abroad where these trading missions extend too. This risky venture was in part attempted
due to a city-states need to enter into trade in order to expand for monetary reasons, but also,
because of practical purposes, such as keeping the home city’s population fed, ensuring
protection of ships outside of one’s home territory, and also in order to demonstrate and expand a
city’s international clout. When acknowledging these features pertaining to maritime city-states,
it is easy to then see how important overseas trade was for these cities, as successful and
prosperous trade led to enormous wealth and prominence for that city, which would help that
polity survive in the ever changing context of the Mediterranean. However, these ventures came
with considerable risk, posed by other polities, natural disasters, and further unseen fortune that
could alter the fate of any state in the Mediterranean.
Histories of these city-states have shown that successful and significant maritime trade
and monopolization of that trade can lead to significant growth within that city, leading to the
creation of institutions, and thus resulting in a city that has a relatively innate ability to adapt and
respond to opportunities and risk with relative speed and tactfulness, although this quality is not
necessarily innate and is reliant upon certain institutions and traits imposed by the state. This in
part, is a result of the small size allowing for the government and institutions to be more effective
187

at the onset of the Venetian state, which then expanded later encompassing more and more
territory, yet central authority remained within Venice allowing the state to continue to oversee
the affairs of the latter Empire. To further explain this point, most city-states have tended to
materialize in areas of political power vacuums, usually as a result of the collapse and
disintegration of a large state or empire.597 In light of this collapse, some cities may choose to
isolate themselves and choose to rule themselves independently, thus allowing for a people with
a past identity of “greatness”, and at the same time, a new allegiance to a city that does not
necessarily answer to any greater authority. This line of reasoning leads to the creation of a new
unique sense of nationality to not only your home city, but also a greater past unifying the whole
of the city together, and in theory, should at the same time protect against most civil uprisings
since one is creating love for the state (both past and present). To acknowledge a state’s ability to
win over its people also alludes to the fact that that state then has the ability to mobilize its
citizenry by rallying them around their home city. Machiavelli wrote that “princes and
commonwealths that would save themselves from growing corrupted, should before all things
keep uncorrupted the rites and ceremonies of religion, and always hold them in reverence; since
we can have no surer sign of the decay of a province than to see Divine worship held therein in
contempt.”598 These institutions, Machiavelli argues, preserves the integrity and well-being of a
government and state, with the added result of uniting the people under these myths. Therefore,
in light of all this, an effective myth around ones founding can unite a population and invigorate
this small group to achieve what larger states prove unable to accomplish in history. This line of
reasoning is witnessed within both Venice and Genoa, although the Venetian government proves
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to be far more stable over the course of history than that of their Genoese rivals. For example, in
Venice during the 1354 Conspiracy of Marino Falier, the Venetian people and government
officials, some involved in the conspiracy, rallied together to stop this coup attempt by a tyrant as
is stated in the Morosini Codex because “God and the Evangelist St. Mark, who by their divine
grace have never allowed this to happen, nor will they ever allow it, inspired some men who
were in the conspiracy to reveal it, so at one the doge Signoria, as quickly as they could, secured
every entrance of the square, and the doge was brought to justice on the staircase of the palace,
and was at once decapitated.”599
The main, and most notable difference between Venice and Genoa revolved around state
control of commercial and military expeditions. Genoa practiced within a system that did not see
a tremendous amount of state control or interference in Genoese activities. For example, despite
the fact that Genoa had the most powerful merchant marines within the Mediterranean world in
the 14th and 15th centuries, their war fleet was “weak, indeed laughable, in comparison with the
forces of its naval competitors.”600 In addition, the Genoese commune had no effective means for
calling up fleets and processed few state owned galleys throughout their entire history. Most
Genoese vessels were owned by families or individuals, who could place significant sway over
the affairs of the state for that very reason as they had the naval power to carry out tasks for the
state. In addition, the simple fact that multiple families or individuals are making the decisions
based off their military might, alludes to yet another reason as to why there was considerable
unrest in Genoa. Although allowing businesses to operate without government control can allow
for creativity and technological advances, this helps explain why Genoa seemed so incapable of
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keeping extended periods of peace and tranquility without outside help. The result of this is that
the commune of Genoa was consistently weak and resultantly became a dependent state, tossed
between the competing interests of the Hapsburgs and Bourbons, although Genoa did benefit
from the ever expanding frontiers of the Kingdom of Aragon and later the Spanish Empire.601
Venice, on the other hand, possessed a government that practiced a considerable amount
of state control over a variety of different areas, mostly concerning military and commercial
activities along with participation in government. Venetian shipping lanes usually consisted of
Venetian Mude convoys with which the Venetian government would organize to help protect and
control the cities shipping. Participation in the Venetian Mude system was mandatory, thereby
eliminating competition toward the government. This, in fact, made it easier for the Venetian
government to potentially requisition merchant galleys for their use as war ships.602 To add to
this, the Venetian government also had a monopoly on shipbuilding. Once the Arsenal was
created, Venetian ships could only be built within their government owned Arsenals, either
located in Venice or one of her dependent cities within the Stato de mar. Security was still a
concern for Venice; therefore, the city began tactically seizing strategic locations within the
Eastern Mediterranean in order to provide safe ports of harbor for their ships and their allies.
Furthermore, Venetian patrols would protect the Adriatic and parts of the Aegean in order to
eliminate piracy or other enemies of the state. This can be seen by the Venetian government’s
orders to the galley captains to “engage and neutralize pirates, even if it meant diverting from the
planned course,” thus creating a sphere of safety in which their commerce can continue
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unabated.603 Politically, the Venetian government initiated the “Serrata” or “closing” of their
government after opening it to a large group of wealthy and influential Venetian citizens at the
start of the 14th century. This not only enlarged the number of people who could participate, but
also ensured those families security and positions thereby guaranteeing that these families would
be loyal to that government in which they are a part and, will not be working toward the
overthrow of such.
However, both also shared some traits in common. Both cities did not possess a good
location with which to build a port, yet both mobilized for the exploitation of the sea, as this was
a source of protection from land based threats. Both also created institutions for conducting trade
on water through the creation of the Sea Loan and Commenda agreements that allowed more
citizens to participate in trade and at the same time lessening the monetary risks of that cities
people.604 In addition, both Genoa and Venice, along with a good number of Italian city-states in
general, seem to have developed quite a talent concerning negotiations and diplomatic processes
concerning large powerful states and empires. This can be seen most easily through Venice’s
diplomatic events concerning both the Byzantine Empire and Ottoman Empire after the former’s
fall. During the early time of the Republic, Venice’s fortunes were “directly founded on its
Levantine trade, and during the Byzantine Empire’s waning centuries, the city-state emerged as a
dominant European commercial power in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as a significant
political and military force, with colonies and outposts in Dalmatia and the Aegean and Ionian
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islands.”605 Much of the Venetian territorial expansion is due to their participation in the 4th
crusade and the handsome accommodations with which Venice was rewarded for helping to
capture Constantinople from the Byzantines. However, this newly expanded stato de mar also
created a foundation for Venetian diplomatic relations with the soon to be Ottoman Empire. The
Ottoman Sultan viewed the Venetians monopoly on the Levantine trade as a significant threat,
and implemented policies “to weaken Venice’s stranglehold on Levantine commerce;” however,
these policies were not meant to seriously harm Venice or destroy the Republic, as Venice
remained throughout its time to be “among the Ottomans most important international trading
partners.”606 Due to the fact that the Venetians asserted themselves to be one of the most
profitable and important trading partners to possess in the Mediterranean, this allowed for their
diplomats to negotiate with large states that wished to utilize Venetian trade routes and access
their lucrative economic market. Most city-states had excellent economies (although Venice’s
proved to be among the most prosperous), which could help explain and answer the question as
to why large states and Empires were willing to entertain city-state diplomats.
By creating commercial, political, and military institutions, Venice and other city-states
like her, were effective in establishing trade networks across the Mediterranean, in engaging in
successful diplomatic relations with larger states, and were able to attempt risky ventures that
could be debilitating if that venture were to have ended poorly. These institutions created an
environment that allowed for the adaptability and versatility of city-states to react in a wide
range of responses, both diplomatic, and hostile, which were designed to protect the city-states
most vulnerable and important function, overseas trade. City-states have been known to retain
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their identity and their character in which they were originally founded, despite the fact of
whether or not they were fully dependent or had seen multiple attempts at domination by larger
states. Citizens of a city-state will also revolt against a government they feel has become to
tyrannical, or if they feel that that government is no longer functioning or operating effectively.
This is a threat that city-states must face as these revolts have been known to occur during times
of war if the commune is perceived to be responsible for a major defeat or setback.
Venice and Genoa both suffered through the period of economic depression that tested
their institutions and the resolve of their people. These institutions, however, proved mostly
stable as both cities survive this period of economic downturn although both were changed. This
period of economic depression occurred between 1250/1300 AD through 1450 AD according to
Faruk Tabak. Tabak further adds that “During the tumultuous times of this drawn-out downturn,
empires circumscribing the Mediterranean experienced a considerable weakening of their hold
over their territorial processions or a turnabout in the economic fortunes, or worse, both.”607 This
was a difficult time for any polity that was located within the Mediterranean. The Geohistorical
approach that Tabak offers allows us to reexamine the question of city-state actions during this
time as several conditions within the Mediterranean world had changed. Tabak’s work offers an
approach that analyzes the market economy of Europe, and at the same time, includes the notion
of multiple temporalities focuses on mechanisms and gears that shift “habitation cultivation, and
trade within the larger Mediterranean.”608 His framework encompasses and starts with the “little
Ice Age in the late medieval period and ends only with the Victorian Age” which he uses to
“explore a period of sweeping and dramatic structural and environmental change when colder,
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wetter climates transformed the agrarian landscape and a succession of commercial hegemons
made and unmade the Mediterranean’s linkage with global markets.”609 In addition, instead of
keeping with the usual “Clash of Civilizations” theory, which follows along the lines that the
Mediterranean is broken down into distinct regions, where unity is characterized by a multitude
of varying regions with distinct peoples, one can begin to approach this topic in another light. In
other words, by studying certain patterns and polities within these regions, within the larger
Mediterranean context, one can begin to further understand and equate the inter-complexities and
shifts between the peoples and polities that inhabit this world. For example, Tabak engages his
theory of a Geohistorical approach by analyzing the “rivalry of Genoa, the avatar of the Atlantic
system, and the Venetian Republic, the hinge of the Mediterranean-Indian Ocean trade,
established what [he] calls ‘the tempo of change.’”610 The wars of the 13th century had finally
begun to take their toll, the Bubonic plague or “Black Death” strikes Europe in the early 1340s,
in turn devastating Europe by cutting half of its population, and the Bubonic plague is about to
be introduced to the Mediterranean along with a good number of new state actors within this
context such as the Ottoman Empire, the British, and more. However, Tabak states that at the
same time, city-states:
“In contradiction had fared comparatively better during the downturn, partly because of
the disarray in which the monarchies found themselves and principally because of the
opening of the lucrative Central Asian-Mediterranean trade circuit. In fact, the economic
and political resilience the merchant republics exhibited during these taxing times proved
to be one of the main reasons it was under the initiatives and labors of a few and select
city-states, Venice and Genoa at their helm, that the Inner Sea had, by the 1450s, come to
house and integrated and expansive network of production and trade.”611
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It is clear that because of city-states resilient institutions, these entities were enabled to survive
longer than many other large states located in the same area. The Mediterranean is an everchanging region with ‘fortune’ playing a significant role in the state of affairs. A state’s adaptive
ability to understand and confront the concept of fortune, both good and bad, will determine the
effectiveness, resilience, and duration of a state and government. A maritime city-state republic’s
most valued institution is its commercial functions, chiefly, the ability to trade by sea. This is
even more true based off that of Tabak who believes that this institution is one of the main
reasons that Venice and Genoa survived for as long as they did, because it helped them survive
the economic ‘downturn’ that he describes taking place during the 13th, 14th, and 15th centuries.
Since trade was so important and lucrative, city-states consistently sought to enlarge and
broaden their trading empires by establishing monopolies in locations. One side effect of this is
that “by nature, this Seaborne emporium thrived on and further stimulated cross-border flows:
merchants and vessels, crops and goods, currencies and ideas trespassed jurisdictional frontiers
almost casually and on a continual basis despite sporadic wars and the almost ubiquitous
presence of piracy.”612 This brings up the important fact that maritime trade was constantly
threatened and despite being such a beneficial institution, comes with a considerable amount of
risk for those partied with it. As just stated, Piracy, as well as other states, can pose severe risks
to the well-being of crews and merchandise in merchant ships transporting goods. In light of this,
“among the great maritime leaders of Medieval Italy…only Venice organized any significant
part of her merchant marine into a state-run shipping system” to protect from Pirates and raiders,
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although this was not a guarantee that ships would reach their destination as these vessels could
still face problems from storms, disease, and large armadas.613
City-states were also successful diplomatically in their dealings with larger states
including Empires. Genoa and Venice both had to deal with a number of large empires including
Charlemagne’s Empire, the Holy Roman Empire, the Byzantine Empire, and the Ottoman
Empire, to name a few of the prominent ones. This engagement with successful diplomacy could
mean either the acquisition of rights under their authority, independence, trading rights, territory,
or a combination of agreements that could severely hurt or hamper a city-states prowess and
province in their region of influence. Venice is famed for their relationship with not only the
Byzantine Empire, which placed the city on the path to establish a trading maritime empire, but
also with the Ottoman Empire, a powerful Muslim state that rocked the power ratio of the
Mediterranean with its first appearance in the early 1400s. When attempting to engage in
diplomatic relations with a strong potentially threatening empire, Venice chose the path of
initiating “commerce” as the “initial basis of this relationship.”614 For Venice, a Christian state to
attempt to initiate and sustain trade and diplomatic relations with the Ottoman Empire was
severely frowned upon, but was less unheard off after the 11th century, when city-states and
larger states began to look to North Africa, a predominantly Muslim region, to initiate commerce
trade and treaties. This idea of acting based off of one’s personal financial betterment over that
of one’s religion, began to appear more common approaching the 13th century; in fact, acting in
one’s state interests over that of their religion became the norm.
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The attitude in Europe around 1450 was cautious and fearful of the Ottoman threat, as
individuals of the day report believing that the Ottomans “would in inaugurate the last dreadful
days of the world.”615 Dursterler reports that “in the political realm… apparently rigid divisions
between Christian and Muslim states, proved much more pliable than is often acknowledged”
with “Venice finding “little trouble breaking with Christendom to treat with the Ottoman
Empire; indeed the city was famed for the position expressed by the Senate after Lepanto, Prima
semo veneziani, poi cristiani (first we are Venetians, then Christians).”616 The Ottoman Empire,
being within close proximity to Venice’s procession and holdings, served as a direct threat to
their interests. However, instead of engaging in constant military actions to destroy their empire,
the Venetians opted for a substantial peace with diplomatic relations, in which Venice thrived off
of the Sublime Porte. This notion of coexistence is essential to the continuing prominence of
Venice, as they had to manage both times of peace and hostility with the Ottomans, as relations
could be on opposite poles during certain times. Yet still, the Venetians for more than 300 years
engaged in varying degrees of successful diplomacy with the Ottoman Empire, receiving at times
contracts, trade agreements, territory, and more, although Venice at the same time would yield
much to the powerful Turks.
Finally, city-states were increasingly successful in navigating potential risks in order to
bring betterment and riches to the city itself and its people. An excellent example of this, as
previously discussed, is the participation in the Crusades by city-states. Venice and Genoa were
uniquely positioned and able to both build and launch large war fleets with which other
European countries, as well as the actual city-states, sought to use to invade and capture territory
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in the Levant and North Africa. Despite this however, Venice and Genoa chose to focus on
commercial enterprises, instead seeking to make profit from peaceful seas instead of constantly
engaging in naval warfare. This was the case because peace, in this context, was good for
business. During the 4th Crusade when the Venetians and Crusader army scaled “the great walls
of” Constantinople, “the previously impregnable city was taken and sacked in a matter of days”
with the “most obvious beneficiaries” being “the Venetians, who gained control of the trade
routes of Byzantium and could exclude their rivals at will.”617 However, although this appeared
great for the Venetians, this venture was a significant risk for them to undertake as the Byzantine
Empire, although less so in recent years, had been a patron of the city, showering it in riches and
trading privileges in exchange for Venetian services. In defeat, Venice risked not only their
limited resources such as man power, but also potentially permanently destroying this
relationship with Byzantium and further antagonizing an Empire which is positioned next to
Venice itself. Venice found herself in this position in 1378 during the War of Chioggia, which
Venice successfully navigated out of, through the superior naval tactics of the notable Venetian
Admirals Carlo Zeno and Vettor Pisani, who upon entering the battle changed the conditions of
the battle “in such a manner that the sea and rivers which had previously been closed to [The
Venetians] were now open, and now [The Genoese] were at a disadvantage.”618 This in turn, led
to the Venetian quest to establish a land-based empire in Italy, so as never to be surrounded like
that again. These successful risks, along with the reputation of being skilled sailors and
craftsmen, provided a nice international renown and respect for some city-states when European
rulers sought out the expertise of these individuals.
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By offering a close examination of the powers and limitations of a city-state’s
institutions, one can identify a how their perceived response might look when one takes into
consideration that city’s political, commercial, and military institutions, along with the
foundations in which that entire city was founded upon. These factors shed light on that citystate’s overall power and their limitations. After understanding these facts about a city, it
becomes possible to better understand and interpret the reasoning behind state actions and the
factors that come into play, such as ideology, resources, and the possibility of reward.
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